Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Windfarmer]

JK22 skrev (29 minutter siden):

Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn't fix all of Ukraine's issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy.

Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances.

The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine's defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren't just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia's 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity.

The PDA package will also provide other critical ammunition like anti-tank mines and Javelin/TOW ATGMs. Recent Russian advances have demonstrated that increased numbers of FPVs cannot replace artillery, mines, and ATGMs. Russia's assault on Vuhledar in 2023 and Ukraine's offensive last summer demonstrated how effective mines can be for defending forces.

Further deliveries of armored vehicles will also be important. Many Ukrainian brigades don't have sufficient armored vehicles, and combat losses often aren't replaced. This leads to higher casualties. Bradleys are very popular, armored humvees will help, and further M113 would be very useful for CASEVAC.

Air defense is another critical Ukrainian need. Russia has resumed its missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and UMPK glide bombs, which played a key role in Russia's seizure of Avdiivka, are a serious problem. More recently, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft have been operating closer to the front than normal, which indicates a lack of SHORAD and MANPADS.

The USAI package announced today includes Patriot and NASAMS missiles and the PDA included Stinger MANPADS and RIM-7/AIM-9M missiles reportedly for FrankeSAM systems. Stingers could help push Su-25 further from the front line, and Patriots are critical both for defending cities and infrastructure from Russian ballistic missiles and also to counter Russian Su-34 bombers that drop UMPK glide bombs.

The question is whether production of these missiles is sufficient to meet Ukraine's continued air defense needs over time, especially with increased Russian production of Shahed UAS and missiles. F-16 fighters and their airbases will be another priority target for Russian missiles that will require air defense coverage. It also depends how successful the various FrankenSAM programs prove to be.

Manpower has become the most pressing issue though, which was exacerbated by reduced deliveries of ammunition and equipment over the winter. Ukraine's summer offensive primarily culminated when it ran out of infantry, and Ukraine has struggled to replace combat losses since then.

This means that Ukrainian brigades are understrength, and Ukraine lacks sufficient reserves to respond to Russian advances, so units are pulled from one part of the front to attempt to stop advances elsewhere. Ukrainian infantry need to be rotated more often or there will be a growing risk of exhaustion.

Ukraine has passed a new mobilization bill that provides incentives for volunteers and increases the pool of men available to be drafted. Hopefully, this will improve the manpower situation, but it will take time to mobilize and train soldiers/units.

More concerning is that the manpower issue has been known for some time, but has not been fixed. The longer it takes to improve the manpower situation, the less likely it becomes that Ukraine can conduct a offensive in 2025. The new NATO-trained/equipped brigades last summer did not have enough time to train together, and Russian defenses will still be strong. New soldiers/units need to be mobilized to replace current losses and trained for 2025.

At the same time, one of the most important factors in the war last year was that Russia was able to significantly improve its manpower situation, recruiting more than 300,000 volunteers.

It isn't just involuntary mobilized soldiers and prisoners, they are mostly getting volunteers who are willing to go into costly assaults. The quality, of course, varies, but the quantitative advantage is a serious problem.

Without this manpower advantage, Russia's artillery and airpower advantage would not be sufficient for Russia to make gains on the battlefield. The relative manpower situation is likely the most important factor that will determine the war's trajectory, particularly if Russia can sustain recruiting 20-30k a month.

The immediate problem is that Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, and has reached important locations while Ukraine faced ammunition shortages. Russia is bringing up reserves to Chasiv Yar, and will likely soon begin an assault on the city.

Russian forces are also expanding their foothold in Ocheretyne, which threatens Ukrainian positions nearby, and they have advanced into Krasnohrivka and have made recent gains on the Marinka-Novomykhailivka front.

Even with increased ammunition deliveries/expenditure, Ukraine might not be able to hold Chasiv Yar and other of these towns/cities, and Russia faces more favorable terrain once they get past Chasiv Yar, which could lead to an increase in the rate of advance. If Chasiv Yar falls, it will also put Ukrainian positions south of the city at risk. This is true for further Russian advances elsewhere. The delays in aid/mobilization have been costly.

If Ukraine can stabilize the front and fix the manpower situation in 2024 when Russia has a number of advantages, 2025 could be more favorable because Western production capacity will increase and Russian equipment losses could become a greater issue. If the manpower situation does not improve, then the second half of 2024 will likely be more difficult for Ukraine than the first half.

This bill will be vital, but it needs to be part of a broader long-term strategy for Ukraine. Western countries need to consider how to help Ukraine compensate for Russia's current advantages, including increased deliveries of long-range missiles.

Rob Lee har talt; Ukraina har kommet ut i meget seriøse trøbbel pga. mangel på menn og ammunisjon. Demografisk sett hadde Ukraina nådd den kritiske grensen på 250,000 (døde, skadde) - høyere enn dette vil få alvorlige samfunnskonsekvenser og de trenger en halv million nye soldater i 2024 og eventuelt 2025. Det er en million avmønstrede soldater i Ukraina, men de kan ikke settes inn i aktiv tjeneste på nytt, da disse må erstattes. Mange hadde dessuten avmønstret i nyere tid pga. moralfall og ønsker ikke å slåss på nytt, de er i ferd med å komme i den samme stemningen som de franske soldatene under Nivelleoffensiven i 1917, som sluttet med et mytteri. 

De mange opptakene fra Donetskfronten vist at de russiske tapene har kraftig forminsket i de siste uker - i en krig hvor 90 % av tapene skyldes artilleri mener uteblivelse av ukrainsk artilleri at russerne ikke lenge mistet så mange menn som i november-februar. Til gjengjeldelse er de materielle tapene så enormt, at russerne mer og mer fant seg tom for tilgjengelige kjøretøyer, man deretter forsøkt å ta vare på etter best evne. 

Sullivan, Biden, McConnell, Trump og Jackson kan ha kostet oss enhver i slutten, på mer enn et halvt år kan 100,000 soldater ha blitt drept, tatt til fange, skadet og avmønstret sammen med tapet av meget strategiske viktige territorier. Dessuten er det oppstått et stort etterslep som Lee skildrer, som gjør at det kan ta hele året for å returnere til en fordelaktig situasjon på nytt. 

I Kyiv har det blitt klart at Zelenskyjs aggresjonslinje har vist seg altfor kostbart der man hadde gamblet sterkt på motoffensiven, men hans motvilje mot å tappe ut de menneskelige ressursene i en meget blodig krig og Zaluzjnyjs valg av strategi om størst mulig press i bredde for å tappe russerne for menn og våpen skyldes at man hadde vært i troen om at et avgjørende slag og etterfølgende tap for Putin ville tvinge fram politiske innrømmelser. Zaluzjnyj var dessuten ikke, som det var sett i ettertiden, en tilhenger av passiv-defensiv strategi i motsetning til Syrskyj. 

Det har i ettertiden vist seg at man hadde overfokus på Krim-halvøya med sin "strategisk plafring" som så langt har produsert lite annet enn en voksende regningsliste for Putin, som kan betale det samt betale i gull for alle menn som melder seg til krig takket være gulfaraberne og kineserne - (og Vesten) - og selv om raffinerier tas ut, vist det seg at det ikke vil ha rask virkning i det korte løpet. 

Ukraina kan ikke vinne i dette året. Det eneste som da gjenstår, er å selge seg så dyrt som mulig mens NATO går inn for å finne ut hvordan å stanse bruk av vestlige komponenter i russiske systemer og nøytralisere all EW-virksomhet, ettersom det på sikte er en meget stor trussel mot dem om Ukraina taper eller tvinges til kapitulasjon. 

Den politiske ledelsen i Vesten er apekatter med spikepistoler!!!! 

Jeg er ikke helt der.

Denne krigen begynner gradvis å bli følbar for den vestlige og Europeiske identitet.

Til og med Macron begynner nå å bli stor i kjeften.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Australia hoster opp MANPADS. Good on ya mate.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/3-indian-companies-under-us-sanctions-for-illicit-trade-and-ties-with-iran-427171-2024-04-27

3 Indian companies under US sanctions for 'illicit trade' and ties with Iran

The US Department of Treasury, in an official statement, said, “These companies, individuals and vessels have played a central role in facilitating and financing the clandestine sale of Iranian UAVs to Russia’s war in Ukraine.”

 

 

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-construction-of-fortifications-began-in-the-east-of-latvia/

The construction of fortifications began in the east of Latvia

 

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/27/world/europe/china-spies.html?unlocked_article_code=1.nk0.Rl3k.TGh9d0jAPejX

Suddenly, Chinese Spies Seem to Be Popping Up All Over Europe

A flurry of arrests this week reflect the continent’s newly toughened response to Beijing’s espionage activities and political meddling.

 

 

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/31734

Kremlin Troops Dug Into Chornobyl’s Irradiated Dirt, Cooked Food Over Radioactive Campfires, Thousands Exposed

 

 

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/us-army-sends-heavy-equipment-norwegian-arctic-port-narvik-transfer-finland

US Army sends heavy equipment to Norwegian Arctic port of Narvik for transfer to Finland

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/27/elite-force-bucks-trend-of-ukrainian-losses-on-eastern-front

Elite force bucks trend of Ukrainian losses on eastern front

The Azov brigade, which leaders say has a culture of ‘mutual respect’, is tasked with repelling relentless Russian attacks as the invaders make most of artillery mismatch

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/27/7453276/

Ukrainian forces dismiss as fake information about withdrawal of Abrams tanks from battlefield due to drones

The 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade of Ukraine's Armed Forces has dismissed as fake the report by the Associated Press that the Ukrainian Defence Forces have withdrawn US-supplied Abrams tanks from the battlefield due to the threat of Russian drone attacks.

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/alexei-navalny-death-us-intelligence-71bc95b0

Putin Didn’t Directly Order Alexei Navalny’s February Death, U.S. Spy Agencies Find

The finding, which doesn’t absolve the Russian leader of ultimate responsibility, deepens the mystery surrounding the dissident’s death at an Arctic gulag

[Thor.]

Overskrift fra Reddit: Lloyd Austin when asked if Ukraine using ATACAMS on russian territory was a concern, “It’s up to them on how and when to use it and our hopes are they’ll create some pretty good effects”. That smirk though…..

28:00-29:30

[Thor.]

russerne prøver nå å beskytte oljelagre mot droneangrep:

 

 

[Mannen med ljåen]

 

Ukrainsk popmusikk som latterliggjør Z´iske soldater i Ukraina. Det er jo lørdagskveld.

[torbjornen]

Thor. skrev (39 minutter siden):

Overskrift fra Reddit: Lloyd Austin when asked if Ukraine using ATACAMS on russian territory was a concern, “It’s up to them on how and when to use it and our hopes are they’ll create some pretty good effects”. That smirk though…..

28:00-29:30

Dette var på tide!

[bojangles]

2 hours ago, Thor. said:

Overskrift fra Reddit: Lloyd Austin when asked if Ukraine using ATACAMS on russian territory was a concern, “It’s up to them on how and when to use it and our hopes are they’ll create some pretty good effects”. That smirk though…..

Nice!!

Nå må Europa og egentlig alle som støtter Ukraina legge felles press på Olaf Scholz og Tyskland slik at det også kommer Taurus til Ukraina. Det har vel ikke blitt bekreftet fra offentlig hold ennå, men det har vært spekulert i at Macron og Frankrike har donert long range Scalps. 

Det gjenstår fortsatt å få på plass ytterligere luftvern, patriot naturligvis men også prototypen DragonFire fra UK, da dette luftvernet er laser, og bør være svært effektivt mot droner. 

Nå er det naturligvis også nødvendig at det er på plass store nok mengder radar i Ukraina i som kan supplere data fra vestlige AWACS fly som stort sett er på vingene døgnet rundt.

Endret 27. april 2024 av bojangles

[Brother Ursus]

2 hours ago, Mannen med ljåen said:

 

Ukrainsk popmusikk som latterliggjør Z´iske soldater i Ukraina. Det er jo lørdagskveld.

Dette kommer til å trigge rusbottene noe voldsomt... I love it 😄

EDIT: Videoen er over ett år gammel. Hvordan har jeg aldri sett den før??

Endret 27. april 2024 av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/i/eM1JoR/putins-nye-vaapen-i-ukraina

På slagmarken i Ukraina dukker Putins nye våpen opp.

De kalles bare «skilpadde-stridsvognene».

De nye doningene føyer seg inn i våpenkappløpet som pågår mellom Ukraina og Russland, der kampen står om å være ett steg foran motparten.

 

 

Morsomme bilder i artikkelen i det minste

[Mannen med ljåen]

De kalles også blyatmobile, må ikke forveksles med gopniken Boris sin Lada med Adidas-striper.

 

Endret 27. april 2024 av Mannen med ljåen

[torbjornen]

Russarane intensiverer kampane for å prøve å vinne mest mogeleg terreng før ukrainarane får fram ammunisjon og utstyr til fronten. Håpet må vere at tapte soldatar og utstyr kostar russarane for mykje, og at evna til å drive krig blir svakare for kvar dag som går.

[torbjornen]

Sitat

Blyatmobile

A Russian made coffin with wheels typically found in Ukraine in a state of uncontrolled conflagration or similarly destroyed state.

https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Blyatmobile

[bojangles]

 

• Angrep på russiske oljedepot og raffineri
• russerne gjør med oljedepot som med tanks - de beskyttes mot droner med "skilpaddeskall"
•  

[oddeh]

[Kahuna]

Årets seiersparade i Moskva er visst avlyst, som i fjor. Samtidig så postet dagbla en artikkel i går om at russiske tropper inntar Moskva som forberedelse til paraden. Does not compute. Er dagbla på bærtur her eller ligger det noe annet bak?