Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471446/

Hungary's government wants Ukraine to cease fire in Kursk Oblast

Gergely Gulyás, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Prime Minister, has called for a ceasefire in the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Kursk Oblast, Russia.

"Ukraine is no longer just defending itself but is on the offensive. We want a ceasefire and peace," he said.

 

Jævla forrædere. Sånn i tilfelle det fremdeles hersket noen tvil om hvem Ungarn faktisk jobber for.

[Brother Ursus]

https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-has-its-foot-on-gazproms-throat/

Ukraine Has its Foot on Gazprom’s Throat

Sergiy Makogon was CEO of GasTSO of Ukraine (2019-2022) and is an energy expert with extensive experience in the European and Ukrainian gas markets.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

 

As an expert in gas transit and former head of Ukraine’s gas transmission network, I have closely observed decision-making over Gazprom’s continued use of pipelines through Ukraine, especially since Kyiv’s armed forces seized the critical Sudzha gas metering station inside Russia’s Kursk region two weeks ago.

Understanding Gazprom’s approach requires recognition of Sudzha’s strategic significance. It is the only remaining route to deliver gas directly to Europe and became even more crucial after the Yamal and Nord Stream 1 pipelines ceased operations in 2022.

At present, the gas flow through Sudzha is 40-42 million cubic meters per day, making it an indispensable link in the chain of Russian gas exports to Europe. It is even more important to Gazprom, the once money-spinning gas giant financially humbled by the continent’s turn away from Kremlin energy.

Given its importance, the lack of control over Sudzha introduces substantial risks for the Russian company. Gazprom now has no oversight of the metering station where gas flow is measured, creating the risk of third-party interference with metering equipment and preventing Gazprom personnel from performing standard maintenance procedures.

In short, Gazprom can no longer trust the system that proves and details a large part of its exports and therefore its revenues.

The company is also obliged to provide metering documentation to Russian Customs and Fiscal Services so that it can pay tax.

These issues alone could justify the declaration of force majeure and the halting of gas flows, yet Gazprom has not taken this step, leaving analysts and industry experts wondering why.

Since the company’s employees are no longer there, and anyone can interfere with the metering equipment, its executives can no longer rely on the accuracy of the data produced. So why do they persist?

The financial implications for Gazprom are a major factor. The company reported a loss of 0.5tn rubles ($5.4bn) in the first half of 2024 alone, and maintaining $5bn a year in revenue from gas sales to the European Union (EU) is crucial to its balance sheet.

There are no technical alternatives to redirect the gas to other markets and, with every day of transit generating $14m in revenue, it serves as a lifeline for the company.

Gazprom is acutely aware that even a brief interruption in transit could make its customers switch to alternative gas supply routes, potentially permanently. The minimal volatility in EU gas prices in response to the recent Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region suggests the European market is increasingly able to function without Russian gas and Ukrainian transit.

There are also domestic political considerations. Export revenues have provided the primary source of funding for subsidized gas prices to ordinary Russians, and the loss of the European gas market could force the government to increase prices for consumers. That would add to inflation and stoke social tensions.

Outside Russia, the primary recipients of its gas are Slovakia, Austria, and Italy, with Hungary receiving a share indirectly via the Turkstream pipeline since 2021.

The Kremlin needs Gazprom to maintain supplies to pro-Russian Slovakia and Hungary, where it offers cheaper gas as a quid pro quo to politically sympathetic governments. This is a central element of Russian foreign policy as it seeks to split the EU and block military and financial support for Ukraine. Without Russian gas, their leaders would have fewer incentives to support Russian interests.

Maintaining gas transit to the separatist region of Transnistria is also crucial for the Kremlin. Without the provision of free gas, the reintegration of this region with Moldova might become possible.

If Gazprom were to cease transit, it would not only lose revenue from gas sales but also face substantial legal claims from its European customers for failure to deliver. The firm is contractually obliged to provide gas to Slovakia and Austria for its European off-takers, and failure to do so could result in massive claims for damages.

Germany-based Uniper, for example, has already won a $14.5bn arbitration case against Gazprom, with many other claims still pending. Austria’s OMV has a contract extending until 2040, and a claim for non-delivery could amount to billions of dollars. Even Moldova would have legal grounds to sue Gazprom.

Given these considerations, it is likely Gazprom will continue to operate under the current circumstances for as long as possible. However the military and commercial threats of transit interruption remain significant.

Neither Ukraine nor Europe faces substantial risks if the transit were to be interrupted. In fact, it may be more prudent to end it during the summer rather than in January when the demand for gas is at its peak.

[Brother Ursus]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/22/europe/russia-cnn-paton-walsh-investigation-intl/index.html

Russia opens criminal investigation into CNN correspondent for reporting in Ukrainian-occupied Russia

En CNN journalist passerte altså grensen deres "ulovlig". Vi kan ta tilbake CNN-teamet, i gjengjeld mot at dere tar tilbake de flere hundre tusen terroristene dere ulovlig har sendt inn i Ukraina

[Brother Ursus]

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/people-murmansk-are-starting-ask-about-bomb-shelters

People in Murmansk are starting to ask about bomb shelters

The Ukrainian drone attacks on the Kola Peninsula spark fear among Russian northerners.

This week’s drone attack on the Olenya airbase was one of several recent Ukrainian strikes against the far northern Russian region.

Almost at the same time, a big number of drones attacked targets in the Moscow region, as well as more southern regions of Volgograd, Voronezh, Rostov, Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk.

 

Latterlig at folk på Kola og i Murmansk, altså nesten i Nord-Norge og Arktis, må være redde for ukrainske droner. Dette viser hvor totalt russisk luftforsvar har feilet i denne krigen.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471444/

Germany investigating possible Russian involvement in drone flights over nuclear power plant in country's north – Bild

Prosecutors in the northern German city of Brunsbüttel are investigating an incident involving unidentified drones flying over a shutdown nuclear power plant.

Bild reports that since at least 8 August, drones have been flying at high speed over the area where the shutdown nuclear power plant, liquefied natural gas terminal and chemical plants are located in Brunsbüttel.

A drone flying at over 100 km/hour was spotted in the sky above the nuclear power plant late on 20 August. An internal police report stated that "the no-fly zone had been violated several times".

The most recent drone incident occurred on 22 August, prompting police in Schleswig-Holstein, the federal state where the city is located, to put some officers on alert.

Special services believe that the drones over Brunsbüttel may have been launched by Russian agents from ships in the North Sea for sabotage purposes. They suspect the drones are Orlan-10 models, capable of a range of 500-600 kilometres and speeds over 100 km/h.

 

Hvis dette faktisk er russere er det utvilsomt en "advarsel" om hva Russland kan ha intensjoner om å gjøre. Dette er også noe de har drevet med i veldig lang tid, som del av den lenge pågående kalde hybridkrigen, mot Vesten, og ligner det de gjorde i bla. Sverige.

Endret 23. august 2024 av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/37794

OPINION: Russians Hear Polish Language in Kursk Region Once Again – Or Do They?

A video posted on line includes a clip where two Russian women living in the Kursk region saying they were told that Polish mercenaries were fighting for Ukraine.

 

A sign placed on the Ukrainian side at the border with Belarus showing four words that have similarities in Ukrainian, Polish, and Belarusian, but differ from the Russian. Photo: Author

 

Jeg var faktisk ikke klar over at også Belarus har sitt eget språk, eller i det minste en dialekt, som tidvis skiller seg kraftig ut fra russisk.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Modi er antagelig i Ukraina for å forsøke å skaffe seg ukrainsk (og vestlig) våpenteknologi til India.

Ser ikke bort ifra at han også er der for å be om "fredsavtalesamtaler" på vegne av Putler.

[Kjell Iver]

Brother Ursus skrev (1 time siden):

 

Hvordan gikk/går det med den jernbanen de bygger ved Mariupol fra russland? Det var snakk om en hastebygging der for et års tid siden og det kan jo bli stort behov for dette om Ukraina endelig klarer å få has på den broen..?

[Nedward]

Brother Ursus skrev (17 minutter siden):

Jeg var faktisk ikke klar over at også Belarus har sitt eget språk, eller i det minste en dialekt, som tidvis skiller seg kraftig ut fra russisk.

Det har omtrent samme status som ukrainsk har i Ukraina. Det er ikke mye brukt, ikke alle kan det og dagligspråket er helst russisk. Litt usikker på om den prosentvise oppslutningen er større for belarusisk i Belarus enn den er for ukrainsk i Ukraina. Men de to språkene ligger mye nærmere hverandre enn de gjør til russisk. Hva polsk angår, vet jeg ikke. Men det er radikalt forskjellig fra Russisk ihvertfall. De som kan noen av disse slaviske språkene spøker gjerne med at polakker høres ut som slanger når dem prater.

Litt på siden: Jeg hadde før en oppfatning av at litausk og latvisk var enkelt å forstå hvis du kunne et av dem. Det stemmer ikke. Latviere forstår ikke litauere i noen særlig grad. Uten at det hadde så mye med saken å gjøre.

Så russisk har fått status som et fellesspråk i mange av landene bak hjernteppet. Dessverre ofte på bekostning av lokale språk. I noen land har dem klart å holde på språket, mens andre land er språket utrydningstruet. Det gjelder i alle fall Belarus og Ukraina. Usikker på alle stan-landene og Georgia i tidligere Sovjetunionen. 

Jeg tror og håper at krigen kanskje kan føre til en renessanse for de øvrige slaviske språkene som har blitt presset ut av russisk. Spesielt når man ser at for Russland, så er språk=etnisitet. Det er bare en del av det. Men det vil vanskeliggjøre Russlands stadige krav på land, når ingen der snakker språket engang.

Endret 23. august 2024 av Nedward

[bojangles]

 

Endret 23. august 2024 av bojangles

[Tzigana]

Siste gang ukraina angrep flyplassen ved Murmansk var amerikanerne allerede dagen etterpå ute og viste muskler, eller åpnet buksesmekken om man skal bruke andre metaforer. Fløy langs hele vestgrernsen til russland med tente transpondere. Denne screenshot er fra 24.juni 2024. 

Også denne gangen gjør amerikanerne seg synlige. Dette er fra 22.aug. 2024, dagen etter det andre angrepet på flyplassen ved Murmansk.

[Enceladus]

57 minutes ago, bojangles said:

 

Haha! Angrep de virkelig det samme anlegget som har brent nå i snart en uke!? Resultatet var vel så bra og fikk så mye oppmerksomhet at det var verdt å hive mer bensin på bålet da. Fantastisk!

 

 

[Mannen med ljåen]

Uten at jeg har detaljert kunnskap kan jeg anta at brannen ikke var stor nok, og at det var fare for at deler av anlegget kunne reddes. Så de måtte sprenge resten også.

Det er sikkert noen militære planleggere som følger saken nøye, og kontinuerlig vurderer om det er nødvendig å sprenge anlegget fra den andre enden også.

Endret 23. august 2024 av Mannen med ljåen

[bojangles]

 

[bojangles]

Tenk å ha en slik genetisk uflaks i det store lotteriet. Og på toppen være født med for lite forstand til å ta avstand. Da er vel tiktok prins kanskje helt greit?

[Serpentbane]

Nedward skrev (2 timer siden):

Det har omtrent samme status som ukrainsk har i Ukraina. Det er ikke mye brukt, ikke alle kan det og dagligspråket er helst russisk. Litt usikker på om den prosentvise oppslutningen er større for belarusisk i Belarus enn den er for ukrainsk i Ukraina. Men de to språkene ligger mye nærmere hverandre enn de gjør til russisk. Hva polsk angår, vet jeg ikke. Men det er radikalt forskjellig fra Russisk ihvertfall. De som kan noen av disse slaviske språkene spøker gjerne med at polakker høres ut som slanger når dem prater.

Litt på siden: Jeg hadde før en oppfatning av at litausk og latvisk var enkelt å forstå hvis du kunne et av dem. Det stemmer ikke. Latviere forstår ikke litauere i noen særlig grad. Uten at det hadde så mye med saken å gjøre.

Så russisk har fått status som et fellesspråk i mange av landene bak hjernteppet. Dessverre ofte på bekostning av lokale språk. I noen land har dem klart å holde på språket, mens andre land er språket utrydningstruet. Det gjelder i alle fall Belarus og Ukraina. Usikker på alle stan-landene og Georgia i tidligere Sovjetunionen. 

Jeg tror og håper at krigen kanskje kan føre til en renessanse for de øvrige slaviske språkene som har blitt presset ut av russisk. Spesielt når man ser at for Russland, så er språk=etnisitet. Det er bare en del av det. Men det vil vanskeliggjøre Russlands stadige krav på land, når ingen der snakker språket engang.

Hva er dette for no tull?

I undersøkelser omkring hvilke språk folk snakker så bruker 67,7% ukrainsk som primærspråk i Ukraina, og 13,8% snakker russisk som primærspråk. 17,4% bruker både russisk og ukrainsk til daglig der de fleste har en overvekt på russisk. Resten snakker andre språk. Så selv om man legger godviljen til er andelen som snakker russisk som hovedspråk ikke større enn 30%.

Dette står i sterk kontrast til Belarus der hele 70% bruker russisk som primærspråk og litt over 20% bruker belarusisk.

[bojangles]

 

[Sjørøver]

 

Brannen har spredt seg videre.

Angående språk: Kona til en kamerat er fra Belarus. Hun fungere som tolk for ukrainere. Sa at det ble som norsk, svensk og dansk. 

[ambientos]

Sjørøver skrev (20 minutter siden):

 

Brannen har spredt seg videre.

Angående språk: Kona til en kamerat er fra Belarus. Hun fungere som tolk for ukrainere. Sa at det ble som norsk, svensk og dansk. 

Min kone som er ukrainsk og russisk tolk er nok ikke helt enig med henne der.
Større forskjell enn norsk/svensk/dansk men ikke så stor forskjell som norsk og tysk.

Men mange ukrainere kan også russisk så de kan forstår hva som blir sagt.

[bojangles]

 

 

Spoiler

The video provides an in-depth analysis of recent developments in Ukraine's ongoing military operations, particularly focusing on the Kursk direction. Here's a detailed breakdown of the key points discussed:

Ukrainian Military Strategy in Kursk

The video begins by addressing recent developments in the Kursk direction, where Ukrainian forces have made significant progress. After successfully destroying three key bridges over the Seym River, military analysts predict that Ukraine will shift its focus to the western flank of the incursion. This shift aims to tighten control over the newly formed cauldron, where a considerable number of Russian soldiers could become encircled and cut off from retreat. The strategy is designed to capitalize on Ukraine's current momentum, potentially leading to further entrapment and the surrender of Russian forces.

Ukrainian Expansion and Strategic Gains

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced that Ukrainian forces have expanded their control in Kursk, deepening their penetration from 28 to 35 kilometers, now covering approximately 1,250 square kilometers, including 92 settlements. The potential capture of a bridgehead, bordered to the north by the Seym River, could extend this area by an additional 700 square kilometers, significantly bolstering the territory under Ukrainian control.

Destruction of Bridges and Strategic Implications

The video discusses the strategic reasoning behind the staggered destruction of the three bridges over the Seym River. Rather than attacking all the bridges simultaneously, Ukrainian forces destroyed them over several days. This approach was likely intended to offer Russian troops a window to withdraw, thereby minimizing unnecessary Ukrainian losses in battles for these territories. By isolating the cauldron, Ukrainian forces have prioritized cutting off Russian supply lines and creating operational encirclement.

Challenges for Russian Forces

With the bridges destroyed, Russian troops face significant logistical challenges. Some Russian analysts suggest that Russia might attempt to deploy pontoon bridges, small barges, or inflatable boats to overcome these obstacles. However, the area is under close Ukrainian surveillance, and the first Russian pontoon bridges set up north of Glushkovo were quickly destroyed by Ukrainian forces. Satellite imagery and NASA FIRMS data, which tracks thermal anomalies, confirmed these strikes, making the pontoon bridge solution unviable for large-scale logistics.

Ukrainian Tactical Positioning and Advances

The video further analyzes the northeastern section of the targeted 700-square-kilometer area, where Ukrainian forces are intensifying efforts to secure control over Korenevo and surrounding areas, extending up to the Seym River. This strategic positioning aims to establish the river as the natural boundary of Ukrainian-controlled territory. The elevated areas north of the river pose challenges for Ukrainian forces, making it more practical to establish a defensive line along the river while launching attacks from higher ground within Ukrainian territory.

Multi-Vector Approach and Precision Strikes

In the Tiotkino sector, Ukrainian forces have initiated a multi-vector approach to advance on the cauldron. Despite Russian efforts to destroy several bridges across the Seym River to hinder Ukrainian advances, Ukrainian forces have consolidated their positions along the west bank of the river. Geolocated footage shows a MiG-29 fighter jet delivering precision strikes with JDAM-ER guided air bombs, reducing Russian positions to rubble. The use of both American and French glide bombs underscores the meticulous planning behind the Ukrainian offensive in Kursk.

Strategic Outcomes and Future Implications

The sequential destruction of the bridges highlights a strategic decision by the Ukrainian command to maximize territorial gains while minimizing casualties. By isolating the area logistically, Ukrainian forces are setting the stage for concentrated efforts to secure control over it in the coming days and weeks. The Russians, facing increasing difficulties in maintaining supply lines, will struggle to sustain their positions. This approach aligns with the broader objectives of the operation: creating a buffer zone to protect the Sumy region and simultaneously capturing a substantial portion of Russian territory, which could serve as a valuable asset in future negotiations.

Conclusion and Call to Action

The video concludes with a call to support Ukraine and the content creator’s work by purchasing products with Ukrainian symbols from an online store. The narrator thanks viewers for their support and promises more updates in future reports.

 

Endret 23. august 2024 av bojangles