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🟦 TURKEY MOVES TO TRANSFER 70 ATACMS, 12 M270 LAUNCHERS AND TENS OF THOUSANDS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS TO UKRAINE 🇺🇦🇺🇸🇹🇷🚀 A major weapons transfer from Turkey to Ukraine is moving through the formal U.S. approval process, and the scale of it is significant. According to the official U.S. Congressional Record, Turkey is proposing the permanent transfer of 70 M39 ATACMS ballistic missiles to Ukraine. A separate notification covers 12 M270 multiple launch rocket systems, 2,524 M26 rockets equipped with DPICM cluster warheads, and 47,000 M509A1 203mm DPICM artillery shells. One important clarification: this is not confirmation that all of the weapons are already in Ukraine. The transfer has entered the legally required U.S. congressional notification process for the re-export of American-made weapons, with Washington indicating it is prepared to authorize the move once that process is completed. The return of cluster munitions is especially important. The M39 is the original ATACMS variant, with a range of roughly 165 kilometers and a warhead carrying around 950 M74 submunitions. Unlike later unitary-warhead ATACMS designed to strike a single hardened target, the M39 is built to saturate a large area. That makes it particularly dangerous against troop concentrations, parked aircraft, air-defense positions, lightly protected vehicles, logistics areas and other dispersed targets. The same logic applies to the M26 rockets fired from the M270. These rockets disperse DPICM submunitions across a target area rather than relying on a single blast point. Combined with 47,000 203mm cluster artillery shells, Ukraine could be receiving a very substantial new stockpile of weapons designed specifically for destroying concentrations of Russian manpower and equipment. That has real relevance to the battlefield Ukraine is fighting today. Russian forces increasingly avoid the large armored formations seen earlier in the war. Personnel, vehicles and equipment are dispersed through tree lines, staging areas, ruined settlements and rear positions in an attempt to reduce vulnerability to Ukrainian surveillance and precision strikes. Ukrainian drones have become exceptionally good at finding those concentrations. Cluster ammunition gives artillery and rocket forces another way to punish them rapidly once they are located. There is also an important historical element here. When the United States first supplied Ukraine with DPICM ammunition in 2023, one of Washington’s central arguments was that Ukraine urgently needed additional artillery ammunition during a period of severe shell shortages. Kyiv also provided assurances regarding its use, including avoiding populated civilian areas and recording where cluster ammunition was fired because unexploded submunitions can remain dangerous long after a battle ends. Their reappearance now in potentially very large quantities suggests something else is happening as well: older Western and NATO stockpiles are still being searched for weapons Ukraine can use immediately. Instead of waiting years for every new production line to catch up with wartime demand, allied countries are increasingly looking at older systems already sitting in storage and converting them back into usable combat power. The 70 additional ATACMS are important in their own right. Ukraine has previously used cluster-warhead ATACMS to devastating effect against Russian airfields and concentrated military assets. One of their earliest known combat uses against occupied Berdyansk and Luhansk in 2023 destroyed or damaged helicopters and other valuable Russian equipment. And then there is Turkey itself. Ankara has spent the entire war balancing a complicated relationship with Moscow while continuing to support Ukraine in several important military and political areas. A transfer involving dozens of ATACMS, additional M270 launchers and tens of thousands of cluster rounds would go far beyond symbolism. The numbers speak for themselves: 70 ATACMS. 12 M270 launchers. 2,524 cluster rockets. 47,000 cluster artillery shells. If the re-export process is completed without being blocked, Ukraine stands to receive a major package of firepower suited to exactly the kind of attritional battlefield it is fighting now. And after years of watching Ukrainian units ration artillery ammunition, the appearance of tens of thousands of additional heavy rounds is a development worth paying very close attention to. Se mindre

nrk.no

nrk.no

https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-7-2026/

READ 💬: Since the onset of its long-range air campaign in Ukraine, Russia has launched thousands of cruise missiles, suicide drones, and high-speed ballistic rockets against targets across the country. Among these weapons, ballistic missiles present the most dangerous threat because their hypersonic speeds and steep arrival angles leave air defense crews with only seconds to respond. However, sustaining this continuous bombardment has exposed a critical weakness in Moscow's defense industrial base: Russian factories simply cannot manufacture advanced ballistic missiles fast enough to match their firing rate on the battlefield. To keep its long-range strike campaign operating at full intensity, the Kremlin has turned to North Korea for short-range ballistic missiles, primarily the solid-fueled KN-23 and KN-24 systems. Understanding why Moscow depends on these imported weapons reveals the severe pressures facing both Russian military stockpiles and Ukrainian air defenses. The Production Gap in Russian Missile Factories 🔻 At the start of the conflict, Russia relied heavily on its homegrown Iskander-M ballistic missile system. The Iskander is highly accurate and capable of performing evasive maneuvers in flight, making it a primary tool for striking high-value targets. However, building an Iskander requires complex electronics, specialized rocket motors, and strict quality controls. Even with Russian defense plants working in round-the-clock shifts, domestic production yields only a small number of Iskander missiles each month. During periods of heavy bombardment, Russian forces fire missiles much faster than assembly lines can replace them. Without an external source of supply, Russia would have been forced to drastically scale back its ballistic missile strikes to avoid completely draining its strategic reserves. North Korea's High-Volume Alternative 🔻 North Korea offers an immediate solution to Moscow's supply shortage. For decades, Pyongyang built vast underground weapon facilities focused on mass-producing artillery shells and tactical ballistic missiles. North Korean systems like the KN-23 closely resemble the design of the Russian Iskander, carrying heavy warheads over hundreds of miles. Because North Korean designs share similar operational concepts with Russian weapons, Russian launch crews require minimal training to deploy them. Sourcing hundreds of these missiles from Pyongyang provides Russia with a ready-made stockpile that can be plugged directly into existing combat operations. Exhausting Ukrainian Air Defenses 🔻 Beyond filling factory shortfalls, firing North Korean missiles serves a clear tactical purpose: draining Ukrainian air defense stocks. Ballistic missiles travel on high-altitude arcs and descend at extreme velocities. Standard anti-aircraft guns and short-range surface-to-air missiles cannot touch them. Ukraine can only intercept these incoming threats using top-tier defensive systems like the U.S.-made Patriot. Patriot interceptor missiles are extremely expensive and available in limited quantities worldwide. By launching waves of cheaper North Korean missiles alongside its own weapons, Russia forces Ukrainian defenders to expend precious interceptors. Every North Korean missile launched toward a Ukrainian city forces defenders to fire a multi-million-dollar interceptor, rapidly wearing down Ukraine's defensive shield. A Mutually Beneficial Partnership 🔻 This missile trade provides major advantages to both regimes. For Russia, imported missiles sustain a relentless bombardment campaign that would otherwise stall due to domestic production bottlenecks. For North Korea, supplying weapons yields cash, oil, and assistance from Russian engineers to upgrade missile accuracy and guidance systems. Combat testing in Ukraine also gives Pyongyang real-world flight data to refine its weapon designs against modern defense systems. Russia needs North Korean ballistic missiles because domestic factories cannot produce enough precision rockets to sustain a continuous long-range strike campaign. Importing missiles from Pyongyang allows Moscow to maintain relentless pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure while conserving its own high-end weapon stockpiles.

https://www.finansavisen.no/politikk/2026/08/06/8370876/usas-ukraina-samarbeid-er-tilbake-pa-toppniva

https://x.com/Exilenova_plus/status/2085800827176865886

https://x.com/cameron19460429/status/2085403296987234708

https://www.vg.no/nyheter/i/oE1Qyj/ukraina-tom-for-missiler-dramatisk-utvikling

https://euromaidanpress.com/2026/08/06/reuters-the-patriot-deal-trump-denied-is-quietly-still-alive/

Begge deler funker for meg 😋😇

Nei, eg har sett det når knappen var ødelagt/fjernet. Det var kun 2 hull til skruer, ingenting annet.

Det blei spist opp før eg såg posten din 😇 Det var vellykket dette, men kunne fint stått 5 minutter til. Eg hadde på litt flytende melange, buljong og chilisaus etter at eg tok bildet.

VG har fått med seg uttalelsene frå Valerij Zaluzjnyj https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/eks-general-med-nato-advarsel/84987027