Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

6 hours ago, Homba said:

Skjønner at du synes det er vondt å få høre om utviklingen på fronten, men det er ganske pinlig for din del at du igjen angriper JK22 mens du lar alt annet som postes i denne tråden gli forbi. 

https://www.abcnyheter.no/nyheter/verden/2024/08/20/196023327/professor-og-tenketank-advarer-zelenskyj-kan-ha-gatt-i-putins-felle

Forøvrig skikkelig 5D-sjakk om planen hans var å vinne krigen ved å bli invandert for første gang siden WWII, ydmyke seg selv og la tusener av vernepliktige som er både verdifulle og et uhyre sensitivt tema i Russland, bli tatt til fange eller drept.

Selv ikke Budanov ville se den komme

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/zelenskiy-ukraine-controls-92-settlements-russias-kursk-region-2024-08-19/

Zelenskiy: if Ukraine could strike deep in Russia, no need for Kursk incursion

President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said Ukrainian forces captured more than 1,250 square km (480 square miles) in a "defensive operation" in Russia's Kursk region and urged allies to allow Western weapons strikes deep inside the country.

"The naive, illusory concept of so-called red lines regarding Russia, which dominated the assessment of the war by some partners, has crumbled apart in these days somewhere near Sudzha," he said, referring to the border town currently under Kyiv's control.

 

Ukrainian troops have taken a total of 92 settlements, he added in an address to ambassadors published on the Telegram messaging platform.

 

"If our partners lifted current restrictions on the use of weapons on Russian territory, we wouldn’t need to physically enter the Kursk region," Zelenskiy said, citing the need to protect Ukrainian border communities.

[Kjell Iver]

Brother Ursus skrev (12 minutter siden):

 

 

Skjønner ikke helt.

Tidligere var det snakk om 700 som kunne bli omringet, men så ble det nevnt at elven var så smal at de bare kunne svømme over. Nå er det plutselig blitt 3000 som kan bli omringet...? Har de bare sittet der nå i snart 2 uker..? Virker helt uforståelig..

Så er det en Julian fra Bild som poster dette på twitter med henvisning til Bild med denne posten. Regner med de mener bladet Bild - og ikke "bildeanalysere"..

 

 

[bojangles]

 

[Brother Ursus]

Just now, Kjell Iver said:

Skjønner ikke helt.

Tidligere var det snakk om 700 som kunne bli omringet, men så ble det nevnt at elven var så smal at de bare kunne svømme over. Nå er det plutselig blitt 3000 som kan bli omringet...? Har de bare sittet der nå i snart 2 uker..? Virker helt uforståelig..

Så er det en Julian fra Bild som poster dette på twitter med henvisning til Bild med denne posten. Regner med de mener bladet Bild - og ikke "bildeanalysere"..

 

Ikke jeg heller, for det var meldt allerede for et par dager siden at nesten alle hadde kommet seg over elven, dog uten en del utstyr. Men vi får tro og håpe at Bild har en brukbar kilde for å hevde noe slikt.

[bojangles]

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/putin-orders-ukrainian-forces-to-be-pushed-1724143578.html

Putin orders Ukrainian forces to be pushed out of Kursk region by October 1

 

 

https://www.uawire.org/Contents/Item/Display/30695

Mongolia rejects 'Power of Siberia-2' gas pipeline, deals major blow to Russia's energy ambitions

 

 

https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-ato/3896523-russia-redeploys-5000-troops-to-kursk-region-isw.html

Russia redeploys 5,000 troops to Kursk region - ISW

 

 

https://www.politico.eu/article/putins-adversity-problem/

Putin is paralyzed in crisis – again

As Ukraine awaits a response to its Kursk invasion, the Russian leader is once again demonstrating he has an adversity problem.

Ukrainian military officials are perplexed. They’d expected a bigger and much more ferocious pushback to their surprise incursion into the Kursk region of Russia. And despite Kremlin-controlled media’s claims of successful resistance, there’s little evidence of this so far. But why?

 

 

https://united24media.com/latest-news/russian-soldier-defects-to-ukraine-after-sabotaging-storm-z-battalion-headquarters-1843

Russian Soldier Defects to Ukraine After Sabotaging 'Storm Z' Battalion Headquarters

 

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[N-4K0]

Herlig, elsker nyheter om RU soldater som deserterer til Ukraina  

[bojangles]

 

Chatgpt sammendrag:

Spoiler

Ukrainske styrker har ødelagt tre strategisk viktige broer over San-elven i Kursk-regionen, noe som isolerer russiske styrker sør i området fra forsyningslinjer. Denne aksjonen speiler situasjonen i Kherson, der ukrainske styrker blokkerte russiske retretter med lignende metoder. Ukraina forbereder seg nå på å angripe Korenevo, en viktig by som kan åpne veien til videre fremrykking i regionen.

I tillegg har Belarus økt sin militære tilstedeværelse ved grensen til Ukraina, trolig for å tvinge Ukraina til å omdirigere styrker fra frontlinjen. Belarus fungerer i tandem med Russland, men det er usikkert om de vil gå til direkte angrep.

Russland har reagert på presset i Kursk ved å øke sitt troppeantall i regionen. Kreml planlegger å utvide sin styrke til 800 000 soldater, inkludert 300 000 nye vernepliktige, som signaliserer en kommende mobilisering. Dette er et forsøk på å styrke forsvaret mot den ukrainske fremrykningen, men det er tvil om effektiviteten til de nye rekrutteringene, mange av dem unge og uerfarne.

Til tross for presset på flere fronter, har Ukraina allerede sikret kontroll over flere landsbyer nær Korenevo og fortsetter å utvide sitt territoriale fotavtrykk. Dette fremrykningen kombineres med ødeleggelsen av pontongbroer som Russland har forsøkt å bygge for å erstatte de tapte krysningspunktene, ytterligere svekkende russisk logistikk.

Det er også rapporter om at russiske soldater i området blir stadig mer demoraliserte, med mange som frykter at de vil møte en skjebne lik den russiske hæren opplevde i Kherson, hvor forsyningslinjer ble kuttet og retrietter ble umulige

 

[Mannen med ljåen]

https://www.dagbladet.no/nyheter/putin-bonn-hort-frir-til-verdiflyktninger/81821440

Sitat

Kan du ikke fordra vestlige verdier som frihet, likeverd og ytringsfrihet, åpner krigerpresident Vladimir Putin dørene for deg...

President Putin har utstedt en presidentordre som skal gjøre det lettere for vestlige «verdiflyktninger» å få midlertidig opphold i Russland.

Høres ut som om han kan inngå en avtale med Belarus, de har hentet en del ikke-vestlige asylsøkere som vil til Polen. 

Putin vil ta imot folk som hater Vesten, men de må altså ha vestlig opprinnelse. Hmmm.

Endret 20. august 2024 av Mannen med ljåen

[Brother Ursus]

Mange av disse "verdiflyktningene" er regelrett kriminelle. Ofte av verste sort. Flere pedofildømte amerikanske tidligere soldater har forrådt landet sitt, blant annet. Leste senest om sistemann i dag.

[Brother Ursus]

https://fortune.com/europe/2024/08/19/an-economic-catastrophe-is-lurking-beneath-russias-gdp-growth-as-putin-throws-everything-into-the-fireplace/

An economic catastrophe is lurking beneath Russia’s GDP growth as Putin ‘throws everything into the fireplace’

Even as Ukrainian advances in the Kursk region pierce Russia’s aura of military invincibility, resurgent cynics have painted an unrealistically optimistic picture of a supposedly resilient Russian economy despite sanctions and the exit of over 1,000 global multinational corporations.

This misleading narrative attributes Russia’s apparent economic continuity to aggressive government spending and efforts to shield the population from restrictive monetary policies through extreme fiscal stimulus. However, this rosy outlook is fundamentally flawed, except for one crucial observation: Russia is indeed engaged in unsustainable spending practices.

The reality of Russia’s economic situation is far more complex and concerning than some would have you believe. The productive core of the Russian economy has been severely compromised, with the government’s spending spree bearing a striking resemblance to Keynes’ famous metaphor of digging trenches and filling them with dirt—a superficial attempt to prop up GDP figures without creating genuine economic value, improving the lives of the Russian people, or improving Russian productivity. Financial, production, and human resources have been redirected en masse to the defense sector, leaving the civilian sector struggling to meet growing consumer demand. This imbalance—cannibalizing the rest of the Russian economy to fund Putin’s war—has fueled inflation, further exacerbated by the depreciation of the ruble and rising import costs.

Simply put, Putin’s administration has prioritized military production over all else in the economy, at substantial cost. While the defense industry expands, Russian consumers are increasingly burdened with debt, potentially setting the stage for a looming crisis. The excessive focus on military spending is crowding out productive investments in other sectors of the economy, stifling long-term growth prospects and innovation.

It’s crucial to approach Russian economic data with skepticism. As we’ve repeatedly highlighted, the country’s statistical services have a documented history of distorting economic indicators, making it challenging to accurately assess the true state of the economy. In light of these factors, the apparent resilience of the Russian economy is more illusion than reality, especially on the following key fronts.

Mortgaging the future to pay for Putin’s war today

Despite increases in Russian budget revenues, mostly the result of a devalued ruble, continuously growing inflation (hence growing revenues from sales tax), and new levies and taxes all over the economy: a rise in the excise duty on cigarettes and cars, a windfall tax on the metallurgical and fertilizer sector, a tax on the sale of Russian assets by Western companies, and many more—the Russian budget still finds itself running a 2% deficit of GDP, which is significant by Russian standards. Russia is fast running through the reserves that it accumulated over the 2000s and 2010s—or at least the half that is not frozen in the West and being repurposed to help Ukraine by the G7 governments. Today, the total distributable liquid assets remaining in Russia are just short of $100 billion. Putin’s cronies point to sizable yuan-denominated holdings stored with the Chinese Central Bank, ignoring the unenviable reality that this means China holds disproportionate sway over the future of Russian finances.

The biggest revenue item for Russia has always been oil and gas sector proceeds, which constitute one-third of the total budget revenues. The only reason why we see these revenues growing (still below expectations) is due to significantly higher taxes imposed on oil and gas producers, which cannibalizes their productive assets and impedes their ability to reinvest in future production, mortgaging the future to pay for Putin’s war today.

Russia has implemented a mineral extraction tax on its oil and gas giants and increased the corporate tax rate for Novatek, its only LNG producer, from 20% to 34%, while increasing the overall corporate tax rate by 25% across the board effective January 2025. Measures like these, paired with Western sanctions and the voluntary withdrawal of global multinational businesses, stifle investment critical to the future of the Russian economy. Moreover, key development projects such as Arctic LNG-2 have been brought to a halt due to the exit of companies like Linde, Baker Hughes, and Technip, along with sweeping U.S. sanctions.

Over the past months, Russian crude has been trading at an average $10 discount compared to benchmark Brent oil prices, and natural gas prices returned largely to depressed pre-war levels, as we clearly see reflected in the poor economic performance of the Russian state giants. Gazprom’s net loss amounted to 480.6 billion rubles for the period from January to June 2024, compared to a net loss of 255 billion rubles in the same period last year—a record for poor performance. Additionally, the net sales of foreign currencies by the largest exporters fell to $11.5 billion in July from $14.5 billion in June.

The only reason why the budget revenues continue to increase is because of harmful inflation and the overall labor shortage in Russia—partially thanks to the exodus of millions of educated Russian workers following Putin’s invasion—which translates to insatiable wage pressure and spikes in the prices of manufactured goods. Russia is bleeding dry its private sector, which has a hard time competing against the defense sector wages. None of that is sustainable in the longer term. The Russian budget is effectively an act of desperation in wartime. Putin is throwing everything into the fireplace—and it’s completely unsustainable.

The Kremlin is forcing the increasingly heavy costs of its war on the Russian population

The Kremlin’s approach to social welfare and resource allocation during wartime reveals a stark contrast between military spending and civilian welfare. While the government has poured an estimated 2.75 to 3 trillion rubles (equivalent to 1.4-1.6% of Russia’s expected GDP in 2024) into payments for soldiers, the wounded, and families of the deceased, the civilian population faces a different reality. These military payments, amounting to 3.4-3.7% of all consumer spending by Russians in 2023, have further increased inflationary pressures. However, Russia’s war Keynesianism masks the true wretched state of welfare for the broader population. Announced increases in pensions and public sector salaries often fail to materialize, with public sector salary increases implemented in merely 13% of Russian regions, despite Putin’s decrees—exposing a huge gap between propaganda and reality.

The methodology for calculating these salaries is manipulated through procedural tricks, such as reducing employee numbers through sleight of hand. Consequently, 60% of Russian physicians report that their salaries are insufficient to meet basic needs, with 80% working multiple jobs to make ends meet. Meanwhile, Russia has experienced a massive brain drain, losing over a million highly educated individuals, 86% of whom are under the age of 45 and 80% college degree holders, according to a French Institute of International Relations report.

Notwithstanding the political repressions imposed by the Kremlin, there is a strong economic rationale for this dramatic talent flight. IT workers’ salaries in Russia have decreased by 15-25% in 2024, down to 150,000 rubles, driven in part by the exodus of global multinational companies from the country.

The redistribution of welfare is clearly targeted, prioritizing military expenditures over civilian needs and effectively shifting the economic burden of the war onto the broader Russian population while creating an illusion of economic stability through military spending for a tiny subsection of beneficiaries.

Unsustainable monetary policy and trade weakness are revealing structural flaws in Russia’s economy

The inflationary pressures on the Russian economy remain high, despite the Russian Central Bank setting an interest rate of 18%. An annualized rate of price increases from May to July stands at 10%, driven significantly by war spending. This economic militarization is accelerating inflation in a fundamental way: increased production of military goods boosts employment and wages, but the resulting surge in demand isn’t matched by a corresponding increase in consumer goods production. Normally, such an imbalance would be offset by increased imports. Under current conditions, this correction isn’t occurring. In fact, according to the Russian Central Bank’s preliminary estimate, imports in May 2024 were 10% lower than in May 2023, exacerbating the supply-demand mismatch.

The business environment is rapidly deteriorating, with the Russian Central Bank’s assessment showing an almost crisis-like 4.75-point monthly decline. Labor shortages are driving unsustainable wage growth, especially in the military-industrial complex, creating an inflationary wage spiral. While seemingly positive for workers, wage growth is outpacing the minimal productivity gains in Russia while fueling further inflation, which is borne by those very workers as they live their everyday lives. Russian businesses, having levered up in expectation of rate cuts, now face a harsh reality in an increasingly closed economy where such cuts are unlikely. The increase in output is not structural but driven by idiosyncrasies such as the completion of large metalworking orders, predominantly concentrated in the state-controlled armaments industry. All these factors combine to create a self-reinforcing cycle of inflation and economic instability, pointing towards an impending downturn and threatening to destabilize the entire economic structure.

The notion that increased interest rates will attract Indian and Chinese investors to Russia is also fundamentally flawed. In reality, Russian treasuries have become toxic assets, and the country teeters on the brink of financial insolvency. The country has become completely cut off from global financial markets and pools of capital. Simply put, no investor from anywhere in the world wants to purchase Russian securities. The only buyers of Russian sovereign bonds at scale are Russian financial institutions, making it impossible for Russia to finance its large deficits. Furthermore, it has become impossible for Russian companies to tap into global debt or equity markets to raise desperately needed funds. The idea that ruble-yuan transactions could form the foundation of a new, non-dollar financial world order, as many Putin cronies optimistically predict, is laughable, with a vast majority of global trade transacted in the dollar.

Moreover, China is not helping Russia financially, contrary to popular belief and no matter whatever political rhetoric the two countries may engage in. The stark disparity in interest rates between Russia and China illustrates the misalignment of their economies. While the interest rate on overnight yuan transactions in Russia hovers near 20%, Chinese banks lend to each other at rates closer to 2%. This gulf in lending rates represents a fundamental disconnect between the two economies. Furthermore, the fact that 80% of Russia’s yuan transactions are being reversed due to fears of secondary sanctions from Chinese financial institutions underscores the reluctance of these institutions to engage with Russia. Even direct commodity payments, traditionally a staple of Russian-Chinese trade, are being frozen, according to Bloomberg reports. This paints a clear picture: Chinese financial institutions are unwilling to lend to Russia, effectively isolating it from a key potential ally, out of their own pragmatic financial self-interest, regardless of the rhetoric of political leaders.

Similarly, the hope of Putin’s cronies that investors from India and China would seamlessly replace Western oil and gas companies in Russia has also proven to be unrealistic. Indian investment in Russia has stagnated and totaled a mere $14 bln by the end of 2023, close to pre-war levels, while the overall value of greenfield foreign direct investments from all countries decreased from $14.9 bln in 2021 to a meager $300 million in 2022.

The current climate of fear surrounding secondary sanctions and stringent wartime regulations has deterred significant investment out of pure financial self-interest. Even Chinese companies that had previously shown interest, such as Sinopec, have suspended operations and investment talks in Russia.

The forced pivot to Chinese technology has also proven costly for Russia. Novatek, for instance, reported a staggering $4 billion increase in capital expenditures for its Arctic LNG-2 project, attributed to the necessity of replacing Western equipment with Chinese alternatives.

It appears that China, India, and other Global South nations are more interested in buying discounted Russian energy than in making substantial investments in the country’s economy. Russians themselves were not capable of filling the economic niches left by the 1,000 multinationals with combined assets of over $220 billion that curtailed their operations in Russia.

For all the government spending, the rest of the economy is stagnant. The contribution of import substitution schemes to economic growth remains modest at best. Every Russian company that has tried to step into the vacated footsteps of Western predecessors still lacks crucial know-how and access to capital, being completely cut off from global capital markets. And Western pundits don’t understand that oil is now being sold at breakeven prices given Russia’s highly inefficient production costs and high transportation costs to its now-more-distant customers while natural gas remains virtually unsold.

The financial strain is not limited to cross-border trade and investment—it’s increasingly evident in the domestic credit market as well. Russians are facing growing difficulties in obtaining personal loans, a trend that signals deepening economic troubles at the household level. In July, the approval rate for unsecured consumer loan applications plummeted to a year-to-date low of 36%, down from 41% in June. This means that nearly two-thirds of Russians seeking cash loans are being turned away empty-handed, a stark indication of the tightening lending policies of Russian banks.

In conclusion, the apparent resilience of the Russian economy is largely illusory, built on a precarious foundation of unsustainable government spending and short-term market factors. The recent ostensible growth spurt masks deep-seated structural weaknesses. As unsustainable stimulus inevitably fades, Russia faces an unenviable perfect storm of challenges: the exhaustion of foreign exchange reserves, an irreversibly strained labor market, rising inflation outside the control of the central bank, and the heavy burden of military expenditures for years to come.

The government’s approach has redirected resources away from productive sectors, cannibalizing the rest of the Russian economy to fund Putin’s war and stifling long-term growth prospects and innovation. With the economy having absorbed the wartime stimulus through credit expansion and increased investment into the defense industry, it now stands at a precipice. A significant economic slowdown or recession appears not just possible but increasingly probable.

Russia is set on a long-term trajectory of structural challenges under the weight of sanctions and elevated government spending—and the true cost of its economic policies is becoming ever more apparent. A looming economic catastrophe driven by the fundamental flaws in Russia’s current strategy will likely set the stage for severe long-term consequences that will play out in the years ahead.

 

Lang og god kommentar av flere karer jeg har veldig sansen for, bla. Sonnenfeld og Åslund.

Russerne spiller whack-a-mole med økonomien sin. Når én muldvarp blir banket ned, så dukker en annen opp.

Oljeprisen er forøvrig også massivt på vei nedover om dagen. Bensinprisen i Norge i dag var rundt 16kr for diesel på det billigste.

[Sjørøver]

Sjørøver skrev (På 18.8.2024 den 7:19 AM):

De får servert et helt annet verdensbilde på skolen. Historien de blir lært er også annerledes. 

Kan utdype litt. De fleste trodde at vi(vesten) var sjalu på Russland og friheten de hadde der før de reiste ut av landet. De er også veldig bitre på andre verdenskrig, som de kaller for den store krigen. De mener de fortjener mye mer skryt for bidraget sitt. 

 

Jeg hadde også ett innlegg om behandlingen av vernepliktige i russland tidligere. Under er det en film av en russisk soldat som dreper sine egne for de blir behandlet så dårlig. All infoen finnes her:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1825452740501282870.html

 

 

Endret 20. august 2024 av Sjørøver

[Enceladus]

Ny Jake Broe fundraiser. Jeg donerte litt. Blir spennende å se om han når målet på $1,000,000 denne gangen også.

 

[bojangles]

 

chatgpt sammendrag:

Spoiler

Ukraine's Encirclement Strategy: Ukraine is advancing its offensive along the Seym River in Kursk, Russia. With the destruction of two bridges and severe damage to a third, Ukrainian forces are attempting to encircle Russian troops. The goal is to trap Russian forces by cutting off their supply lines, similar to Ukraine's 2022 strategy in Kherson. The Seym River, though narrower than the Dnipro, poses a significant challenge to Russian efforts to reinforce or resupply their troops via pontoon bridges.

Comparison to Kherson, 2022: The video compares the current situation in Kursk with the 2022 Kherson offensive. In Kherson, Ukraine's use of HIMARS to destroy key bridges eventually forced Russian troops to withdraw, despite Kherson's formal annexation by Russia. The Kursk operation, however, differs in scale and population, with only 700-800 Russian troops at risk of encirclement compared to Kherson’s 30,000.

Challenges Facing Russian Forces: Russian forces face difficulties due to the smaller scale and rapid pace of the Kursk offensive. The video highlights the logistical and strategic challenges Russia faces, including the reliance on conscripts who may not be motivated to fight. Additionally, Ukraine's destruction of infrastructure complicates Russia’s ability to supply its forces, further hampering their defensive efforts.

Ukraine's Strategy Adjustments: Ukraine is focusing on reaching the river to establish a defensive boundary, allowing them to redeploy troops elsewhere. The offensive has shifted from a direct northern push to a more strategic east-west expansion, minimizing the need for additional defensive lines. The strategy also aims to exploit Russia’s limited ability to reinforce and resupply, especially with conscripts who cannot be redeployed to the Eastern front.

Political Implications: The video discusses the potential political fallout in Moscow due to the capture of Russian conscripts, who are seen as more politically sensitive than regular soldiers. This situation could lead to increased pressure on the Kremlin to negotiate prisoner exchanges, though Ukraine may use this leverage to extract better terms.

Conclusion: The video concludes by noting that the success of Ukraine’s Kursk offensive could mitigate concerns about manpower shortages elsewhere on the front, provided the conscripts do not attempt to retake lost territory. The potential impact on the broader war effort and the possibility of further Ukrainian incursions into Russian territory are also highlighted

 

[qualbeen]

Sjørøver skrev (58 minutter siden):

Kan utdype litt. De fleste trodde at vi(vesten) var sjalu på Russland og friheten de hadde der før de reiste ut av landet. De er også veldig bitre på andre verdenskrig, som de kaller for den store krigen. De mener de fortjener mye mer skryt for bidraget sitt.

Jeg er tidels enig i at vi (Vesten) ikke er flinke nok til å anerkjenne Russlands ekstreme innsats under andre verdenskrig. 

De var en svært viktig alliert, og resultatet av WWII kunne vært helt annerledes, dersom de ikke hadde bidratt. (Gjelder forsåvidt USA, England og flere andre, da!)

Jeg mistenker at Sovjet sin innsats druknet litt i alt rabaldere som skjedde i etterkant? Da de like gjerne annekterte halve Tyskland, og fortsatte med dette i mange mange tiår..! Hadde Sovjet valgt en annen strategi her, hadde vi kanskje husket de for sine viktige bidrag. I stedet husker vi de for den kalde krigen, og hvordan de iherdig prøvde å etablere et velfungerende kommunistisk system i Øst-Tyskland (spoiler alert: it did not work!)

Hvis vi spoler tilbake til krigen, synes jeg at jeg selv fikk alt for dårlig opplæring på skolen. Det var mye fokus på hvordan krigen påvirket lille Norge, kongens flukt, samt motstandsbevegelse, oppbygging av Norge i etterkant, etc., og fint nok det. Men på min skole var det samtidig alt for lite fokus på hva som skjedde utenfor Norge. Hvem andre som bidro, etc. (At befolkningen var litt delt, og at flere nordmenn tok nazistenes side, ble hysjet kraftig ned!)

Hadde jeg ikke fått bedre innsikt enn ungdomsskole-historieboka, er jeg redd jeg kunne ha trodd at Norge snudde krigen omtrent alene. At gutta på skauen var utslagsgivende, liksom ... 😅

Heldigvis vet jeg bedre nå. Og jeg har ikke glemt russernes innsats. Samtidig har jeg ikke glemt all dritten de kommer med i andre sammenhenger, da! 😳

[bojangles]

7 minutes ago, qualbeen said:

Heldigvis vet jeg bedre nå. Og jeg har ikke glemt russernes innsats. Samtidig har jeg ikke glemt all dritten de kommer med i andre sammenhenger, da! 😳

Noe som jeg tenker har hatt lite fokus er hvordan sovjet kunne bidra - pga støtte fra vesten. Våpen, drivstoff, osv osv. Men viktigere enn det er jo at sovjet hadde en stygg plan før hitler dolket dem i ryggen der sovjet og hitler skulle dele frie land. 

[bojangles]

 

Spoiler

Introduction: The podcast starts with updates on the situation in Ukraine, specifically the Kursk offensive, and explores the political implications of prisoner of war exchanges involving Azov fighters.

Battlefront Updates:

• Ukrainian forces continue to advance in Kursk Oblast, targeting the Seym River to trap Russian troops between the river and the border.
• Bridges have been destroyed or rendered inoperable, isolating around 3,000 Russian troops in a pocket south of the river.
• Russia is attempting to build pontoon bridges, but Ukraine is targeting and destroying them with drones and artillery.

Russian and Ukrainian Military Movements:

• The Russian MOD claims to have attacked Ukrainian forces near Vishva, showing how far Ukraine has advanced.
• Ukrainian forces are aiming to close the pocket, trapping Russian soldiers, while Russia is bringing in additional troops, some of whom are less capable conscripts.
• The Institute for the Study of War reports increasing Russian casualties, with families of conscripts protesting their deployment in Kursk.

Domestic and International Political Developments:

• Ukrainian Parliament has passed a law effectively banning the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, with concerns over potential backlash, particularly from U.S. figures.
• President Zelensky’s strategy is seen as a high-risk maneuver to gain military and political leverage before upcoming U.S. elections.
• Zelensky is pushing for long-range missile strikes on Russian territory, and prisoner exchanges are also politically significant, particularly concerning the Azov fighters.

International Reactions:

• Russia continues to rule out peace talks, stating they are inappropriate while Ukrainian troops are on Russian soil.
• Meanwhile, Western countries like Sweden express strong support for Ukraine, emphasizing the unrestricted use of supplied weapons.

Sanctions and Economic Impact:

• Discussions about the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia reveal significant loopholes, with goods reaching Russia through third countries like Kazakhstan.
• The UK is praised for its stringent controls on exports to Russia via third countries, setting an example for the EU.

Political Implications in Ukraine:

• Tensions within the Ukrainian Parliament are highlighted, with frustrations over postponed laws and challenges in uniting MPs for crucial votes.
• The relationship between Zelensky and Kyiv’s Mayor Klitschko is strained, reflecting deeper political rivalries.

Conclusion:

• The situation in Ukraine remains fluid, with military advances, political maneuvering, and international support playing critical roles in the ongoing conflict.

This summary captures the detailed developments on the ground and the broader political context discussed in the transcript

 

Chatgpt er dørgende lat idag, og sammendraget bærer preg av det. Endel sentrale punkter mangler i sammendraget og jeg har ikke kapasitet til å forsøke å få en mer detaljert oversikt. Har du tid anbefaler jeg å lytte til den, heller enn å lese sammendraget. 

Endret 20. august 2024 av bojangles