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The Tremendous Trump Thread - Første periode (Les førstepost)


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1 hour ago, Joeal88 said:

Dere som er så trofaste til meningsmålinger bør ta og glo litt på denne artikkelen: http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/25/why-public-opinion-polls-dont-include-the-same-number-of-republicans-and-democrats/

Dere som ikke forstår  hva meningsmålinger måler og hvorfor det er uvitenskapelig å spørre like mange demokrater som republikanere hvis man ønsker å vite hva amerikanere generellt mener burde lese artikkelen.

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jjkoggan skrev (1 time siden):

Dere som ikke forstår  hva meningsmålinger måler og hvorfor det er uvitenskapelig å spørre like mange demokrater som republikanere hvis man ønsker å vite hva amerikanere generellt mener burde lese artikkelen.

Av med foliehatten, jorda er ikke flat. ?

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2 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Og jeg peker igjen på den bipartisane etterretningsrapporten som fortalte at republikanerene visste sannheten, og likevel lot være å fjerne Trump selv om de visste om samarbeidet med Russland.

Hvorfor tror du demokratene klarte å finne "sannheten", men ikke Mueller da? Hva hadde demokratene tilgang til som Mueller ikke hadde som ledet de til 'sannheten'?
 

2 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Og du siterer Washington Examiner.
Som er delaktig i løgnene.

Hva mener du, er artikkelen i Washington Examiner på noen måte løgn, er videoen av Pelosi der deep fake ellsnosnt? Mener du at Pelosi ikke sa det?

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Drain the swamp?

Sitat

Donald Trump continued to shift money from his donors to his business last month, as his reelection campaign paid his private companies for rent, food, lodging and other expenses, according to a review of the latest Federal Election Commission filings. The richest president in American history, who has yet to donate to his 2020 campaign, has now moved $2.3 million of contributions from other people into his private companies.

(...)

In addition to the campaign, the Republican National Committee and the president’s joint-fundraising committees have also paid millions of dollars to Trump’s businesses. Last month, Forbes reported on $4.7 million of payments from those entities since Trump took office. The president’s total haul—from his campaign, party and joint fundraising committees—now stands at more than $6.9 million.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/danalexander/2020/08/25/trump-has-now-moved-23-million-of-campaign-donor-money-into-his-private-business/

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jallajall skrev (44 minutter siden):

Hvorfor tror du demokratene klarte å finne "sannheten", men ikke Mueller da? Hva hadde demokratene tilgang til som Mueller ikke hadde som ledet de til 'sannheten'?
 

Hva mener du, er artikkelen i Washington Examiner på noen måte løgn, er videoen av Pelosi der deep fake ellsnosnt? Mener du at Pelosi ikke sa det?

...

Sier du at du faktisk ikke har sett analyser av Mueller sitt arbeid..?
Det var mange svakheter;
Han avhørte ikke Donald Trump fordi han forventet at Donald Trump kom til å lyge eller plead the 5th.
Han avhørte ikke Kushner, fordi han forventet at Kushner kom til å lyge eller plead the 5th.
Han avhørte ikke Eric Trump.
Han avhørte ikke Trump Jr.
Om han hadde avhørt dem, så kunne de ha løyet til FBI -- som er straffbart. Han valgte altså å beskytte dem, fordi han visste at alle sammen er notoriske løgnere.
Hans etterforskning ble så hindret av obstruksjon på alle fronter.
Han ble løyet til, i brevform på skriftlige forklaringer skrevet av advokater og signert av partene, av praktisk talt alle i Trump sin administrasjon -- fra Bannon til Trump selv.
Han fulgte ikke viktige pengestrømmer, fordi han ikke hadde mandat til å gå inn på Trump sine økonomiske transaksjoner -- som også sannsynligvis er grunnen til at Senatet avsluttet saken sin nå -- da myndighetene holder på å få tak i skattepapirene Mueller aldri kunne fått tak i, fordi han ville blitt fjernet på dagen.

Det meste og viktigste av hva Mueller fant er fremdeles sensurert -- og han får ikke lov til å snakke om det.
Om han snakker om det, så vil republikanerene i effekt bruk lovbruddet til Mueller til å invalidere funnene til Mueller.

Mueller kunne renvaske Trump -- og hadde i praksis ikke mandat til noe annet -- men erklærte altså at han ikke kunne renvaske Trump.

---

Du har allerede postet løgnene til Marco Rubio -- og jeg har allerede postet faktuelle kilder som bekrefter at Marco Rubio er løgnhalsen han er.
Senatet fant samme ulovlige samarbeid med Russland som Mueller fant, bare vagt mer utbrodert -- med notater fra FBI i tillegg til Mueller-rapporten.

Dommeren som krevde og fikk innsikt i den komplette Mueller rapporten hadde over 70 spørsmål til Department of Justice angående deres sensur av Mueller-rapporten -- og Department of Justice har tydeligvis ikke evne eller vilje til å svare på de 70 spørsmålene på en tilfredsstillende måte, og lyger om årsaken.
Det ble BEORDRET om å svare -- og fristen gikk ut i midten av Juli. Det er enda ikke noe kjent svar.
https://lawandcrime.com/high-profile/judge-orders-doj-to-explain-its-secret-portions-of-the-mueller-report-by-next-week/

Hint; De kommer ikke til å svare før valget.
Hvorfor ikke..?
Hva er så fordømt galt med å fortelle sannheten at republikanerene konstant lar være og holder sannheten tilbake, og presenterer 'alternative fakta' i stedet?

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Live nå:

Dag 2 av republikanernes landsmøte. Blant talerne er Melania Trump, utenriksminister Mike Pompeo, sen. Rand Paul, Iowas guvernør Kim Reynolds, Eric og Tiffany Trump.

Man kunne kanskje håpe på en noenlunde smooth og normal konferanse, men før sending ble det kjent at Mary Ann Mendoza, en av talerne for kvelden, har blitt kansellert etter at hun hadde tweetet om en antisemittisk konspirasjonsteori fra Qanon om jødisk verdensdominans. Utenriksminister Pompeos tale går i opptak fra Israel, hvor dette ble innspilt på taket på "King David"-hotellet i Jerusalem, etter å ha sendt ut notat om at amerikanske diplomater ikke skal delta i partipolitisk aktivitet. Han er nå under etterforskning, men det ventes ingen straffereaksjon.
Trump selv deltar også i kveld, og kveldens partipolitiske partytriks skal inkludere benåding av en bankraner.

Live i nyhetskanaler og på nett:

 

Alternativ stream:

Spoiler

 

 

 

Endret av xRun
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8 hours ago, ism_InnleggNO said:

Hvilken sannhet er det du mener Mueller ikke fant? Vet du i det hele tatt hva han etterforsket?

Tydeligvis så fant demokratene en annen 'sannhet' enn Mueller, de kom hvertfall til forskjellige konklusjoner.
 

7 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Sier du at du faktisk ikke har sett analyser av Mueller sitt arbeid..?
Det var mange svakheter;
Han avhørte ikke Donald Trump fordi han forventet at Donald Trump kom til å lyge eller plead the 5th.
Han avhørte ikke Kushner, fordi han forventet at Kushner kom til å lyge eller plead the 5th.
Han avhørte ikke Eric Trump.
Han avhørte ikke Trump Jr.
Om han hadde avhørt dem, så kunne de ha løyet til FBI -- som er straffbart. Han valgte altså å beskytte dem, fordi han visste at alle sammen er notoriske løgnere.
Hans etterforskning ble så hindret av obstruksjon på alle fronter.
Han ble løyet til, i brevform på skriftlige forklaringer skrevet av advokater og signert av partene, av praktisk talt alle i Trump sin administrasjon -- fra Bannon til Trump selv.
Han fulgte ikke viktige pengestrømmer, fordi han ikke hadde mandat til å gå inn på Trump sine økonomiske transaksjoner -- som også sannsynligvis er grunnen til at Senatet avsluttet saken sin nå -- da myndighetene holder på å få tak i skattepapirene Mueller aldri kunne fått tak i, fordi han ville blitt fjernet på dagen.

Her virker som dine "analyser" av Muellers arbeid er basert på alt han ikke gjorde.
 

7 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Det meste og viktigste av hva Mueller fant er fremdeles sensurert -- og han får ikke lov til å snakke om det.

Jeg har spurt deg flere ganger før,  du har aldri svart, men tar sjangsen på å spørre igjen:
Mener du Mueller og rapportens konklusjon er basert på den sensurerte utgaven? Ergo at Mueller vil endre sin konklusjon den dagen en usensurert versjon foreligger?
 

7 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Mueller kunne renvaske Trump -- og hadde i praksis ikke mandat til noe annet -- men erklærte altså at han ikke kunne renvaske Trump.

Et av de demokratenes fremste talking points.
Muellers jobb er ikke å renvaske. Det er ikke en aktors oppgave, en aktor har ikke denne muligheten, det er ikke en definert prosedyre, det er ikke noe avdeling for renvasking hos DOJ.
Dersom Mueller kan renvaske så vil det selvfølgelig også innebære at Barr kan renvaske, ikkesant?

7 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

Du har allerede postet løgnene til Marco Rubio -- og jeg har allerede postet faktuelle kilder som bekrefter at Marco Rubio er løgnhalsen han er.
Senatet fant samme ulovlige samarbeid med Russland som Mueller fant, bare vagt mer utbrodert -- med notater fra FBI i tillegg til Mueller-rapporten.

Sensasjon, Republikanerne er uenig med Demokratenes konklusjon.

Republikanerne og Mueller kunne ikke finne bevis for at Trump er en russisk agent innsatt av Putin (eller hvordan nå man ønsker å fronte det), Demokratene fant det. Ikke at det er noe nytt, det har de visst lenge. Schiff har jo i flere år hevdet at han sitter på indisputable bevis, men vi venter alle på at han snart skal komme med det.

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jallajall skrev (27 minutter siden):

 

Dette er ganske poengløst.

Jeg kunne og har flere ganger gitt deg kilder som påpeker samarbeidet, og to innlegg senere så er du tilbake på samme konklusjon som det republikanske partiet og Breitbart / RT.

Jeg må virkelig bare lage et svar du kan klippe ut og henge opp hjemme, slik at jeg slipper å gjenta meg.

---

Republikanerene og demokratene kom til en felles enighet om fakta i saken, i senatet sin rapport.

Fakta står i rapporten.

Republikanerene kunne ikke lyge i rapporten. Derfor måtte de lyge i sin oppsummering i stedet.

Når 1+1=2, og eller er enige, fordi konklusjonen er uomtvistelig, så må selvsagt republikanere lage og skrive under på et memo som sier "1+1=0, for små verdier av 1."

...fordi de tror at konservative er dumme nok til å falle for samme løgn igjen og igjen uten å høre på seriøse kilder sine meninger om fakta, eller lese og forstå rapporten selv.

Det viser seg å være en ekstremt effektiv strategi.

...

Vi så det samme under Mueller.

Bill Barr løy om hva rapporten sa, dagen han fikk rapporten, i et forhåndsskrevet memo, og de i den konservative boblen hørte aldri noe annet.

..her er en grundigere analyse av senatets rapport, fra sikkerhetseksperter med ekstremt høy objektivitet og lasng erfaring fra politikk:

https://www.lawfareblog.com/collusion-reading-diary-what-did-senate-intelligence-committee-find

Advarsel: Lang.

Men fakta i motsetning til Republikanerene sine bortforklaringer.

A. Paul Manafort

B. Hack and Leak

C. The Agalarovs and the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting

D. Trump Tower Moscow

E. George Papadopoulos

A. Paul Manafort (pp. 27-169)

The first section of the report concerns Paul Manafort, Trump’s one-time campaign chairman who resigned from the campaign in August 2016 following news reports of his previous work for a pro-Russian Ukrainian political party. Manafort was indicted in October 2017 in the course of the Mueller investigation and was eventually convicted of, and pleaded guilty to, charges including bank and tax fraud. Manafort’s business associate Rick Gates, who served on the Trump transition team, also pleaded guilty to fraud charges. Much of the Senate report’s information on Manafort echoes the Mueller report’s conclusions, but the Intelligence Committee is far more aggressive in its description of the counterintelligence threats posed by Manafort’s involvement with the campaign.

“Manafort had direct access to Trump and his Campaign’s senior officials, strategies, and information,” the committee notes, as did Gates—and “Manafort, often with the assistance of Gates, engaged with individuals inside Russia and Ukraine on matters pertaining both to his personal business prospects and the 2016 U.S. election.”

The report provides a brief overview of Manafort’s “connections to Russia and Ukraine,” which date to “approximately 2004.” In brief, Manafort began work then for the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and pro-Russian oligarchs in Ukraine, which eventually led to his role in engineering the 2010 election to the Ukrainian presidency of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. While the Mueller report described Deripaska as “closely aligned with Vladimir Putin,” the committee’s report is much more direct: “The Russian government,” the committee writes, “coordinates with and directs Deripaska” in conducting influence operations, with which Manafort also assisted. At another point, the committee states that “Manafort’s influence work for Deripaska was, in effect, influence work for the Russian government and its interests.”

In other words, as a baseline matter, the Trump campaign was—for a time—run by a man who himself had carried out influence operations on behalf of Russian interests.

It gets worse, however.

Manafort’s work in Ukraine and with Deripaska also led him to have a long-term business relationship with a man named Konstantin Kilimnik, the report states, who “became an integral part” of Manafort’s business. Kilimnik is no stranger to those who have followed L’Affaire Russe. The Mueller report had reported that “[t]he FBI assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence.”

But here again, the Senate report goes much further, bluntly stating that “Kilimnik is a Russian intelligence officer.” What’s more, Manafort was likely aware of this fact, the committee states: In a footnote, the committee states that “Manafort … at some point harbored suspicions that Kilimnik had ties to intelligence services. Manafort was undeniably aware—often from first-hand experience—of suspicious aspects of Kilimnik’s behavior and network. Nevertheless, Manafort later asserted to [Mueller’s team] that Kilimnik was not a spy.”

As the Senate writes, Manafort’s work for the Trump campaign took place in the wake of a business dispute between Manafort and Deripaska involving money owed to Deripaska by Manafort, as well as a separate dispute involving money Manafort felt he was owed by other clients, pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs. The report states that Manafort “was actively seeking a position on the Trump campaign” in January 2016 on the grounds that it would help iron out his financial disputes with Deripaska and the Ukrainian oligarchs. Trump associate Roger Stone reached out directly to Trump and helped Manafort lobby for that role, the committee writes. According to Trump associate Tom Barrack, Manafort’s willingness to work for free was central to his getting the job of chairman—and, the Senate writes, Manafort was hired without the campaign conducting any vetting, “including of his financial situation or vulnerability to foreign influence."

The report states that Manafort “likely made Kilimnik aware of the possibility [that] he would join the Trump Campaign prior to its public announcement” in March 2016. After the public announcement, “Manafort used Kilimnik to send private messages to three Ukrainian oligarchs—at least one of whom Manafort believed owed him money—and to Deripaska.” The report contains several heavily redacted pages following a description of Manafort’s communications with Kilimnik during this time, which, from unredacted footnotes, seem to involve Kilimnik’s outreach to various oligarchs.

During his time on the Trump campaign, the committee writes, Manafort also worked with Kilimnik on developing a peace plan to end the conflict in eastern Ukraine on terms favorable to Russia. And, the committee states, “On numerous occasions over the course of his time on the Trump campaign, Manafort sought to secretly share internal Campaign information with Kilimnik.” Most notably, Gates told investigators that Manafort had instructed him to share internal campaign polling data with Kilimnik. Gates “understood” that the data would be shared with Deripaska as well. Notably, the committee writes that “Kilimnik was capable of comprehending the complex polling data,” given his “significant knowledge of, and experience with” such material. On the basis of testimony by Kilimnik’s business partner Samuel Patten, it appears that the data involved information about the public’s negative views of Hillary Clinton, which Manafort felt could give Trump a chance to win the election.

In other words, throughout his work on the Trump campaign, Manafort maintained an ongoing business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer, to whom he passed nonpublic campaign material and analysis.

So what did Kilimnik do with the data—and why did Manafort share it? This was one of the great mysteries left unsolved by the Mueller report, and the Senate was also unable to come up with an answer. Gates, apparently, did not know: “Gates ultimately claimed that he did not trust Kilimnik, that he did not know why Manafort was sharing internal polling data with him, and that Kilimnik could have given the data to anyone.” The report states that “the Committee did … obtain a single piece of information that could plausibly be a reflection of Kilimnik’s actions” after receiving the data—but the next paragraph is entirely redacted.

Perhaps the most tantalizing suggestion in this section involves the redacted pages following the committee’s assertion that “ome evidence suggests Kilimnik may be connected to the GRU hack-and-leak operation related to the 2016 election”—that is, the hacking of the Democratic National Committee and Clinton campaign chair John Podesta. The suggestion that Kilimnik may have had some link to the hack-and-leak operation is new; it was not included in the Mueller report. Sections of unredacted text discuss the “Cyber Berkut” hacker group—which the report identifies as a “GRU influence operation”—and the 2014 leak of a conversation between State Department official Victoria Nuland and the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, which the White House at the time accused Russia of releasing.

The committee goes further, stating that there is a “possibility” that Manafort himself was somehow connected to the hacking and leaking. Much of the text that follows is redacted, though the unredacted text includes information about Manafort’s one-time son-in-law Jeffrey Yohai, who pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud. The possible connection between Yohai and the GRU operation is unclear.

In other words, according to the committee, not only was the chairman of the Trump campaign engaged in a business relationship with a Russian intelligence officer during the campaign and feeding him confidential information, but one or both of them might have played some kind of role in the hacking and dumping operation at the heart of the Russian electoral interference.

The engagement did not end when Manafort resigned from the campaign in August 2016. Manafort remained in contact both with members of the Trump campaign and with Kilimnik after his resignation, the report states—and “Kilimnik was aware that Manafort remained in contact with Trump and the Campaign generally and took an interest in making use of the connection.” Manafort’s contacts included providing advice to Trump and Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner, and sending the campaign a memo days before Election Day predicting Trump’s victory. Among the advice Manafort gave Kushner, emails show, was the suggestion to use “WikiLeaks information” for the campaign.

Manafort’s work along these lines, and his relationship with Kilimnik, continued even after the election. Kilimnik, the report states, “began considering how to leverage his relationship with Manafort for influence” under the new Trump administration. And “Kilimnik specifically sought to leverage Manafort’s contacts with the incoming Trump administration to advance” Kilimnik’s preferred policies in Ukraine. The report quotes an email shared with Manafort by Kilmnik advocating the deployment of the peace plan discussed by the two men in August 2016. As part of this effort, Manafort met with a representative of Deripaska in Madrid, the committee states—and “provided false and misleading information” about that meeting to the committee and the special counsel’s office—and later met with Kilimnik in Madrid as well. Additionally, Kilimnik traveled to the United States for Trump’s inauguration and met with Manafort while he was there, though he did not attend the inauguration itself. Through 2018, Manafort helped Kilimnik with polling on the possible peace plan, the committee states.

Finally, the report notes that “Manafort, Kilimnik, Deripaska, and others associated with Deripaska participated in … influence operations” spread by the Russian government after the election that were designed to “discredit investigations into Russian interference … and spread false information about the events of 2016.” Notably, the committee states that “Kilimnik almost certainly helped arrange some of the first public messaging that Ukraine had interfered in the U.S. election”—the same false idea that led to Trump’s animosity toward Ukraine and precipitated the scandal at the center of the president’s impeachment. Some of the material in this section is redacted, but the unredacted text sketches how Manafort and Kilimnik sought to discredit Ukrainian investigations of Manafort and seed the idea that the real 2016 election interference was by Ukraine in support of Clinton, including contacts between Kilimnik and the Ukrainian prosecutor whose false allegations against U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch became a central component of the impeachment scandal.

It is particularly striking that the committee’s Republicans signed onto this portion of the report, given the insistence by Trump and many Senate Republicans that Ukraine interfered in the 2015 election. Yet here are Republican senators, some of whom have even endorsed that theory, admitting that its origins lie in Russian disinformation.

Notably, the committee states that its investigation into Manafort was limited by the committee’s inability to interview Manafort and Gates to the extent desired; by Manafort, Gates and Kilimnik’s use of encrypted communications and other means of avoiding documentation; and by Manafort’s lies to the special counsel’s office about his relationship with Kilimnik. “Manafort's obfuscation of the truth surrounding Kilimnik was particularly damaging to the Committee's investigation,” the report notes, “because it effectively foreclosed direct insight into a series of interactions and communications which represent the single most direct tie between senior Trump Campaign officials and the Russian intelligence services.”

B. Hack and Leak, pp. 170-256

The section entitled “Hack and Leak” contains perhaps the frankest statements describing efforts by the Trump campaign institutionally—and Trump personally—to take advantage of Russia’s efforts, through WikiLeaks, to damage Hillary Clinton’s candidacy:

While the GRU and WikiLeaks were releasing hacked documents, the Trump Campaign sought to maximize the impact of those materials to aid Trump's electoral prospects. To do so, the Trump Campaign took actions to obtain advance notice about WikiLeaks releases of Clinton emails; took steps to obtain inside information about the content of releases once WikiLeaks began to publish stolen information; created messaging strategies to promote and share the materials in anticipation of and following their release; and encouraged further theft of information and continued leaks.

The report summarizes the key role of Roger Stone in these efforts:

Trump and senior Campaign officials sought to obtain advance information about WikiLeaks through Roger Stone. In spring 2016, prior to Assange's public announcements, Stone advised the Campaign that WikiLeaks would be releasing materials harmful to Clinton. Following the July 22 DNC release, Trump and the Campaign believed that Roger Stone had known of the release and had inside access to WikiLeaks, and repeatedly communicated with Stone about WikiLeaks throughout the summer and fall of 2016. Trump and other senior Campaign officials specifically directed Stone to obtain information about upcoming document releases relating to Clinton and report back. At their direction, Stone took action to gain inside knowledge for the Campaign and shared his purported knowledge directly with Trump and senior Campaign officials on multiple occasions. Trump and the Campaign believed that Stone had inside information and expressed satisfaction that Stone's information suggested more releases would be forthcoming.

These summaries are supported by detailed factual accounts that specify the roles different members of the campaign and other Trump associates played in the efforts. The report shows, in detail, that Roger Stone did not act in a vacuum or without the knowledge of the campaign or Donald Trump himself. In August 2016, following a tasking from the campaign, Stone obtained information indicating that John Podesta would be a target of an upcoming release, prior to WikiLeaks releasing Podesta's emails. Stone communicated this information to Trump and other senior campaign officials and affiliates, including Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.

Indeed, the report specifies that “[w]hile it was seeking advance information about potential WikiLeaks releases, the Campaign created a messaging strategy to promote the stolen materials.”

And crucially, the report makes clear that both Trump and the campaign continued these efforts even after it was well understood that Russia was behind them:

Trump and the Campaign continued to promote and disseminate the hacked WikiLeaks documents, even after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence [ODNI] and the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] released a joint statement officially attributing the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia as part of its interference in the U.S. presidential election. The Trump Campaign publicly undermined the attribution of the hack-and-leak campaign to Russia, and was indifferent to whether it and WikiLeaks were furthering a Russian election interference effort.

Specifically, the report states that “[t]he Campaign tried to cast doubt on the October 7 joint DHS/ODNI assessment formally attributing the activity to Russia, and was indifferent to the significance of acquiring, promoting, or disseminating materials from a Russian intelligence services hack-and-leak campaign.” It reiterates again that “[t]he Trump Campaign strategically monitored and promoted the WikiLeaks releases of John Podesta's emails from October 7 until the election.”

The report also tracks a second, related effort to obtain emails: Trump’s obsession with the "missing" emails from Hillary Clinton's server. It repeats what was already revealed in the Mueller report and widely reported in the press: that Trump publicly requested (“Russia, if you’re listening…”) that Russia find and release those emails and, hours later, that GRU hackers spear-phished nonpublic email accounts of Clinton's personal office for the first time and targeted seventy-six email accounts hosted by the Clinton campaign's domain.

But the report goes into many more specifics about the effort, the broad range of campaign officials and associates that were involved, and the willingness of campaign officials to engage with foreign actors to obtain them. According to Rick Gates, the report states, Donald Trump Jr. would ask where the Clinton emails were during "family meetings." Other senior advisers—including campaign adviser Michael Flynn, Kushner, Manafort, campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, then-Sen. Jeff Sessions and campaign policy adviser Sam Clovis—also expressed interest in obtaining the emails:

Manafort also recalled hearing from Stone sometime in June 2016 that "a source close to WikiLeaks confirmed that WikiLeaks had the emails from Clinton's server." Like Gates, Manafort recalled Stone telling him that the emails would be released "soon," but Stone "did not know when." Manafort, who was not convinced that the documents were coming out, directed Gates to check in with Stone "from time to time" to see if his WikiLeaks information remained "real and viable."

The report takes pains to corroborate telephonic and in-person conversations discussing the topic, including with phone logs, calendars of members of the campaign and other detailed sources.

It shows that key members of the campaign—including Trump himself—knew of WikiLeaks’s potential Russia connection long before the intelligence community’s assessment of the issue in October 2016. On June 12, Julian Assange gave an interview in which he said that WikiLeaks was planning to release information on Hillary Clinton. The report finds that the “Trump Campaign was elated by the news about WikiLeaks's plans, which it considered an unexpected ‘gift.’” When, two days later, the Democratic National Committee (DNC) announced it had been compromised by Russian government hackers, the report documents a flurry of phone calls between Trump and Stone:

That evening, at 9:03 p.m., Stone called Trump at Trump's home number. Trump returned Stone’s call from his cell phone two times, at 9:53 p.m. and 9:56 p.m.: the calls lasted about two-and-a-half minutes and two minutes, respectively. The Committee does not know the substance of these conversations, but the pattern and timing of Stone’s calls with Trump and others during this period suggest that they could have discussed the DNC hack and WikiLeaks.

And then there’s this:

Campaign leadership reacted positively to the news that the DNC had been hacked by the Russians. Gates described the reaction in part as "disbelief," but also given "what we were told that information might be about," the Campaign "felt it would give [them] a leg up" if released.

And campaign officials made sure they were well positioned to take full advantage of the fruits of the Russian hacking: The campaign planned a "press strategy, a communications campaign, and messaging based on the possibility the emails existed" and conversations were held "about what the campaign could plan for in the way of emails." Members of the campaign communicated frequently with each other and with Stone. Hours after the GRU released stolen DNC documents through its Guccifer 2.0 persona in June, Stone and Gates discussed the DNC hack by phone. Stone told Gates that "more information would be coming out of the DNC hack."

The report found that witness testimony and documentary evidence “support that Stone spoke to Trump about the WikiLeaks information prior to its release.” Although Manafort claimed that he was reluctant to tell Trump and cautioned Stone against doing so, “Stone could-and did-contact Trump directly, as Stone did on June 14.” And everyone knew Trump would be pleased: “Manafort believed Stone would have told Trump anyway because he ‘wanted the credit for knowing in advance.’” Trump’s frequent communications with Stone were no secret: “Gates was aware that Stone called Trump during the campaign. Cohen similarly noted that ‘Stone called Trump all the time,’ and ‘could call Trump's cell phone, especially if at night.’ Trump himself acknowledged that he ‘spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign.’” The report makes this assessment about Stone’s and Trump’s communications:

Any of these calls would have provided Stone with an opportunity to share additional information about WikiLeaks directly with Trump, and given the content of his conversations with Manafort and Gates combined with Trump's known interest in the issue, the Committee assesses he likely did.

In one telling tidbit that speaks to the regard the campaign had for the hacking of the DNC, a campaign staffer posed a question in an email about whether, in connection with downloading and distributing the newest batch of Guccifer 2.0 emails, "Senate or campaign rules preclude us from possessing data that's been hacked from a third party and distributed via the internet." Tellingly, John Mashburn, the policy director for the Trump campaign, replied: "I don't see a problem. Just like WikiLeaks material."

The report recounts in detail the actions by the committee in the run-up to the July 22, 2016, release by WikiLeaks of 20,000 emails the GRU had stolen from the DNC. The report states that “a possible WikiLeaks release appeared central to the Campaign's strategic focus.” Indeed, the hack-and-dump brought the Trump campaign and the Republican National Committee (RNC) in a more trusting relationship: “Trump and Kushner were reportedly willing to ‘cooperate’ with the RNC's efforts on this front, overcoming their earlier skepticism of working with the RNC, and demonstrating that both were focused on the possibility of WikiLeaks releasing Clinton documents.”

It recounts in-person conversations in which Donald Trump encouraged Stone’s contact with Julian Assange, and also potential efforts to mask such conversations. It finds that witness testimony indicates that Stone may have raised WikiLeaks again to Trump in late July, shortly before the DNC release occurred. Manafort assumed such a conversation took place, and Michael Cohen recalled overhearing a phone call from Stone in Trump's office in which Stone reported that he had talked to Assange and that there would be a “massive dump” of emails in July. Trump encouraged him, though Cohen was somewhat skeptical about whether Stone was telling the truth. The report suggests that such conversations may have taken place on the phone of Trump’s bodyguard, Keith Schiller, rather than Trump’s own phone: “Witnesses said that Trump often used Schiller's phone to hide his communications.”

The campaign staff, including Gates, Stephen Miller, and Jason Miller, worked on a “messaging strategy” and had “brainstorming sessions” in the run-up to the July 22 release. After the release, the report recounts, “Trump and his Campaign immediately pivoted to leveraging the WikiLeaks documents. Gates recalled that Manafort 'express[ ed] excitement' about the release,” and Manafort and Trump discussed how they could use the DNC emails relating to Debbie Wasserman Schultz. Michael Cohen and Trump discussed "the usefulness of the released emails," including in relation to Bernie Sanders, Donna Brazile, and Wasserman Shultz. Gates recalled that following the email release, the takeoff of Trump’s plane was delayed 30 minutes so that Trump “could work the emails into his next speech.”

The campaign’s weaponization of the WikiLeaks release to attack and divide the Democratic Party “mirrored the discussion between WikiLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 about using the emails to create conflict within the Democratic Party by splitting Clinton and Sanders supporters” and “echoed social media efforts by Russia to drive a wedge between supporters of Clinton and Sanders” as described in the second volume of the Senate Intelligence Committee's report.

The July 22 Wikileaks release energized the Trump campaign, and it “began to more actively pursue leads on WikiLeaks activities.” Manafort reminded Trump that Stone had predicted the release and, in response, Trump “directed Manafort to stay in touch with Stone to see if there were more emails coming out.” Manafort spoke with Stone during the week of the 2016 Democratic National Convention, and he agreed to follow up. Manafort also instructed Gates to follow up with Stone on occasion to find out when additional information might be released. He told Gates that he would be "updating other people on the Campaign, including the candidate." But Manafort was cautious to use Stone, rather than official campaign staffers, advising Gates and others “throughout the Campaign” that no one should "touch’" Assange, even though there was a "growing belief that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort."

Having received Trump’s direction through Manafort, Stone channeled his outreach efforts to Assange through right-wing author Jerome Corsi—but kept in close contact with the campaign. The report details multiple communications and machinations between Stone, Corsi, Ted Malloch and others in an effort to get to Assange. Stone stayed in contact with Trump and the campaign throughout this time period, including a “68-minute call” between Stone and Manafort on July 30. Stone indicated to Manafort that “additional information would be coming out down the road” and Manafort "thought that would be great."

Next came the “October surprise”: the release of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta’s emails. In August, Stone asked Corsi for information about the “timing and content of the Podesta email release,” and Stone told Corsi he was talking to Trump. Stone was also talking to the campaign staff: He had “at least 25 phone calls with Manafort, 20 phone calls with Gates, two calls with Bannon and two calls with Trump in the month of August 2016 alone.”

Enter Steve Bannon, who recalled discussing WikiLeaks and Assange with Stone “both before and after taking over as the chief executive officer of the Trump Campaign on August 13, 2016.” Bannon recalled that, before he joined the campaign, "Stone told him that he had a connection to Assange" and "implied that he had inside information about WikiLeaks." After Bannon became the campaign’s CEO, Stone repeated to him that he "had a relationship with Assange and said that WikiLeaks was going to dump additional materials that would be bad for the Clinton Campaign."

Notably, Trump, in written responses to questions from Mueller's office, stated, "I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with [Stone], nor do I recall being aware of Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign." Trump further claimed that he had "no recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1, 2016 and November 8, 2016."

The Senate report does not directly conclude that Trump was lying, but it gets pretty close. It draws this conclusion: “Despite Trump's recollection, the Committee assesses that Trump did, in fact, speak with Stone about WikiLeaks and with members of his Campaign about Stone's access to WikiLeaks on multiple occasions.”

The wording is careful. It does not say that Trump did, contrary to his testimony, recall the specifics of any of these conversations. It merely says that he had repeated conversations with Stone and describes them in fashions that would be memorable to any reasonable person. It thus shows the ridiculousness of Trump’s representations to the Department of Justice about Stone and WikiLeaks, though it stops short of accusing him of lying under oath.

The report also describes the sheer volume of communications among members of the campaign, and with Breitbart employees, regarding the hoped-for “October surprise” dump of new Wikileaks documents. Although members of the campaign had grown more hesitant about communicating directly with Stone, the campaign staff tracked Stone’s commentary and the news about WikiLeaks and communicated copiously with each other about it. Andrew Surabian, who ran the campaign's war room, emailed Stone's Twitter prediction about a Wednesday release to Bannon, campaign pollster Kellyanne Conway and the Trump campaign press team. The next day, campaign staffer Dan Scavino emailed the Oct. 3 WikiLeaks Twitter announcement to Bannon. Bannon reached out to two editors at Breitbart, where he held a leadership role, to ask if they would be awake "to get what he [Assange] has live."

Bannon also received an email from another Breitbart editor, forwarding Boyle's correspondence from earlier that day with Stone. But Bannon, for one, seemed less eager. Boyle had asked Stone, "Assange-what's he got? Hope it's good." Stone responded, "It is. I'd tell Bannon but he doesn't call me back." Stone also emailed Trump supporter and associate Erik Prince on Oct. 3, telling him: "Spoke to my friend in London last night. The payload is still coming."

When no “leak” was forthcoming, Trump got frustrated and his advisers immediately reached out to Stone to see what went wrong. “Trump was frustrated with the absence of a WikiLeaks release on October 4,” Gates said, recalling that Trump asked: "When is the other stuff coming out?" Other key Trump advisers were likewise disappointed. Bannon reached out directly to Stone by email about the lack of any new releases, asking, "[W]hat was that this morning???" On Oct. 4, Prince also asked Stone whether Assange had "chicken[ed] out." Prince texted Stone, again to ask whether he had "hear[d] anymore from London." Stone wrote, "Yes-want to talk on a secure line-got Whatsapp?" and previewed that it was "good.” Prince spoke with Stone, who told him that “WikiLeaks would release more materials harmful to the Clinton Campaign.” Prince also described Stone having the equivalent of "insider stock trading" information about Assange.

On Oct. 6, Stone tweeted: "Julian Assange will deliver a devastating expose on Hillary at a time of his choosing. I stand by my prediction. #handcuffs4hillary." On the afternoon of Oct. 6, Stone received a call from Keith Schiller's number. The report states,

Stone returned the call about 20 minutes later, and spoke—almost certainly to Trump—for six minutes. The substance of that conversation is not known to the Committee. However, at the time, Stone was focused on the potential for a WikiLeaks release, the Campaign was following WikiLeaks's announcements, and Trump's prior call with Stone on September 29, also using Schiller's phone, related to a WikiLeaks release. Given these facts, it appears quite likely that Stone and Trump spoke about WikiLeaks.

It seems a new opportunity was brewing for the use of the Podesta release of emails. After it became clear to Trump associates that the famous Access Hollywood tape would be coming out, Stone sought to time the much-sought-after release of Podesta emails by WikiLeaks to divert attention from the tape. Corsi recalled that Stone "[w]anted the Podesta stuff to balance the news cycle" either "right then or at least coincident."

And Stone got his wish: “At approximately 4:32 p.m. on October 7, approximately 32 minutes after the release of the Access Hollywood tape, WikiLeaks released 2,050 emails that the GRU had stolen from John Podesta, repeatedly announcing the leak on Twitter and linking to a searchable archive of the documents.”

You get the picture. All of the key figures in the Trump campaign—including Trump himself—knew about, and anticipated, the Podesta WikiLeaks dump. Stone helped engineer the timing of it with WikiLeaks through Corsi. Afterward, Stone, Manafort and Gates all communicated with one another.

So what about Corsi? Was he really in communication with Assange directly or through another interlocutor, or was it something he fabricated? Or was it bluster on Stone’s part? The report provides ample detail regarding communications between Corsi and Stone that are very specific about both the release, timing and nature of the emails. And it leaves the reader with the unmistakable impression that Corsi was in contact with Assange either himself or through Ted Malloch. But the report also states:

The Committee is uncertain how Corsi determined that Assange had John Podesta's emails. Corsi initially explained in an interview with the SCO that during his trip to Italy, someone told him Assange had the Podesta emails. Corsi also recalled learning that Assange was going to "release the emails seriatim and not all at once." However, Corsi claimed not to remember who provided him with this information, saying he could only recall that "it feels like a man" who told him.

...

However, during a later interview with the SCO, Corsi revised how he had learned that Assange would be releasing Podesta's emails. Corsi claimed that, rather than being told this information by a source, he had deduced it from Assange's public statements.

And then there’s this: "The Committee did not interview Corsi, who asserted his Fifth Amendment rights in response to a Committee subpoena, and could not determine if either of the two versions of these events was accurate."

The report also states, based on an FBI interview report form, that

Corsi recalled that, at the end of August, Stone grew concerned about having made a statement about the release of Podesta materials before WikiLeaks had released any documents. On August 30, Stone and Corsi agreed to fabricate a story that Stone's knowledge and his August 21 Podesta tweet were both based on a public article and subsequent memorandum from Corsi. However, Corsi understood that he was Stone's actual source of information and admitted that this "cover story" was "bullshit."

The reality is that the information Stone got from Corsi ended up being both specific and accurate. On Aug. 21, a month-and-a-half before WikiLeaks ultimately released its first batch of stolen John Podesta emails, Stone tweeted, “Trust me, it will soon the Podesta’s time in the barrel.” The volume and connectedness of the details in this part of the report leave the reader with the impression that Corsi really did have some kind of channel to Assange and that Corsi passed that information back to Stone—though the report never says this explicitly.

The same day that the Podesta emails were released, Oct. 7, the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued their now-famous public release finding that “[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations. The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts.”

It seems Stone met with Trump on Oct. 8, the next day. Stone messaged Corsi: "Lunch postponed - have to go see T," referring to Trump. And Stone grew concerned that his contacts with WikiLeaks through Corsi be hidden: “Corsi said that Stone was concerned about having advance information about the Podesta release, and that Stone recruited Corsi to make sure no one knew Stone had advance knowledge of that information.” Corsi claimed that Stone directed him to delete emails relating to the Podesta information. Stone’s later testimony to the House Intelligence Committee about his actions formed the basis for his indictment and trial on charges of making misleading and false statements about his communications with the Trump campaign and individuals associated with the campaign. In addition, Stone directed Corsi to "stick to the plan" and threatened radio host Randy Credico, who had also served as a link between Stone and Assange, to prevent Credico from testifying to the House Intelligence Committee and contradicting Stone's story.

Recall that on July 10, 2020, Trump commuted Stone’s sentence on seven felony crimes for which he had been convicted, sparing Stone from a 40-month prison term.

The report confirms that following the Oct. 7 release, WikiLeaks released 33 more sets of stolen materials before Election Day—more than 50,000 documents—advertising the materials on Twitter each time. And the campaign once again eagerly integrated WikiLeaks materials into the campaign’s efforts, including Trump’s tweets, speeches and press releases. The campaign even “tracked WikiLeaks releases in order to populate a fake Clinton Campaign website, clintonkaine.com.” In short, as summarized in the report:

Despite the contemporaneous statement by the U.S. Government warning of Russian responsibility for the hacking and leaking of the DNC, DCCC, and Clinton Campaign documents and emails, the Trump Campaign considered the release of these materials to be its "October surprise."

And they took full advantage—DHS and ODNI findings be damned. They even endeavored to undermine the attribution of the theft to Russia: “While the Campaign was using the WikiLeaks documents, Trump cast doubt on the assessment that Russian government hackers were responsible for the hack-and-leak campaign.” Everyone who saw the second presidential debate on Oct. 9 saw Trump assert "maybe there is no hacking." Other times he suggested it was an "absurd claim" to say that the Kremlin was promoting the Trump campaign; that "the DNC did the 'hacking'" as a distraction; that the Democrats were "putting [it] out" that the Russians were responsible; and that it was "unlikely" that the Russians did it; that nobody knew it was Russia, and it "could also be China" or "lots of other people."

Gates described a "growing belief” within the campaign that Assange was, in fact, assisting their effort. But it seems that any moral sense that it was wrong for the campaign to accept Russian involvement in assisting Trump’s campaign was nonexistent. The campaign “treated the releases as just another form of opposition research.” Bannon's view was that "anything negative that comes out [against an opponent] is clearly helpful to a campaign." Campaign aide Stephen Miller felt "t would have been political malpractice not to use the WikiLeaks material once it became public." Trump “praised and promoted WikiLeaks repeatedly in the closing month of the campaign”—a “deliberate strategy employed by the Campaign” in his remarks and on social media:

In mid-October, Ivanka Trump tasked the Campaign's senior officials (including Bannon, Scavino, Stephen Miller and Jason Miller) with preparing two Trump tweets every day linking to WikiLeaks content, which, she said, would help "refocus the narrative." Trump tweeted direct references to WikiLeaks throughout October and November 2016, including on October 11, 12, 16, 17, 21 (twice), 22, 24, 27 and November 1.

And then there’s Donald Trump Jr., who had his own special connection with WikiLeaks.

It seems Trump Jr. did not get the message about obscuring contact with WikiLeaks. Instead, he responded directly when WikiLeaks reached out to him. As previously outlined in the Mueller report, the Senate report recounts how, on Sept. 21, WikiLeaks used a direct message on Twitter to reach out to Trump Jr. for a comment about a website, "putintrump.org," and provided Trump Jr. a password to access the website before it launched. Trump Jr. responded, "Off the record I don't know who that is, but I'll ask around." He then forwarded the message to the campaign team with this note:

Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it works and the about section they reference contains the next pic in terms of who is behind it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it's a fully built out page claiming to be a PAC let me know your thoughts and if we want to look into it.

The report also describes how, prior to the October Podesta dump, WikiLeaks reached out directly to Trump Jr. and asked him to "comment on/push" a report about Clinton asking whether Assange could be droned. Trump Jr. responded that he had already done so, and then two minutes later, Trump Jr. wrote to WikiLeaks: "What's behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?" (He did not receive a response.)

This section of the report concludes with a description of how WikiLeaks sought to coordinate its distribution of stolen documents through Don Jr. After Trump proclaimed at an Oct. 10 rally, "I love WikiLeaks," and then posted about it on Twitter, WikiLeaks resumed messaging with Trump Jr.: "Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us ... there's many great stories the press are missing and we're sure some of your follows [sic] will find it. btw we just released Podesta Emails Part 4." Shortly afterward, Trump tweeted: "Very little pick-up by the dishonest media of incredible information provided by WikiLeaks. So dishonest! Rigged System!" In case that didn’t make the point strongly enough, two days later, Trump Jr. tweeted the link himself: "For those who have the time to read about all the corruption and hypocrisy all the @wikileaks emails are right here: wlsearch.tk." According to the report, Trump Jr. admitted that this may have been in response to the request from WikiLeaks but also suggested that it could have been part of a general practice of retweeting the WikiLeaks releases when they came out. Trump Jr. retweeted WikiLeaks content numerous times in October and November 2016, frequently encouraging others to go to WikiLeaks or elsewhere to review the hacked emails.

But he wasn’t alone. This section of the report concludes:

The Campaign's preoccupation with WikiLeaks continued until the general election. As the general election approached, Scavino, a member of the communications team who also had a role in administering Trump's Twitter account during the campaign, increasingly forwarded updates relating to WikiLeaks to other Campaign officials, using subject lines like · "WIKI ABOUT TO DROP SOME BOMBS ... 4 pmE" and "The WikiLeaks BOMB!" and linking to the latest WikiLeaks twitter post or its website. To one, Donald Trump Jr. responded: "Blow it out."

At least there was no collusion.

C. The Agalarovs and the June 9, 2016, Trump Tower Meeting, pp. 259-406

The committee next examines the infamous June 2016 Trump Tower meeting, at which the Trump campaign unsuccessfully sought negative information on Hillary Clinton from individuals linked to the Russian government. The meeting was precipitated by Russian oligarch Aras Agalarov and his son, Emin Agalarov, whom Trump knew from business dealings in Russia beginning in 2013. Before the report delves into the events of the Trump Tower meeting, it first provides a great deal of detail on the Agalarovs themselves and the nature of Trump’s past dealings with them. While the report’s account of the meeting itself is consistent with Mueller’s, this information adds important texture to the interaction.

The report pulls no punches on its view of the Agalarovs, who, it writes, “have significant ties to Russian organized crime and have been closely affiliated with individuals involved in murder, prostitution, weapons trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other significant criminal enterprises. Some of those activities have extended outside of Russia, including to the United States.”

Further information about Agalarov’s activities is redacted. But the report goes on to note that Aras Agalarov “has significant ties to the Russian government, including to individuals involved in influence operations targeting the 2016 U.S. election”—and “access” to Putin, among other high-level figures in the Russian government. This information is followed by several entirely redacted pages—but one unredacted paragraph notes that “in October 2010 when Russian intelligence held a celebration for the 60th anniversary of the GRU's special missions department, the event was hosted” at a venue owned by Agalarov. More redacted information follows a brief description of Emin Agalarov, who is a musician but also works with his father’s real estate development company. According to Michael Cohen, the committee says, a friend of Cohen’s warned him twice against working with the Agalarovs, saying they were “really rough.”

So the first point to bear in mind is that the Trump Tower meeting was arranged by a Russian oligarch with ties to organized crime and to Putin.

The second key point is that the Agalarovs had been cultivating Trump for some time. Trump met the Agalarovs in 2013 through efforts to bring the Miss Universe pageant, which Trump owned, to Moscow. This alone is nothing new. But the report also suggests—without stating outright—that the event, including the involvement and support of the Agalarovs, was likely a Russian effort to gain influence over Trump.

The Agalarovs agreed to fund the pageant in what resulted in a $10 million loss for them, though according to the report, “Moscow was one of the most lucrative deals that the Miss Universe Organization had ever participated in.” The report contains an incredibly detailed tick-tock of events and interactions leading up to the pageant. It includes visits to seedy Vegas nightclubs, material on Trump’s personal relationships with various Russian oligarchs linked to organized crime, and stories of multiple efforts by Trump to obtain a meeting with Vladimir Putin—which, according to the president of the Miss Universe Organization, was highly unusual. Notably, the committee writes, “Aras Agalarov was personally involved in the effort to secure a meeting” between Trump and Putin. Though Putin did not attend the pageant or meet with Trump, he “reportedly sent a senior Kremlin official … in his place”—and the president of the Miss Universe Organization remembered Trump asking her to falsely say that Putin had attended.

As a taste of the sort of people Trump was dealing with through Miss Universe, the report describes:

On October 31, 2013, the Crocus Group and the Miss Universe Organization hosted a charity auction. The initial guest list for the event, which includes individuals with ties to the highest levels of the Russian government, military, intelligence services, organized crime, Russian banks, and Russian energy companies, among others, offers some insight into the Agalarovs' social and professional network in Moscow. Some of the individuals on the Agalarovs' guest list have participated in Russian influence operations targeting the United States and its allies, some have significant connections to the Russian intelligence services, and some are currently sanctioned by the United States.

Likewise, the report outlines Trump’s participation during his Moscow visit in meetings with top banking officials, including the head of Sberbank—which is subject to U.S. economic sanctions and is closely linked to Putin. Trump even wrote a personal letter to the head of Sberbank thanking him for an “absolutely fantastic job.”

The committee takes pains to document Trump’s stay at the Ritz Carlton Moscow—the subject of allegations in the Steele dossier concerning supposedly compromising video of Trump with sex workers. According to the report, Keith Schiller, Trump’s head of security, was approached with an offer to send five women to Trump’s hotel room one of the nights he was in Moscow. While Schiller told the committee that he and Trump laughed off the offer and the liaison never occurred, a conspicuous footnote leads the reader to question whether Schiller is, in fact, telling the truth: “Cohen has testified that, ‘Keith is the ultimate protector, and he was [Trump's] bodyguard, his attache for many, many years. And he was the keeper of Mr. Trump's secrets. So, for example, if he was going to text a female, he would have Keith do it on his phone.’ Cohen has also testified that he has seen Schiller lie for Trump.”

The report also notes interactions on the Moscow trip between Trump and employees of the Agalarovs, Artem Klyushin and his wife Yulya Klyushina. The committee states that it has “significant concerns” about Klyushin, who “is a Kremlin-linked bot developer who has supported Russian influence operations on social media.” “The Committee assesses that he has provided social media influence expertise to the Kremlin,” helping spread pro-Kremlin propaganda in Ukraine in 2014. He is also connected to “a number of Kremlin-linked online influencers that are of concern to the Committee,” among them Konstantin Rykov, who “likely collaborated with the Russian Presidential Administration regarding a Russian influence operation targeting France” in 2014 in support of far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. Much of this section is redacted. The committee states that it has “little insight” into the nature of Trump’s 2013 interactions with Klyushin and his wife.

Though Trump never succeeded in meeting with Putin during the 2013 trip, Emin Agalarov’s music manager, Rob Goldstone, recalled that Putin’s representative, Dmitry Peskov, apparently indicated that Putin invited Trump on his next visit “to meet with him, whenever or wherever that should be within Russia. And he actually said to him that, if he could, he'd like to invite him to the Sochi Winter Olympics. If not, at the next possible time that Mr. Trump might be in Russia he would do everything he could to meet with him.” And the Agalarovs provided Trump with a small gift and a letter from Putin as well. An included note from Trump Jr. to his father reads, “You are being sent a gift from Putin!”

Trump stayed in touch with the Agalarovs following the Miss Universe pageant, and the report’s description of their subsequent interactions lays the foundation for understanding Trump’s efforts to construct a Trump Tower Moscow. The Agalarovs and the Trumps began discussing possible real estate collaboration shortly after the pageant: Trump actively pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project, the report shows, and Donald Trump Jr. was closely involved. Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov even signed formal, preliminary agreements on the deal. At some point, however, the negotiations petered out. Nevertheless, the Agalarovs stayed in touch with Trump, congratulating him on victories in the 2016 primary.

All this leads up to the June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower, New York, which the Agalarovs set in motion.

According to the committee, the June 9 meeting was not the first time that individuals linked to the Russian government had lobbied potentially sympathetic Americans on the subjects discussed in Trump Tower. Specifically, in April 2016, Dana Rohrabacher, then a Republican congressman, met with a “close confidant” of Putin's in Moscow, who provided the congressman with documents on “a series of allegations related to U.S. Magnitsky Act sanctions legislation.” While these documents are not the same as the documents used by Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya during the Trump Tower meeting, the committee writes, “the organization and substance of the two documents are similar, and parts of the two documents are nearly, or completely, identical.” Apart from this, much of the section on Rohrabacher’s meeting and the Russians with whom he met is redacted.

The report next describes the players in the June 9 meeting. While it has long been public that Veselnitskaya “previously worked for, and remains in contact with, senior individuals in the Russian government,” the report’s language about her activities is more ominous than that of the Mueller report: The Senate writes that Veselnitskaya, along with another participant in the meeting, Russian-American lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshin, have “significant connections to … the Russian intelligence services.” Veselnitskaya has “close ties” to one-time Russian chief prosecutor Yuri Chaika, who “likely has been involved in Russian influence activities.” As to Akhmetshin, the report states that Akhmetshin’s ties to Putin and Russian intelligence services “were more extensive than what has previously been publicly known”—and “Akhmetshin has a history of allegations against him regarding hacking and the dumping of stolen information as part of influence operations.” The section of the report concerning Veselnitskaya and Akhmetshin contains extensive portions of redacted information, and the committee states that neither person was “forthcoming” in conversations with the committee.

As with Trump’s adventures in Moscow, the Senate report contains a detailed tick-tock of the Trump Tower meeting and the events leading up to it. According to Goldstone, the seeds of the June 9 meeting were planted when Emin Agalarov reached out to Goldstone to ask if he could connect “the Trumps” with a “well-connected” Russian lawyer who had information “potentially damaging to the Democrats and Hillary”; in Goldstone’s recollection, Emin said that “my dad would really like this meeting to take place.” When Goldstone reached out to Trump Jr., the latter responded—now famously—"if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer.” Trump Jr. told the committee that “‘l love it’ is a colloquial expression he frequently uses to indicate being in favor of something.”

During this period, Goldstone was also reaching out to the campaign with invitations from the Russian social networking site VKontakte to set up an “official” Trump campaign page on the site to reach Russian-speaking voters. Though much of the information on VKontakte’s outreach is redacted, an unredacted sentence states that the committee has “extremely limited” insight into the motivation behind the outreach but that “targeting Russians speaking voters in the United States is thematically consistent with [redacted] undertaken by the Russian government in support of Trump in the 2016 election.”

According to both Manafort and Gates, Trump Jr. discussed Goldstone’s proposal for a meeting at a regular “Family Meeting” held daily in Trump Tower for “Trump family members and senior Campaign staff.” Trump Jr. and Kushner, however, said they did not remember this. Manafort and Gates both recalled Trump Jr. telling them about the meeting; Manafort told the committee that, as the report puts it, “Trump Jr. would not have invited Manafort to attend unless Trump Jr. thought the meeting would potentially be important,” while Gates remembered Trump Jr. announcing “he had a lead on negative information about the Clinton Foundation,” and described Manafort as telling Trump Jr. to be careful.

After a back-and-forth between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov—documented by phone records, but which both participants told the committee they could not remember—the meeting was scheduled, and Manafort and Kushner were invited. An email chain with the subject line “FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential” documents the invitation, but Kushner said he didn’t remember reading the email, and Manafort said he read only the first email in the chain.

The report describes:

On June 7, several days after Goldstone's offer of information to Trump Jr. and several hours after Trump Jr. confirmed the June 9, 2016 meeting with Goldstone, then-candidate Trump publicly stated, "I'm going to give a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons. I think you're going to find it very informative and very, very interesting." That speech did not happen as scheduled.

Stephen Miller, who worked on the Campaign, told the Committee that the speech referenced by Trump may have been postponed due to the Pulse nightclub shooting in Florida. … This is consistent with Trump's written answers to questions from the SCO. The SCO "did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton."

So did Trump know about the meeting? Michael Cohen recalled:

Michael Cohen testified to the Committee that he was present in Trump's office when Trump Jr. came into the office and, in a manner that was uncommon, walked toward the back of Trump's desk and leaned over and quietly said, "The meeting. It's all set." Cohen recalled that Trump replied, "Okay. Keep me posted."

But Cohen acknowledged that it was “speculation” to connect this to the June 9 meeting and could not recall the exact date of the conversation. Meanwhile, Trump Jr. told the committee he did not remember informing his father of the meeting; Kushner said he had no “reason to believe” that Trump was informed; Trump said in answers to Mueller’s team that he did not remember if the meeting took place; and Manafort said he had never told Trump about the meeting.

The committee notes that both Manafort and Kushner prioritized the meeting with Veselnitskaya despite their busy schedules. The meeting quickly got off on the wrong foot when Veselnitskaya began speaking about Democratic donors whom she accused of failing to pay taxes in Russia and the U.S.—which Veselnitskaya’s translator told the committee he understood as a “carrot”—and then transitioned to discussing the Magnitsky Act and offering to push for lifting Russian restrictions on American adoptions if Trump would undo sanctions under the legislation.

Kushner left the meeting early, sending Manafort a text reading, “Waste of time.” According to Trump Jr.: “I think it became pretty apparent to me once they made that transition that this was a way for them to lobby me about some sort of policy. We listened for a few minutes, said it has nothing to do with us, we left. Rob Goldstone apologized to me on the way out. ... The meeting really wasn't about anything that he said it was going to be about.”

Likewise, another attendee at the meeting, who was present as a representative of the Agalarovs, wrote to a family member: “[The] meeting was boring. The Russians did not have any bad info [on] Hillary."

After news broke on June 14 that the Russian government had hacked the DNC, Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov and the Agalarov family representative, writing, “seems eerily weird based on our Trump meeting last week with the Russian lawyers etc.” The representative responded, “Very interesting.” The day before, Goldstone had spoken with Paula Shugart, the president of the Miss America Organization, who recalled him mentioning “a ridiculous meeting, where he went and they supposedly had emails from the Democrats and dirt on Hillary and then it turned out to be something about adoptions”—and when the news of the hack was reported on June 14, Shugart called Goldstone and said, “This sounds like what you were talking about,” though Goldstone denied it. The committee writes in a footnote:

The Committee notes this exchange because it is the only time that the Committee was told that emails were discussed as derogatory information at the June 9, 2016 meeting. It is noteworthy that Shugart recalls the emails being mentioned by Goldstone prior to the news of the DNC hack becoming public, and that she made the connection between the news of the DNC hack and Goldstone's account of the meeting at the time. Nevertheless, Shugart herself was not present at the meeting and noted that Goldstone is an "over-the-top personality, sometimes hard to follow." The Committee found no other evidence indicating that emails were discussed at the June 9, 2016 meeting. The Committee was ultimately not able to reconcile this discrepancy.

Oddly, following the failed meeting, the Agalarovs sent Trump a large painting as a birthday gift, and promised to send him two additional paintings (which were never delivered). They also sent the candidate more presents and messages as the campaign progressed, through Election Day. On Nov. 9, the father and son shared a congratulatory letter with the president-elect, stating, “We in Russia have been rooting for you and are very happy about your truly historic victory. People in Russia held high hopes that with your arrival into the White House, we will finally have a chance to normalize Russian-American relations, create [sic] ground for rebuilding the network of human and business contacts.”

Aras Agalarov aggressively pushed for a further meeting between Veselnitskaya and the Trump team following the election, though these efforts were unsuccessful.

In short, the committee paints the Trump Tower meeting in a somewhat more ominous light than do previous accounts: In the committee’s version, it took place against a backdrop of several years of cultivation of the Trumps by the Agalarovs, whom it describes as closely tied to mobsters and the Putin regime and specifically tied to folks involved in election-related influence operations. Against that backdrop, it describes a failed meeting that coincided in timing with the Russian hacking operation—to which it may or may not have had any relation.

D. Trump Tower Moscow, pp. 407-463

Trump Tower in New York, where the infamous June 9 meeting took place, was not the only Trump Tower at issue in the interactions between Donald Trump and the Russians during the 2016 campaign. During the 2016 election cycle, senior members of the Trump Organization received at least three proposals for a Trump Tower in Moscow. Two were made to Michael Cohen, then executive vice president of the Trump Organization and personal attorney to Trump, by Felix Sater and Giorgi Rtskhiladze. One was made to Eric Trump by Boris Epshteyn, a then-Trump Campaign surrogate. Dmitri Klokov also contacted Cohen, through Ivanka Trump, during the 2016 election to set up a potential Trump-Putin meeting, possibly related to the same project.

These outreaches ended up being funneled to Michael Cohen, and he pursued them eagerly. In particular, the report describes in detail the energetic efforts by Cohen—with Trump’s blessing and encouragement—to pursue a real estate deal to build a Trump Tower in Moscow through Felix Sater and his Russian-government-and-organized-crime-connected interlocutors. These efforts continued throughout the campaign. Yet Trump reassured Americans throughout the campaign and into his presidency that he had no Russian business interests or other entanglements. As just one example, on July 27, 2016, he said, “I have nothing to with Russia. I have nothing to do with Russia—for anything.”

This was a lie, and for those quick to dismiss the notion that Donald Trump was to any degree compromised by the Russians, consider the lie for a moment. Trump made these comments publicly in a high-stakes situation. He knew when he did so that they were untrue. The Russians also knew they were untrue. And Trump also knew that the Russians knew that they were untrue. The only people who didn’t know they were untrue were the American public. This creates leverage, because Trump also knew at some level that the Russians could expose his lie in a high-stakes situation at any point. Such knowledge creates counterintelligence risk for the simple reason that it creates a powerful incentive on the part of the candidate not to cross the party with leverage.

How powerful was that incentive? This section of the report spends more than 50 pages documenting communications and other machinations about the potential for a Trump Tower Moscow project. Architectural renderings were created. Trump himself signed a letter of intent. And Trump admitted to pursuing the deal only after it became utterly clear, in November 2018, that information about his, Cohen’s and others’ involvement in negotiations for the project would become public—and that denying any involvement with Russia would be impossible.

Even then, he was unrepentant: “There would be nothing wrong if I did do it. I was running my business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn’t have won, in which case I would have gotten back into the business. And why should I lose lots of opportunities?”

The seemingly most promising such opportunity came through Sater, who had worked for Trump and had explored the possibility of building a Trump Tower Moscow years earlier. In 1998, Sater had pleaded guilty to participation in a racketeering enterprise and agreed to serve as a government cooperator as part of his plea deal. Over the next decade, he proved extremely cooperative on a wide range of issues because of his continued connections with Russian individuals—including high-ranking military, former military and KGB officers—and with Russian criminal groups. The report states that Sater was a “prolific cooperator for the U.S. Government,” providing information on “‘the most elusive and dangerous’” individuals of interest to U.S. law enforcement.

Sater began working with the Trump Organization on real estate deals in 2000 as an executive at Bayrock. Bayrock leased office space in Trump Tower in New York around 2000, two floors below Trump’s offices. Later, while working with Daniel Ridloff, Sater got office space on the same floor of Trump Tower as Trump’s offices in exchange for work to source international deals. For less than a year, he served as senior adviser to Donald Trump. Between 2003 and 2004, he began working on a Trump project in Moscow, potentially to build a Trump Tower, and took an “exploratory trip” to Russia. These efforts continued on and off for some time but never resulted in a deal.

Fast forward to 2015. Donald Trump announced his candidacy for the presidency in June.

On Sept. 15, Cohen appeared on a radio program with Sean Hannity in which he said there is a “better than likely chance” that Trump would meet with Putin during Putin’s upcoming trip to the U.N. General Assembly in New York City. Cohen initially told the committee that he was “just throwing it out there in order to have fun.” However, Cohen later admitted that prior to the Hannity show, he had engaged in concerted efforts to arrange such a meeting. He had called the Kremlin earlier in September and asked the woman who answered if there was “[a]ny chance when President Putin is in New York at the General Assembly he’d like to come by and have a burger with Mr. Trump at the [G]rille?” Cohen claimed the Kremlin representative responded by stating that she didn't think “protocol” would allow it, but that she would “let you know if we can.”

Cohen initially claimed to the committee that he never told Trump or anyone else in the Trump Organization or Trump campaign about the outreach or the idea for the meeting, but in subsequent testimony with the committee he admitted that much of this original account was false. He had, in fact, discussed the potential Putin meeting with Trump “two or three” times and Trump had supported Cohen’s outreach.

Specifically, Cohen recalled Trump seeing press articles that suggested that then-President Obama would not meet with Putin during the U.N. General Assembly. Cohen recalled Trump asking him rhetorically, “How stupid is our President not to meet with Putin when he's here?” Cohen recalled telling Trump that it would be “really cool” if “we can get [Putin] to come here and have a burger with you over at the Trump Grille.” Trump directed Cohen to “see if you can make it happen.” Cohen subsequently conducted the initial outreach to the Kremlin. Sometime after the Sept. 15, 2015, Hannity radio interview, Cohen followed up with the representative of the Russian government. Cohen was under the impression that Putin was informed of the outreach. Cohen ultimately informed Trump that the meeting would not happen.

Yet it seems Cohen’s statements and outreach sparked interest in Russia and with Trump’s Russia-connected associates. The report states that in late September, “Cohen received two seemingly independent offers to build a Trump Tower Moscow” that “arrived within days of each other.” Although Cohen did not think the offers were related to his outreach to the Kremlin earlier in the month, he “admitted that he had never before received two separate offers for the same building location at approximately the same time.”

One offer was from Sater, who claimed that his outreach was undertaken at his own initiative. In late September 2015, Sater called Andrei Rozov, the head of a Russian real estate development firm with the concept for a Trump Tower Moscow. Notably, the report states that “a body of information suggests Rozov’s personal and professional network likely has at least some ties to individuals associated with Russian influence operations.” Sater then called Cohen and presented the idea for a Trump Tower Moscow—a skyscraper that would be the tallest tower in Europe. Sater believed that a deal this large would require approval from Putin himself.

Cohen sought and obtained approval from Trump to initiate the negotiations.

Shortly thereafter, Cohen, Sater and Rozov quickly agreed to basic deal parameters and, around late September, Cohen forwarded architectural renderings for the project directly to Rozov. By Oct. 5, Cohen had drafted a letter of intent for the project that included specifics: a 120-story residential tower to be built in Moscow, a license fee structure that included a $4 million up-front fee to be paid in various installments, and a number of other detailed financial arrangements. Various revisions were made, including the inclusion of a hotel management provision that would allow Trump International Hotels Management to operate the hotel for 25 years, collecting a percentage of gross operating revenue, with the option to manage food and other services.

Sater moved energetically from there. He met with Russian billionaire Andrey Molchanov. Putin had worked in the past with Molchanov’s stepfather, who was in St. Petersburg’s city government. He told Cohen that Andrey Kostin, whom Sater described as “Putin’s top finance guy and CEO of 2nd largest bank in Russia,” was “on board and has indicated he would finance Trump Moscow.” The bank was VTB, and Kostin was “extremely powerful and respected.” Sater also tried to get Putin “on board” and claimed he had set up a tentative meeting with “Putin and [his] top deputy.”

The meeting did not happen, but by mid-October, Sater sent Cohen a letter of intent with Rozov’s signature. In the email, Sater linked the project to relations between the United States and Russia:

Lets [sic] make this happen and build a Trump Moscow. And possibly fix relations between the countries by showing everyone that commerce & business are much better and more practical than politics. That should be Putins [sic] message as well, and we will help him agree on that message. Help world peace and make a lot of money. I would say that’s a great lifetime goal for us to go after.

Approximately two weeks later, Trump countersigned the letter of intent. At approximately the same time, Trump conducted a campaign rally in Norfolk, Virginia, to announce his policy plans for veterans. During the rally, and seemingly unprompted, Trump made positive comments about Putin:

You know, I've made a lot of money. Deals are people, deals are people. And you have got to analyze people, and I can look at people. I can tell you, I’ll get along with Putin. I was on 60 Minutes with Putin. He was my stablemate three weeks ago. We got the highest ratings in a long time on 60 Minutes. You saw that, right? He was my stablemate. I believe I’ll get along with him. It was Trump and Putin, Putin and Trump. I’d even let him go first if it makes us friendly. I’ll give up the name. I’ll give up that place. But I was on 60 Minutes three weeks ago. I’ll get along with him.

He made similar comments at a press conference a few days later. Sater told Cohen that Putin was aware of the Trump Tower Moscow project and was supportive—a claim that Cohen relayed to Trump. The report states:

(U) Cohen further believed that the Trump Moscow project, and particularly the signing of the [letter of intent], affected Trump’s thinking and rhetoric toward Russia and Putin on the campaign trail. Cohen believed that Trump’s public comments about Russia could have been influenced by Cohen informing Trump that Putin was aware of, and had approved of, the project. When asked if Cohen had coordinated Trump’s public comments about Putin, Cohen stated that he hadn’t, but pointed to the fact that he had conveyed Putin’s awareness to Trump and believed it was a factor in Trump’s statements.

The report finds that Sater, for his part, “said that the connection between the project and the campaign was so obvious that he didn’t think the connection needed to be verbalized. … Sater told the Committee that what Trump was saying on the campaign trail could ‘help’ the project move forward.”

It’s worth pausing for a moment here to consider how the Americans involved in these efforts seemed to have zero pause about using a presidential campaign to actively advance potentially lucrative private business deals. Trump clearly shared that ethos: As has been previously reported, Cohen said Trump called his campaign “the greatest infomercial in the history of politics.”

The report details Sater’s efforts to engage with personal friends of Putin, like Andrey Rozov, the Rotenbergs (a family “extremely close to Putin” who handle “special projects” for him), Mikhail Zayats, and Evgeny Shmykov.

Who is Shmykov? The report redacts most of the text addressing Shmykov. But based on reporting by multiple news outlets, Shmykov is a former general in Russian military intelligence—the GRU.

Another Evgeny also makes an appearance in Sater’s efforts: Evgeny Dvoskin, who the report states is “strongly connected to Russian organized crime and the Russian intelligence services, particularly the FSB.”

It’s quite a crowd, and, remember, none of this is public at the time. Trump is literally running for president while attempting to negotiate a business deal with a Russian dictator and while actively courting the mobsters and spies around him.

The report goes on, in detail, to show the continued efforts by Cohen to advance the deal, that Cohen sought to visit Moscow himself as well as to lay the groundwork for a visit to Moscow by Trump in 2016. At one point, Cohen sent his own passport information to Sater, and he kept Trump apprised of his and Sater’s efforts. Cohen also recalled speaking with Donald Trump Jr. and lvanka Trump about the project.

In late December 2015, Cohen grew impatient with Sater for not delivering the high-level Russian contacts and invitations Sater had promised. Cohen told Sater he had “lost the deal” and that Cohen was contacting his “alternate”—presumably Giorgi Rtskhiladze. Cohen also reached out directly to the Kremlin to get Putin’s help to advance the project—this time with considerably better results. He tried to email Dmitry Peskov, the Russian government press secretary as well as a “high-level Kremlin insider and a key advisor to Putin.” His efforts worked. Peskov’s chief of staff, Elena Poliakova (described in the report as someone with “exceptional access within the Kremlin”) responded from her personal email account a few days later and provided a phone number for Cohen to call. They spoke for approximately 20 minutes and discussed the Trump Moscow project in great detail. Poliakova already knew all about the proposed project—Cohen stated that she had “really done her homework” and that he wished some of the Trump Organization’s assistants “would be this prepared.” Poliakova told Cohen that they would be in touch.

That conversation reignited Cohen’s and Sater’s efforts and engagement. For a while, it looked like Trump might actually go to Russia:

At some point shortly after Cohen’s call with Peskov’s assistant, Cohen told Trump about the call. Cohen recalled telling Trump that he had spoken with “someone from the Kremlin” about the Trump Tower Moscow project. … Cohen recalled that at some point in this approximate time period he also discussed the possibility of traveling to Russia with Trump. Cohen recalled that Trump did not express concerns about traveling to Russia while a presidential candidate if it would aid the deal. According to Cohen, Trump instructed Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski about dates for potential travel to Russia.

Travel dates were identified, and Rhona Graff, Trump’s assistant, brought Cohen Trump’s passport in preparation for a trip in February or March 2016.

It didn’t happen, and there was a short lull in planning, but later that spring, Cohen and Sater resumed their activity around the project and the possibility of traveling to Russia. This time, the question was whether it would happen before or after the Republican National Convention in Cleveland in late July 2016. Cohen instructed Sater: “My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the convention.” Sater told the Committee that he “absolutely” understood that the Moscow project was still active at this time.

In early May, Sater told Cohen that Peskov himself wanted to invite Cohen to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) in mid-June. SPIEF is the most important Russian business summit conducted “under the auspices of the President of the Russian Federation, who has also attended each event.” It is unclear if an invitation actually was forthcoming from Peskov, but in any event, Sater worked with “Evgeny” to arrange an invitation for Cohen.

But alas, after many machinations to arrange a trip to Moscow for Cohen and Trump to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project, it was not to be. Sater and Cohen met in the Trump Tower atrium, and Sater recalled: “[Cohen] turned around and said: I can’t go. At the last minute he said: I can't go; let’s wait until after Cleveland.” The report states that Cohen decided not to go because “he felt the invitation did not come from the highest level in Moscow.” In any event:

Through at least June 2016, Cohen said that Trump viewed the Moscow project the same way Cohen did, as an “opportunity that was active.” Cohen came to this understanding because Trump would, on a “regular basis,” ask Cohen about the status of the Russia project. Cohen recalled: “In other words, Mr. Trump is out there on the rally, in the public, stating there’s no Russian collusion, there’s no involvement, there’s no deals, there’s no connection. And yet, the following day, as we’re walking to his car, he’s asking me, ‘How’s things going with Russia?’” … Cohen understood that Trump was “interested in the project” and recalled that he had spoken to Trump “ten to twelve” times during the course of the negotiations, which lasted from September 2015 to at least until June 2016.

Imagine if the Russians had decided to disclose the fact of these discussions that Trump was then denying. Imagine as well the pressure this possibility would have created for Trump even as he was setting himself up for it.

After the Republican National Convention in July 2016, the report indicates, Sater stated that it became obvious that there was “just no way that a presidential candidate could build a tower in a foreign country.” As a result, efforts on the project ceased.

What about the other offer to build a Trump Tower Moscow that materialized in late September 2015? In addition to Cohen’s attempts with Sater, Cohen received a call from Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a businessman with whom he had previously worked, about a similar project proposal in Moscow. Rtskhiladze had worked with Cohen on at least two other business projects. Rtskhiladze said he “had a group that he wanted to talk to about doing a Trump Tower Moscow.” Simon Nizharadze, a business associate of Rtskhiladze’s, had requested he contact Cohen to facilitate a potential licensing deal between Vladimir Mazur and the Trump Organization. The architect Rtskhiladze had in mind had designed the tallest building in Russia and worked on projects for the Moscow city-level government in Russia. Later, Rtskhiladze told Cohen that a “project presentation” for the Trump residential building will be ready in several days and that the Trump World Tower project concept “is being shared with the presidents [sic] cabinet and Moscow mayor.”

It was not to be, though. Cohen decided not to pursue a Moscow project with Rtskhiladze and instead pursued the project with Sater.

And what about the other instances of outreach to the Trump family related to the Trump Tower Moscow project? According to the report, in addition to communicating with both Sater and Rtskhiladze in the fall of 2015, Cohen had contact with another Russian national, Dmitry Klokov, in the same time frame. Klokov was the director of external communications for a large Russian energy company and had served as the press secretary to Russia’s minister of energy.

This time, the outreach came not to Cohen but through a different channel: Ivanka Trump. On Nov. 16, 2015, Ivanka Trump received an email from Klokov’s wife about the Trump Tower Moscow project. According to Cohen, the report states, Ivanka Trump called Cohen, forwarded the email, and asked him to follow up and “report back to her on the outcome of the outreach.” According to Cohen, Ivanka Trump also forwarded the initial outreach from Klokov’s wife. When asked if lvanka Trump’s instruction to Cohen was about the Trump Tower Moscow project or a potential meeting between Putin and Trump, Cohen said that it was a “combination of the two.”

When Cohen spoke to Klokov on the phone the next day, Klokov already knew about the project in Moscow. Cohen told the committee that Klokov claimed he had “relationships with the government,” that he could “help with this Trump Moscow proposal, and it would be great if all parties were able to meet and to develop this property in Moscow.” Cohen said Klokov was “adamant about me coming to Moscow and to bring Mr. Trump to Moscow for the two to meet.” Klokov emailed Cohen the next day, Nov. 18, 2015, to emphasize that he was not affiliated with any business but was, instead, a “trusted person” focused on “political synergy.” He indicated that “our person of interest,” meaning Putin, was “ready to meet your candidate,” meaning Trump. Klokov said the Russian side would facilitate all aspects of the Putin-Trump meeting, including the security, transportation and accommodation. The meeting “ha[d] to be informal”:

Further, Klokov told Cohen that Cohen’s business development efforts should be separated from the proposed “informal” meeting between Putin and Trump. Klokov emphasized that although these would be bifurcated, ultimately the meeting would yield even larger business opportunities which would have “the most important support.”

Cohen quickly responded to Klokov’s email—and copied Ivanka Trump. Cohen expressed enthusiasm but told Klokov that he would advise Trump not to travel to Russia except in the context of an “official visit.”

According to the report, Klokov responded to Cohen the following day, Nov. 16, 2015, and “reemphasized that his focus was not on the immediate business project, but rather arranging an informal meeting between Putin and Trump.” Klokov stated that the meeting “has already been discussed” with Putin, who was “knowledgeable about it and would gladly meet your client”:

Klokov focused again on his goal of creating “synergy on a government level,” but made clear that the Putin meeting would have lucrative business outcomes: “Now, your client is a candidate and hardly any other political move could be compared to a tete-a-tete meeting between them. If publicized correctly the impact of it could be phenomenal, of course not only in political but in a business dimension as well. I don't have to tell you that there is no bigger warranty in any project than consent of the person of interest.”

Cohen tried to refocus the discussion on the business project and said that he would be “honored” to meet with Klokov while in Moscow “to discuss any thoughts you might have that could enhance the project.”

The report states that the committee did not obtain any further communications between Cohen and Klokov. Cohen said he relayed the sum and substance of his conversation with Klokov to Ivanka Trump. He “may have” told Trump about the outreach but said he did not recall whether he informed anyone else in the Trump Organization of the outreach during this time period.

There is one more Trump Tower Moscow outreach to describe—this one to Eric Trump. In the spring of 2016, Boris Epshteyn—a Trump campaign surrogate and later employee—received a proposal from contacts he had in the Moscow city government. He shared it with Eric Trump, with whom Epshteyn had long been friends. The report states that the committee has no indication that the Trump Organization took any action related to the proposal.

The balance of this section describes all of the efforts Michael Cohen, Trump, and others made to mislead the public—and Congress—about Trump Tower Moscow during the 2016 presidential campaign:

As described by Cohen in his testimony to the Committee and elsewhere, Cohen believed that there was a discrepancy between then-candidate Trump’s public statements on the campaign trail stating that he had no business deals related to Russia, and the approximately nine-month effort to build Trump Tower Moscow in 2015 and 2016. During the campaign, Cohen also undertook efforts to maintain the secrecy of the negotiations.

The report also includes a puzzling little discussion about the potential for other Trump figures’ involvement with some of the same Russians that popped up in the Trump Tower Moscow narrative. After the election, Cohen was part of an alleged joint defense agreement (JDA) with an unknown number of other Trump-affiliated individuals, including Trump himself, the Trump Organization, Jared Kushner, lvanka Trump, Felix Sater, and others.

According to the report, a number of issues arose as the committee sought testimony and documents from Cohen that likely related to the functioning of this alleged JDA. One such issue involved outreach related to Dmitry Klokov. Cohen initially told the committee that a communication came into the Trump Organization requesting that Cohen speak with Klokov. Cohen’s then-attorney, Stephen Ryan, told the committee that the communications were privileged and they were therefore not produced. Cohen later told the cthat, in fact, Ryan had said the communication was privileged at the request of Abbe Lowell, who at the time served as attorney to Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner. Cohen then told the committee the communication was not, in fact, privileged and testified about its contents in his second interview with the committee. The report states that “t is unclear why Ryan ever considered the communication privileged.”

The report also makes clear that multiple emails between Cohen and Russian government officials were never produced to the committee, including Cohen’s outreach to the Kremlin's press office seeking to speak with Putin's chief of staff, Sergei Ivanov, as well as a response from Dmitri Peskov’s assistant seeking to discuss the Trump Moscow project. Cohen initially made false statements to the committee about these communications and transmitted his false statements about his outreach to the Kremlin on the project to the press and to the public generally. The goal was to give the false impression that Cohen had not communicated in a substantive way with the Russian government regarding the project.

Of course, Cohen eventually pleaded guilty to making intentionally false statements to this committee and to the House Intelligence Committee related to the Trump Tower project. Cohen told the committee that a certain email with a Russian government employee—presumably Elena Poliakova—was never provided to him by the Trump Organization, another member of the alleged JDA. As a result, he could not produce it to the committee: “The Committee was unable to determine the accuracy of this claim. However, if true, this lends support to the conclusion that Cohen’s initial false statements to the Committee were aided by other members of the alleged JDA, namely the Trump Organization.”

It doesn’t stop there. The section ends with this paragraph:

Furthermore, drafts of Cohen’s prepared statement that included this and other false or misleading statements was “circulated through all of the various individuals” who read it and, according to Cohen, these individuals “knew the information was false.” Cohen “suspect[ed]” that Trump had seen the statement. He further said that he believed Trump knew that the statement was false because “my conversations with him took place for several months after the January date that’s referenced in this statement.” Cohen also said that after he was indicted in the Southern District of New York, he discussed a potential pardon for himself with Jay Sekulow “more than a half dozen times.” Cohen further stated that he understood that the pardon discussions had come from Trump through Sekulow.

In short, the gist of this section seems to be this: Multiple efforts were made by the Russian government to create a situation in which Putin and candidate Trump could meet. It seems the enticement of the Trump Tower Moscow project was as good a predicate as any to make that happen. When it became clear that Trump’s candidacy had legs, multiple offers from Russian-government-connected interlocutors presented themselves to Trump confidantes through multiple channels. Trump encouraged Michael Cohen and asked about progress on the project. Yet a deal never quite seemed to come to fruition, despite multiple probes through multiple channels. Once it dawned on the Trump inner circle that a meeting with Vladimir Putin might not serve their political interests, they lied about it and tried to cover it up.

But it seems Putin may have gotten what he wanted anyway—a sordid story of an American president and his cronies cynically pursuing business interests while proclaiming “America First” and lying about it. So in the end, Putin can tell his countrymen what he’s always wanted them to understand—that America is really not any different from Russia.

And along the way, Trump put himself in a position in which the Russians could reveal him as a liar about one of his more famous 2016 campaign pledges.

E. George Papadopoulos, pp. 464-524

Among the many colorful characters orbiting around the 2016 Trump campaign was George Papadopoulos, who described himself on LinkedIn as an “oil, gas, and policy consultant” despite having relatively little experience in that field. After a period working on Ben Carson’s unsuccessful presidential campaign, Papadapoulos reached out aggressively to the Trump campaign in 2015 and early 2016, and was rewarded with a volunteer spot on Trump’s foreign policy advisory team. The campaign added Papadopoulos to the team “without thorough vetting,” the committee writes, as part of a rush to put together a group of foreign policy advisers to counter negative press attention regarding the campaign’s lack of foreign policy experience. According to the report, this “resulted in [the campaign’s] recruitment of inexperienced advisors, over whom they exerted little control”—and those advisers “exposed the Trump Campaign to significant counterintelligence vulnerabilities.” The committee finds that Papadopoulos “was not a witting cooptee of the Russian intelligence services”—that is, in intelligence jargon, he was not knowingly being used by the Russian government—but he “nevertheless presented as a prime intelligence target and potential vector for Russian influence.”

“Papadopoulos,” the committee writes, “proffered himself as a conduit between the Trump team and foreign governments, including Russia, Egypt, and Greece.” Crucial to his Russia outreach was his relationship with Joseph Mifsud—a shadowy academic identified by the Mueller investigation as a link between the Russian government and the Trump campaign. (The report notes that “[t]he Committee’s awareness of Mifsud’s activities is limited to document production and testimony from other witnesses, information from the Executive Branch, and open source research, in the absence of Mifsud’s testimony.”) Papadopoulos met Mifsud during a 2016 trip to Rome, and the committee writes that “Mifsud’s interest in Papadopoulos appeared entirely reliant on Papadopoulos’s association with the Trump campaign.”

Mifsud put Papadopoulos in touch with Olga Polonskaya, a Russian woman he introduced as a relative of Vladimir Putin. (According to his Google history, Papadopoulos spent some time online after meeting her searching for “Putin’s niece.” Papadopoulos apparently had a habit of “conducting internet research on individuals he met” after meeting with them, the committee writes.) Papadopoulos told the FBI that “Polonskaya, who could barely speak English during their in-person meeting, then began communicating with him via electronic means in more fluent English.”

Following his meeting with Mifsud and Polonskaya, Papadopoulos wrote to other members of the Trump campaign foreign policy team, announcing that he had “just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud … who introduced me to both Putin’s niece and the Russian Ambassador in London[.]” (Papadopoulos later testified to the House Judiciary Committee that he had lied about meeting the Russian ambassador, the Senate Intelligence Committee notes.) He added that the lunch had concerned arranging a meeting between the Russian government and the Trump campaign—perhaps even Putin and Trump themselves. In response, campaign aide Sam Clovis responded that the campaign would make “no commitments” for the time being, but added, “Great work.”

This early email exchange sets the tone for many of the interactions between Papadopoulos and the Trump campaign described in the report. Papadopoulos repeatedly tried to arrange a meeting between Trump and Putin throughout the campaign—while also serially exaggerating his own connections and accomplishments. The committee writes that he “did not seem to consider himself a target for foreign intelligence services.” Meanwhile, the campaign sometimes encouraged Papadopoulos, sometimes ignored him, but tended neither to give his ideas enthusiastic backing nor ask him to stop entirely.

Papadopoulos raised his suggestion of a meeting between Trump and Putin during an in-person meeting of Trump’s freshly minted national security team on March 31, 2016. Papadopoulos “believed that Trump and Sessions were somewhere between tacitly supportive of his idea and very supportive of his idea, and he left the meeting with the impression that ‘these guys wanted this,’” he explained in one of his FBI interviews.

He followed up on the proposal with two other members of the foreign policy team, Walid Phares and Carter Page. Around this same time, he also followed up with Polonskaya and met with Mifsud again, who introduced him via email to Ivan Timofeev, an employee of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). Papadopoulos and Timofeev corresponded about a potential in-person meeting between the two of them and spoke over Skype. Although Papadopoulos told the FBI that he could not remember much of what the call involved, he did say that “the two likely discussed relations between Russia, Israel, Cyprus, and China.” He described a second Skype call with Timofeev as “strange” and formal, and recalled “hearing static noises on the call, which Papadopoulos thought suggested that someone was recording the call.”

On April 26, 2016—by which point, the committee writes, the GRU had already successfully hacked Democratic Party systems and John Podesta’s email account—Papadopoulos met with Mifsud once more. Mifsud proceeded to tell him that “he had just returned from a trip to Moscow” and informed Papadopoulos that “they have her emails”—“her” being Hillary Clinton.

When asked what Papadopoulos thought when he heard the information from Mifsud, Papadopoulos recalled it being “a strange thing to hear.” Papadopoulos inquired of Mifsud how he could know such information, to which Mifsud stated, “they told me.” When Papadopoulos referred to Mifsud’s statement of “they told me,” Papadopoulos extended both of his hands and pointed at himself with both index fingers.

The next paragraph is redacted, but an unredacted footnote cites Papadopoulos’s FBI interview: “Papadopoulos stated to the best of his recollection he remembers Clovis being upset after Papadopoulos said, ‘Sam, I think they have her emails.’ Papadopoulos then reiterated he was not certain if that event actually happened or if he was wrongfully remembering an event which did not occur.”

At this point, the story becomes briefly murky. Essentially, Papadopoulos informed at least one, possibly two, Australian diplomats in London about Russia’s possession of “emails”—which eventually sparked the FBI’s “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation into Russian election interference in July 2016 after Australia alerted the bureau. The committee writes, however, that it is not entirely clear when Papadopoulos conveyed that information: Papadopoulos told the FBI that he remembered having “three drinks,” but the accounts are not consistent as to when and where Papadopoulos had those drinks and informed the Australians of Russia’s “dirt.” (With some irritation, the committee writes in a footnote that “[t]he serial ambiguities and inconsistencies attached to Papadopoulos’s activities … might have been mitigated or even explained away, had the Committee benefited from the testimony of either [Australian diplomat Alexander] Downer or Papadopoulos—both of whom declined the Committee’s invitation to be interviewed.”) This portion of the report is followed by what appear to be three redacted paragraphs.

Regardless, the bottom line remains the same: Mifsud told Papadopoulos that Russia had Clinton’s emails, and Papadopoulos blurted that fact out to the Australians. Yet it’s still not clear whether or not Papadopoulos informed the Trump campaign about the emails.

After this ill-fated drinking excursion, Papadopoulos continued lobbying the Trump campaign to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin. He appears to have had little success, yet “[t]he Committee did not obtain any communications in which Clovis or other Campaign leadership telling [sic] Papadopoulos to cease his interactions with Timofeev or Mifsud regarding Russia.”

However, in an internal campaign document created by Clovis around this time, one bullet point notes, “Still working on the ins and outs of going to Russia as a candidate.” Clovis and then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski later testified to the committee that a trip to Russia by Trump was not seriously on the table, but the committee writes that it “gives greater credibility to the written records, which suggest that the Campaign was at least open to the idea of a foreign trip.”

Ironically, given the counterintelligence risks the committee found in Paul Manafort’s own presence on the campaign, Papadopoulos encountered the greatest resistance to his proposal from Manafort: After Papadopoulos reached out to Manafort about invitations for Trump to visit Greece and Russia, Manafort wrote to Gates, “We need someone to communicate that DT is not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the campaign so as not to send any signal.” Gates responded positively, but the committee did not uncover “any further actions by Manafort or Gates on this issue.”

In May 2016, Papadopoulos traveled to Greece and met with Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotsias and Defense Minister Panagiotis Kammenos. According to Papadopoulos’s FBI interview, he “blurted [out]” to Kotsias what Mifsud had told him about how Russia had obtained Clinton’s emails. Kotsias, Papadopoulos said, responded, “Don’t tell this to anyone”—leading Papadopoulos to believe that Kotsias already knew about the hacking. Somewhat dryly, the committee states that it “has no reliable indication that Papadopoulos shared this same information with anyone on the [Trump] Campaign”—but it “has no additional information as to why Papadopoulos would share the information with the Greek Foreign Minister,” either.

The committee also notes Kammenos’s connections to Putin: In fact, it appears that Kammenos met with Putin, who was arriving in Athens, on the same day he met with Papadopoulos. This paragraph is followed by a block of redacted text. The report does note, however, that Kammenos was photographed in Washington, D.C., with Papadopoulos, and separately with soon-to-be-Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, around the time of Trump’s inauguration.

In June, after he returned from Greece, Papadopoulos continued to push for campaign outreach to Moscow. Though Clovis told the committee he informed Papadopoulos that a Trump-Putin meeting would be a “really bad idea,” the committee writes that it “did not identify any written communications” documenting this. Papadopoulos also pitched Lewandowski on a campaign trip to Moscow, though Lewandowski told him that he was “almost certain” that Trump would not make the trip. Throughout this period, Papadopoulos was in touch with Timofeev—including through an email proposing a meeting between Trump campaign staff and Russian officials, which Papadopoulos “did not produce … to the Committee.” Timofeev later told a journalist that he “did not take [Papadopoulos’s outreach] seriously.”

Papadopoulos remained in “frequent contact” with Mifsud. At one point, he reached out to Mifsud for talking points on Libya after offering up “information” on Libya to a campaign official—though the committee writes that it could not find evidence that Papadopoulos passed the material from Mifsud along to the campaign. Twice, Mifsud suggested to Papadopoulos that Mifsud be formally brought on as a Trump campaign surrogate, traveling with the campaign and organizing meetings with foreign leaders, including in Russia. But the committee found “no indication that Papadopoulos passed on Mifsud’s request to the Campaign, or that Mifsud ever procured greater access to Campaign officials.”

Papadopoulos made two more significant connections during his time on the campaign. First, he connected with Sergi Millian, whom the report identifies as “the president of the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce and a real estate broker in New York City” and who had previously worked with Trump. Along with Mifsud, the report describes Millian as “exhibit[ing] behavior consistent with intelligence tradecraft.” From email traffic, the two were in touch from July 2016 through “past the election.” In early November, Millian wrote Papadopoulos a note warning that “I have no doubt that the forces that invested so much into H [presumably Hillary Clinton] will try to steal the election.” Later in November, Millian offered Papadopoulos significant sums of money for a business deal while encouraging Papadopoulos to secure a job in the new administration—but when Papadopoulos told Millian he did not want an administration position, Millian no longer seemed interested in the deal, according to Papadopoulos’s FBI interview.

Papadopoulos also was in touch with someone whose name remains redacted, but who—from context—appears to be an FBI informant whom news reports previously identified Papadopoulos as having been in touch with. Much of this section is redacted, but it appears that the informant invited Papadopoulos to meet with him in London and write a paper for him. The committee received written responses from the informant.

The campaign cut Papadopoulos loose as an adviser in early October 2016 after he gave two separate press interviews that created problems for the campaign. Nevertheless, “Papadopoulos remained active and engaged with the Campaign”—and Mifsud sought to remain in touch with Papadopoulos. The professor emailed Papadopoulos on Nov. 1 about planning for after the election, the committee writes. The description of Mifsud’s email is followed by two redacted paragraphs—but it appears that Mifsud emailed Papadopoulos again on Nov. 10, congratulating him and suggesting that he and Papadopoulos meet to discuss foreign policy issues. The committee counts five more emails from Mifsud to Papadopoulos over the course of November and December 2016 pushing for a meeting. But the committee found “no indication that Papadopoulos responded,” and it writes that it “does not know if Papadopoulos and Mifsud met subsequent to the election.”

Just as he had remained in touch with the campaign after his formal departure, Papadopoulos remained in touch with the Trump transition, too—and, despite his statement to Millian, sought a position in the administration, though with no success. During the transition, “[r]epresentatives from the UK, Cyprus, Egypt, Taiwan, and Greece all leveraged Papadopoulos as an interlocutor.” But the committee found “no evidence” that “the Russian government used Papadopoulos as a conduit.”

The report’s section on Papadopoulos closes with two pages on “Counterintelligence Concerns about Papadopoulos’s Interactions.” Much of this information is redacted. From an unredacted footnote, it seems that some of the material in this section was drawn from the committee’s interview with former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe. The remaining unredacted text notes that Papadopoulos lied to the FBI concerning his interactions with Mifsud, which limited the FBI’s ability to investigate Mifsud. The professor “departed the United States on February 11, 2017,” the committee writes, “and has not returned.”

 

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4 hours ago, jallajall said:

Tydeligvis så fant demokratene en annen 'sannhet' enn Mueller, de kom hvertfall til forskjellige konklusjoner.
 

t.

Mueller ville ikke «konkludere» noe kriminelt selv om han fant på det, det er umulig å gjøre når en er president. Det er derfor umulig og uærlig å hevde at Mueller konkluderte at det ikke fantes kriminelle oppførsel. 

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5 hours ago, ism_InnleggNO said:

Om du tror Mueller og Demokratene kom til forskjellige konklusjoner har du nok lest alt for mye Republikansk propaganda.

Det er to vidt forskjellig konklusjoner.

USA Today oppsummerer det slik: "Investigation found no evidence Trump conspired with Russia, leaves obstruction question open."
Eller sin det står i rapporten; "the investigation did not establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities." Demokratene er av en annen oppfatning.

 

5 hours ago, Red Frostraven said:

..her er en grundigere analyse av senatets rapport, fra sikkerhetseksperter med ekstremt høy objektivitet og lasng erfaring fra politikk:

Man kan jo faktisk lurte på om du har lest det selv.
Ser du velger å fokusere på Manafort, som jio er lite overraskende i seg selv.

Hvilke andre vurderinger rundt Manafort gjørt senatets rapport sammenlignet med Mueller? Hvorfor går de lenger, hvilket grunnlag finnes det? Hadde sentatet f eksempel tilgang til kryptert kommunikasjon? Hvordan kom senatrapporten til de konklusjonene de gjorde?

Er du enig i senatetrapporten om konklusjonen rundt Steele og FBI forresten?
 

2 hours ago, jjkoggan said:

Mueller ville ikke «konkludere» noe kriminelt selv om han fant på det, det er umulig å gjøre når en er president. Det er derfor umulig og uærlig å hevde at Mueller konkluderte at det ikke fantes kriminelle oppførsel. 

Nå snakker du vel om obstruksjonsdelen antar jeg..

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53 minutes ago, Red Frostraven said:

USA Today henviste til konklusjonene i Bill Barr sin forhåndsskrevne konklusjon, ikke egen vurdering av Mueller sin rapport.

De hadde ikke lest rapporten på tidspunktet.

Som går klart frem fra artikkelen.

De antok, feilaktig, at Bill Barr sin tolkning var ærlig.

Nå blander du sammen russian collusion og obstruction anklagene.

Justice Department special counsel Robert Mueller reportedly raised criticisms about Attorney General William Barr’s summary of the probe into Russian interference in the 2016 election because he felt it left the impression that President Donald Trump was cleared of any possible obstruction of justice, according to multiple reports.


https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/30/mueller-criticizes-attorney-general-summary-of-special-counsel-report.html

 

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Og hva betyr obstruksjon for en etterforskning, la oss si en etterforskning som handler om å finne ut av i hvor stor grad et demonstrerbar valgpåvirkning som førte til flere dommer mot russere var koordinert med den som begikk obstruksjonen eller ikke..?

a) Uskyld..?

Eller

b) At de ikke kan nå en sikker nok konklusjon til å ta ut tiltale, eller frifinne, fordi fakta blir skjult og FBI løyet til..?

...

Og det var massive beviser for collusion, som i seg selv Ikke er straffbart for andre enn uregistrerte agenter -- som det fantes mange av som fikk fengselsstraffer og anklager mot seg på grunn av etterforskningen.

Det var om det var nok beviser til å ta ut tiltaler for forræderi Mueller ble hindret fra å finne svar på, som han altså følte han ikke kunne renvaske Trump for, grunnet nevnt obstruksjon.

Og Bill Barr løy da han sa Mueller overlot til ham å konkludere.

 

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1 hour ago, jjkoggan said:

Også dette-[a] statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there was no evidence of those facts.

Noe som er åpentbart.
Fravær av bevis betyr ikke at det ikke finnes bevis.
Man har ikke avdekket bevis for at Obama gjorde noe kriminelt ifbm obamagate, flynn, osv, men det betyr jo ikke at det ikke finnes bevis for det. ;)
 

48 minutes ago, Red Frostraven said:

Det var om det var nok beviser til å ta ut tiltaler for forræderi Mueller ble hindret fra å finne svar på

Hvilk av obstruksjonene mener du var så sukksessfull at de klarte å holde tilbake bevis?

image.png.5ffb0ae40fa465497072cdc7664cc680.png
 

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House Democrat opens investigation into Pompeo's RNC speech
Here we go again....

Don Lemon sier the rioting has to stop fordi det det skader demokratene i meningsmålingene.
Ikke fordi det er galt.

Biden's lack of a travel plan worries some Democrats
‘If Obama can get on a plane and travel, why can't Biden?’" said one Democratic strategist..

Borte bra, basement best.

Poll finds Biden leading in battleground states, but race tightening
Biden holds a 3 point lead overall in the critical states of Arizona, Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
Biden holds a lead in all six states, but it is just 1 point in North Carolina, 2 points in Arizona and 3 points in Florida and Pennsylvania.
The former vice president has a 5 point lead in Wisconsin, and a 6 point lead in Michigan.

Undrer meg fortsatt hvordan Biden kan lede i Florida.

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