All aktivitet

Takk for en god latter på morgenkvisten :-D Det går helt utmerket med USA, og kommer fortsatt til å være et av de beste landene å bo i lang tid fremover. Økonomien går som det suser og det er fortsatt et av de landene folk fra hele verden ønsker å dra til og bo i. Kriminaliteten er blant den laveste på mange år. Europa er derimot på vei mot undergrunnen, med stadig mer ødeleggende masseinnvandring fra den tredje verden, som igjen medfører økt kriminalitet, med en stagnerende og håpløs økonomi, der arbeidsledigheten stiger, energiprisene er vedvarende høye, skattene og avgiftene stiger.

147 686

Takk for oppmuntrende ord. Håper du har rett. To kasser med spiselige varer er i hus og det kan jo stå en stund før jeg begynner å spise av det, for så å kjøpe inn nye varer senere. Har gjort det før også. Takk. Er det dette som heter "morgenkvisten"? Hva består det ordet av, lurer jeg på? Hva består kvisten av?

Sikkert godt.

Hva mener du?

Vi har drukket cappuccino nå.☕☕😋😋

Nå hører vi to på: Something - The Beatles.♥️♥️♥️♥️

Takk, men det fungerer ikke helt som den sovepillen jeg kunne ha tenkt meg. Jeg kunne jo ha gjort rent, men ender med å gå på nett heller. Ikke bra.

Vi ønsker dere en fin og god tirsdagsmorgen.♥️♥️

147 685

Vi ønsker dere alle sammen en Godtirsdagsmorgen.👨‍🦰👩‍🦰

Tidsreise tilbake i tid er og vil alltid være bare tull. Forøvrig, om noen med millioner av år med teknologisk forsprang på oss ønsket å holde seg skjult, så hadde de holdt seg skjult. Men det var vel mer et generelt svar på tråden

@joandreas, Prime har vel nesten ikke vært billigere?

147 684

Hvis du mener at Alexander Stubb kommer med meninger han ikke har belegg for, så foreslår jeg at du leser deg litt opp på den finske Presidenten... Han fremstår som en av de beste statslederne i hele verden, og finnene er et lysende forbilde for hvordan man skal takle terroristnaboen sin!

ငါ သို့မဟုတ် မဟုတ်။ over satt ikke jeg eller

Vet ikke med overbevist, men jeg liker The Why Files, han er flink til å fortelle og gir rask debunks som regel. Spennende med anunnaki og historiske med atlantis osv.

Bruker AI til: Transkribere lyd til teksting og manus Innspill til idé og vinklinger Manusarbeid basert på opptak (og tar det over til tekstbasert klipping) Enkelte typer søk som ofte treffer bedre, feks finne ulike komponenter/deler Koding av enkle automatiseringer/script Oppsummering og utregning man ellers kunne brukt regneark til Har brukt: Jeg har brukt AI til bilde/videogenerering, men det er ikke noe jeg ønsker at verden skal ha mer av. Jeg tenker folk vil se folk, og verden trenger mindre drit. Jobber som innholdsprodusent, og har heller ikke så behov for å eliminere min egen jobb. Bruker det heller ikke til å generere «ferdig» tekst/e-poster, vi trenger ikke en verden hvor noen plotter inn til AI, og en annen AI dekoder.

Eva Weel Skram - Vendepunkt

Hvilke lover bryter han?

Han er gal. https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/trump-has-already-hit-peak-tariff-morgan-stanley-says-his-new-15-levy-might-not-even-be-legal/ar-AA1WURFi?ocid=hpmsn&cvid=92410d8d74854d068bd4e3d1265b52f5&ei=19 While Trump quickly pivoted to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a stopgap measure, Morgan Stanley economists argued any new trade framework will be legally vulnerable and mathematically weaker, and a return to last year’s aggressive “Liberation Day” tariff levels would be “quite complicated.” The flawed foundation of Section 122 The administration’s fallback plan relies on Section 122, a statute that allows the president to impose an across-the-board temporary import surcharge of up to 15% for 150 days. However, Morgan Stanley warns Section 122 could face legal challenges similar to those versus the IEEPA, especially given that it has never actually been used since its creation. The act provides the president authority to impose temporary import measures of up to 15%, limited to 150 days unless extended by Congress, with no formal investigative process required. But more important, Gapen writes, the statutory trigger is framed around a “balance of payments disequilibrium” rather than a goods trade deficit. In the 1970s context in which this law was written, Gapen explains, this had a concrete meaning related to the Bretton Woods regime in place since the end of World War II. In the 1970s era of fixed exchange rates, a payments problem meant severe reserve loss and forced currency adjustments. Today, under a regime of floating exchange rates and monetary sovereignty, Morgan Stanley economists said, “we would not view a persistent trade deficit as constituting a classic balance of payments ‘crisis’ or solvency constraint.“ Because of this mismatch, relying on Section 122 leaves the new tariff framework wide open to inevitable legal challenges. Beyond this legal fragility, Section 122 mechanically caps the administration’s trade ambitions. Replacing IEEPA with Section 122 would mechanically lower baseline headline tariffs from approximately 13% down to 11%, Morgan Stanley estimates. And if Congress fails to renew these tariffs by roughly August, the bank calculates nominal tariff levels would plummet to the mid-single digits, around 6% to 7%. The refund question A major lingering question following the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down the administration’s use of the IEEPA is the status of the tens of billions in tariff revenue already collected. However, because the Supreme Court ruling did not explicitly mandate whether the Treasury must pay back the collected tariff revenue, the path to recovering those funds remains legally ambiguous. Morgan Stanley expects the issue to be heavily litigated in lower courts. The timeline for this process is expected to be extensive, mirroring comments made by Trump, who said during a press briefing: “We’ll end up being in court for the next five years” over the matter. Given this lack of clarity and the anticipated legal battles, any potential refunds are expected to take a significant amount of time to actually reach the broader economy. When they do arrive, Morgan Stanley forecasts a “midpoint scenario” of partial and delayed refunds totaling approximately $84 billion to $85 billion. Alternatively, a “limited/minimal” scenario projects the refunds could be as low as roughly $56 billion. Because of the relatively limited size and the extended, complicated timeline, economists predict these refunds will ultimately result in very little change to their broader macroeconomic and supply outlooks. Should the administration eventually need to fund these refund issuances, Morgan Stanley expects it will likely do so using Treasury bills, and any resulting rise in yields is expected to be short-lived. “Given the lack of clarity by the Supreme Court, refunds are likely to take a while to reach the economy,” the bank wrote—and these refunds would be for companies, not consumers. The complicated picture Because of the strict 15% cap, the temporary nature of the authority, and the legally untested “balance of payments” trigger, raising tariffs back to the extreme “risk” scenarios seen around last year’s “Liberation Day” would be “quite complicated,” Morgan Stanley said. To rebuild those sweeping tariff walls, the administration would have to rely on slow-moving, sector-specific Section 232 or Section 301 investigations, which can take months or even years to fully implement. For the broader U.S. economy, the unraveling of the administration’s primary tariff tool is a distinct positive, and if the Section 122 tariffs ultimately expire after 150 days without a legislative replacement, the macroeconomic picture would brighten further. A material drop in tariff rates in the third quarter of 2026 could provide a significant uplift to domestic demand, supporting corporate margins, labor demand, and household spending. For now, the Supreme Court ruling has effectively installed a strict near-term ceiling on trade barriers, substantially neutralizing the threat of runaway tariff escalation. What’s unknown, of course, is whether Trump will accept it. Det kom fram at Seksjon 122 som benyttes for 15 % grunntollsats for 150 dager framover, ikke er så legalt sikkert som antatt fordi denne fullmakten opprinnelig er ment for meget forskjellige omstendigheter og var utformet for spesielle situasjoner som avverge presidentbruk i fredstid som stabil økonomisk tid. På norsk ment det "betalingsbalanse" https://brendonbeebe.substack.com/p/section-122-and-the-150-day-tariff Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974—codified as 19 U.S.C. § 2132 and titled “Balance-of-payments authority”—is one of the broadest and most time-limited unilateral tariff authorities Congress has ever written. It was designed for “fundamental international payments problems,” not for ordinary trade skirmishes. When the statutory trigger is met, the President “shall proclaim” (the statute uses that word) a temporary import measure for no more than 150 days unless Congress extends the period by statute. The menu of tools is intentionally blunt: a temporary across-the-board import surcharge (up to 15% ad valorem), import quotas, or both. The trigger language is equally specific. Section 122(a) frames its use around three scenarios: • dealing with “large and serious” U.S. balance-of-payments deficits; • preventing “imminent and significant” dollar depreciation in foreign exchange markets; or • cooperating with other countries to correct an international balance-of-payments disequilibrium. Two design choices matter for understanding why this authority is suddenly in the headlines: First, Section 122 is fast. Unlike many other tariff tools, it does not require a predicate investigation or agency fact-finding process before the President proclaims the surcharge. Second, Section 122 is capped. Congress hard-coded both the rate ceiling (15%) and the duration ceiling (150 days, absent an Act of Congress). Why Congress wrote it in the shadow of the Nixon surcharge To understand why Section 122 exists, you have to go back to the “Nixon shock”—the early-1970s monetary crisis era when the U.S. was navigating pressure on its international reserves and the global monetary order. On August 15, 1971, Richard Nixon issued Proclamation 4074, declaring a national emergency and imposing a 10% supplemental duty on “all dutiable articles” to address what the proclamation described as a worsening balance-of-payments situation and threatened U.S. international reserves. That move became a key reference point in later legal and policy debates about whether broad emergency statutes could be read to authorize tariffs at all. In modern summaries of that episode, the Congressional Research Service links the 1971 surcharge directly to later arguments over the scope of emergency economic powers, noting that President Nixon used the Trading with the Enemy Act framework (a precursor conceptually linked to later emergency-powers debates) to impose a 10% tariff during a monetary crisis. Congress’s solution in the mid-1970s was not to erase presidential flexibility, but to box it in. As the CRS tariff-powers report explains, Section 122 was enacted “following” Nixon’s temporary 10% balance-of-payments tariff; and contemporaneous legislative commentary suggested it was not expected to be used much in the post–fixed-exchange-rate world. Section 122 entered the U.S. Code as part of the Trade Act framework that Gerald Ford signed into law on January 3, 1975. In his signing remarks, Ford emphasized that this law would shape U.S. trade relations for years—reflecting how Congress was building a durable set of trade tools (and limits) rather than improvising from crisis to crisis. Why “balance of payments” is a narrower trigger than it sounds A core confusion—especially in today’s politics—is that “balance of payments” sounds like a synonym for “trade deficit.” It is not. In the CRS analysis of Section 122, the phrase “balance-of-payments deficits” is treated as a term of art that likely refers to broader concepts of international payments that include capital flows, not simply the net of imports and exports of goods and services. This is why Section 122 often sits awkwardly in modern tariff debates. In the mid-1970s, the U.S. was transitioning away from the Bretton Woods fixed-exchange-rate system, and some of the older “overall” balance-of-payments accounting frameworks fell out of favor; CRS notes that the U.S. ceased reporting certain balance-of-payments measures after 1976, and commentators at the time viewed some of these metrics as obsolete after the shift to floating rates. Even the statute itself flags the conceptual distinction. Section 122(a) speaks in balance-of-payments terms (deficits and currency pressure), while Section 122(c)—the rarely mentioned mirror provision that authorizes temporary import liberalization—uses “balance-of-trade” language when discussing persistent surpluses and limits the President to small temporary duty reductions. CRS highlights that courts often treat such drafting differences as intentional. In plain English: Section 122 was written for a world where “payments problems” meant something closer to a currency-and-reserves emergency than to a campaign slogan about trade gaps. The limits baked into the statute Section 122 looks sweeping at first glance—up to 15% on essentially everything—but its internal constraints are unusually explicit. Several of these constraints are easy to miss if you only focus on the “15% for 150 days” headline. The hard cap and the congressional gate The surcharge authority is explicitly time-limited: “for a period not exceeding 150 days (unless such period is extended by Act of Congress).” That parenthetical matters: it’s Congress reserving the right to decide whether a temporary emergency tariff becomes semi-permanent. Nondiscrimination is the default—selectivity is the exception The statute instructs that import-restricting actions should be applied “consistently with the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment.” But it also contains a pressure-valve: if the President determines the purpose is best served by acting against one or more countries with large or persistent balance-of-payments surpluses, the President may exempt all other countries. Broad and uniform product coverage, with narrow carveouts Section 122 aims at macroeconomic stabilization, not sectoral protection. It requires “broad and uniform” product coverage and permits only limited product exceptions tied to economic-need concerns (such as lack of domestic supply at reasonable prices, need for raw materials, avoiding serious supply dislocations, goods already restricted, goods in transit, and similar factors). It also says the authority may not be used for the purpose of protecting individual domestic industries from import competition. Quotas are legally and diplomatically harder than surcharges The statute allows quotas, but only if international agreements to which the U.S. is a party permit quotas as a balance-of-payments measure—and only if the imbalance cannot be dealt with effectively through a surcharge. It then adds quantitative guardrails (e.g., quotas should not drop below representative historical import levels and must account for consumption changes). Built for speed, not for litigation-tested certainty Because Section 122 had never been used as of 2025, CRS emphasized that courts had no occasion to interpret its language and boundaries—meaning that, until very recently, its practical meaning was largely theoretical. Presidents who have used Section 122 A key fact that surprises even trade lawyers: for decades, no president invoked Section 122. In 2025, CRS stated plainly that Section 122 “has never been used.” As of February 20, 2026, reporting indicates Section 122 has now crossed from “dormant” to “deployed,” apparently for the first time: * Donald Trump — Announced he would sign an order imposing a 10% global tariff under Section 122 for the statute’s maximum 150-day period, framing it as a rapid replacement for sweeping tariffs the Supreme Court of the United States held could not be imposed under IEEPA. He said the new duty would take effect the following week and would be layered “over and above” existing tariffs. In the same remarks, he said existing tariffs under other authorities (including “Section 232” and “Section 301”) would remain “in full force and effect,” while his administration would initiate further Section 301 investigations—a signal that Section 122 was being used as a time-limited bridge while slower-moving tariff tools are spun up. Asked about the 150-day limit and the need for congressional extension, he responded: “We have a right to do pretty much what we want to do.” The practical constraints no statute can waive Even if you accept the statute’s broad language on its own terms, Section 122 carries real-world constraints that tend to get lost in the political theater. Congress controls the “day 151” question The statute’s design forces a fork in the road: either the measure ends at 150 days, or Congress passes an Act extending it. That structure is not an accident; it is Congress explicitly choosing temporariness as the default for this particular tariff authority. The WTO and IMF process is part of the background radiation Section 122’s quota authority is explicitly conditioned on what international trade or monetary agreements permit. In the global trading system, balance-of-payments import restrictions have long been treated as extraordinary measures subject to consultation and discipline. The World Trade Organization explains that members using balance-of-payments restrictions under the relevant GATT provisions face consultation requirements intended to ensure such measures are temporary and justified. Those consultations are informed in part by the International Monetary Fund, which historically plays a role in assessing whether a member is experiencing balance-of-payments difficulties. “Tariffs are taxes,” and taxes create political enemies quickly Tariffs function as taxes collected at the border on imported goods. That doesn’t settle who ultimately bears the cost in any specific industry or contract, but it does explain why tariffs rapidly become a constituency fight—importers, domestic producers relying on imported inputs, consumers, and exporters facing retaliation all have different incentives. Litigation risk rises when a dormant statute becomes an active weapon CRS’s point that Section 122 had never been used matters because it implies there is little jurisprudence interpreting phrases like “fundamental international payments problems” or “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits in this specific statutory context. When legal meaning is unsettled, disputes tend to shift from “does the President have authority?” to “did the President satisfy the statute’s predicate conditions?”—especially when a statute’s trigger language is economically technical but politically elastic. The “bridge” problem One reason Section 122 is suddenly attractive is that it is immediate, while other trade tools can be slower. Reuters noted, for example, that investigations under Section 301 generally take months—an awkward mismatch with a tool that expires after 150 days unless Congress acts. Denne artikkelen er meget opplysende omkring problemet med å bruke Seksjon 122-fullmakten, som kan utfordres legalt og avvises av det amerikanske rettsvesenet basert på faktumet om at det knyttes spesielle betingelser til bruk av denne fullmakten, som dermed forklare hvorfor den hadde blitt liggende urørlig siden 1975, den er en tidsavhengig fullmakt som i realiteten er utdatert i dagens økonomiske situasjon, og noe som ikke kan benyttes i handelskrig eller som del av ens politikk. Det kan aktuelt skje at høyesteretten måtte også avvise seksjon 122-fullmakten. Og da er vi kommet til refusjonsspørsmålet, minst 179 mrd. dollar må tilbakebetales, men dette ville ikke Trump høre snakk om, og vil istedenfor innlede en legal prosess for å avverge refusjon inntil punktet at bare 56 mrd. dollar kan sendes tilbake - som da betyr i praksis statlig tyveri. Da det første dommervedtaket kom, skulle IEEPA-tollsatsene ha blitt satt på hold som det er regel for, men Trump regelrett nekte og forbrøt seg mot den amerikanske loven ved å ta fordel av Roberts` stupiditeten omkring absolutt immunitet for presidentembetet. Dette kan skape meget sterk bitterhet for store deler av forretningsstanden som hadde vært tvunget til å betale av egne lommer fremfor å overføre byrdene på kundene og dermed reddet den amerikanske økonomien fra kollaps, ikke minst gjennom svimlende pengeforbruk på børsene. For dem har Trump blitt en tyv og en katastrofe, og ved å nekte å stoppe tollvanviddet - og endog vil ta i bruk andre fullmakter som er legalt sett mindre stødig enn IEEPA - har de nå en meget god grunn for å bryte med ham og republikanerne. Uansett kan ikke Trump forøke tollsatsene på egen ansvar uten legal risiko og større tilbakeslag, spesielt i et valgår. Om han skulle fortsette - vil det enda mer verre. Han hadde griseflaks ved at oligarkene betalt ut av egne lommer, at land som EU og Japan vil helst unngå uroligheter i det som var et dårlig år fram til høsten 2025, og et AI-boble i børsene med enorm pengeforbruk, halvparten av veksten i virkeligheten skyldes AI selv. Men nå ser det ut som flaksen kan være oppbrukt, han er i full gang med å bli sterkt upopulært, blant de selvstendige som utgjør 50 % av velgermassen er det nå ned til bare 24 % som holdt med ham. Selv yngre som misliker demokratene, misliker Trump enda mer. Og utenrikspolitisk sett er det sett at Trump gjør seg meget lite likt, hans aggressivitet mot EU og støtte til Orban og Fico har gjort europeerne sint mens stolte asiater fant seg dypt frustrert - oljesjeikene og andre bare jabbe med Trump. Under FN-avstemningene har man sett et stort fall for USA, selv om Kina bli ikke mer populært pga. Xis kultursjåvinistiske holdninger. Tollvanviddet burde avsluttes om det finnes en fornuftig ledelse i det hvite huset. Der vet man at nesten hele administrasjonen er sterkt mot Trumps sykelige tvangstankene omkring toll.

Ønsker dere også en fin og god natt 🥱🥱💤💤😴😴

Takk for at du tok deg tid til å gi et ordentlig svar! Eksemplene du nevner er gode eksempler på når KI kan gi større verdi enn den gamle måten å gjøre det på.