Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

1 minute ago, Markiii said:

Man bør plassere luftvern langs grensene til Ukraina, og skyte ned alt av russiske droner og raketter innenfor rekkevidde. Hvis Russland klager så er det bare å vise til alle gangene dritten deres har havnet utenfor Ukrainas grenser. Så får man testet luftvernet sitt også.

Jeg skjønner ikke at europeiske ledere er så jævla feige at de ikke klarer å gjøre noe som helst for å stå opp mot russisk terrorisme.

100%

NATO kan jo ikke nekte noen å forsvare eget luftrom, men det er pinlig og svakt at de ikke lar Romania og Polen øke sine forsvarssoner. Kan se ut til at Polen nå i økende grad gir blaff i dette dog.

I verste fall kan NATO splintre på sikt. Organisasjonen vil neppe falle sammen, men jeg tror man kommer til å få mer åpenbare faksjoner som er i konkurranse med hverandre om å styre. Særlig om USA fratrer sin rolle de neste fire årene.

[torbjornen]

Espen Hugaas Andersen skrev (42 minutter siden):

Dette kan også være at verktøyene som benyttes til å lage rutene ikke har nok fleksibilitet. Rutene kan f.eks være autogenerert, med minimal mulighet for operatøren å endre det, slik at om man velger et punkt nær Polen eller Romania så kan den automatisk genererte ruten havne over grensen.

Men det er ikke god nok unnskyldning. Russland må respektere andre lands territorium.

"Fleksibiliteten" var god nok for å gjere ein u-sving tilbake til ukrainsk luftrom.

Nei, dette vart gjort heilt bevisst fordi ukrainarane ikkje forventa å bli angripne frå Polen.

[torbjornen]

Brother Ursus skrev (28 minutter siden):

Det er nettopp det som tyder på at det er gjort med overlegg. Og ikke én, ikke to, men tre ganger.

Spørs om ikke noen NATO-droner bør krenke russisk luftrom også.

Ein kunne iallefall svare med å la nabolanda forsvare luftrommet over vestlege deler av Ukraina, samt å fjerne sjølvpålagde restriksjonar på støtte til Ukraina.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Scholz med pisk og gulrot. Av og til er han smart.

Endret 26. juli 2024 av Brother Ursus

[JK22]

Russia's business elites signal they are tired of propping up the wartime economy (msn.com)

* Some Russian elites are challenging the central bank's potential interest rate hike to 18%.

* Russia's key interest rate is at 16% after a series of hikes to tame elevated inflation and a hot wartime economy.

* However, critics argued that such high rates stifle lending and business activities.

Some of Russia's business elites appear to be getting impatient with the country's wartime economy.

Several influential individuals have come out to publicly challenge the Russian central bank's signal that it's likely to hike interest rates on Friday.

Russia's key interest rate already stands at 16%. Analysts polled by Reuters expected the central bank to hike it to 18% on Friday afternoon — the highest since April 2022, when it hit 20% amid economic turmoil following the invasion of Ukraine.

Igor Sechin, the CEO of Russian oil giant Rosneft, pointed to China's recent interest rate cuts, saying Russia should take cues from its neighbor, TASS, a state news agency, reported on Tuesday.

"We hope for similar steps for Russian prime borrowers from the Bank of Russia," said Sechin, according to a Reuters translation.

It wasn't the first time Sechin complained about high rates. Just last month, he griped that they are holding back borrowing and stifling business activities.

Now, he's also backed by Anatoly Aksakov, the head of Russia's lower house of parliament's banking committee.

"We need relatively cheap credit to come to the economy. We need structural change," said Aksakov, per Reuters. He added that price rises have slowed slightly and that annual inflation would decline in the second half of this year.

Russia's Center for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-Term Forecasting, an influential think tank, even said the central bank is "forcing stagnation" onto the economy with high rates, per Reuters.

"Negative and systemic risks from such an action are likely to outweigh the positive effects," said Dmitry Belousov, the head of the think tank, referring to a potential rate hike.

Infighting with central bank governor

Despite sweeping sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine in late February 2022, Russia's economy has avoided going bust and even appears resilient, as it's now being driven by wartime activities and services. Moscow has also pumped in subsidies for mortgages and businesses.

Russia posted 3.6% GDP growth last year, while unemployment rate hit a record low 2.6% in April as men continued heading to the front and amid a brain drain. This in turn drove up wages that contributed to price gains.

Russia's annual inflation rate remains high, at around 9.2%, amid a red-hot wartime economy that the country's central bank has been trying to cool.

The gripes over interest rates from Russia's elites show the infighting within the country's top echelons with Russian central bank governor Elvira Nabiullina taking several hits over the past year.

In August, one of Putin's aides slammed her for the weak ruble.

But Nabiullina has been at the helm of Russia's central bank for over a decade and is said to be trusted by President Vladimir Putin. She has so far managed to steady the economy and survive his high-level reshuffles.

Given that Russia's inflation rate is expected to remain high this and next year, monetary policy is likely to stay tight — indicating high rates — "until substantial disinflation takes hold," according to Allianz, a German financial services company.

Russia's central bank did not respond to a response for comment from Business Insider sent outside regular business hours. The central bank is also in its quiet period before its rate decision.

Den russiske økonomien har begynte å få hosteproblemer, den er ikke bare for sterkt overhetet,  den er også i ferd med å gå inn i ukontrollerte omstendigheter som økonomiekspertene nå prøve å hindre med alle midler, som sett med et mistenkt selvmord virker det som at motet er i ferd med å forlate dem. Den russiske eliten ser nå faresignalene og har begynte med å innse at skiftet til krigsøkonomi kan på sikte ruinere dem. 

[Brother Ursus]

 

Jeg vet ikke hvor mange dambrudd det vanligvis er i Russland i løpet av et år, men det begynner å bli noen det siste året. Personell som skal drive vedlikehold og drifte disse er nok også i Ukraina.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Bakkeversjonen av Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) fra Saab og Boeing har ikke gjort det så bra. Men ukrainerne med amerikansk hjelp fortsetter å konvertere og bruke versjonene som slippes fra fly og disse skal være svært nøyaktige. Enda bedre; gamle sovjetiske fly kan bære mange av disse på én gang.

[Brother Ursus]

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/amp/2024/07/26/russian-plywood-uavs-with-ukrainian-sim-phone-cards-stalk-patriot/

Russian plywood UAVs with Ukrainian SIM phone cards stalk Patriot

 

Noen russere har visst evnen å lære. I dette tilfellet kopierer de ukrainske billig-stealth-konseptet. Disse finér og papp- dronene flyr rundt og jakter ukrainsk antiluftskyts. De er vanskelige å få radarlås på.

[Brother Ursus]

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/russian-war-correspondent-proposes-sabotage-against-china-blaming-ukraine/

Russian War Correspondent Proposes Sabotage Against China, Blaming Ukraine

A Russian war correspondent proposed setting up a terrorist attack on a facility important to China’s economy, suggesting that Ukraine should be blamed for it.

The correspondent who came up with this idea is Dmitry Steshin, a reporter for the Russian newspaper ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda.’

 

Genialt å lufte det på TV 😄

[bojangles]

2 hours ago, torbjornen said:

Samandraget ser ut til å vere av Denys sin video.

Fixa. Takk for at du påpekte det. Multitasking er nok ikke for mannfolk, en oppgave om gangen. Da går alt så mye bedre 😉

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Simen1]

oddeh skrev (På 25.7.2024 den 10:58 AM):

En russiske toppøkonom er død etter at hun skal ha falt ut av vinduet i sin egen leilighet.
https://borsen.dagbladet.no/nyheter/toppokonom-falt-ut-av-vindu/81716765

Jeg tar det som et tegn på at det finnes ubehagelige sannheter om russisk økonomi. Ubehagelig for Putin.

Dragavon skrev (På 25.7.2024 den 1:24 PM):

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2024/07/25/uralvagonzavod-to-produce-only-90-t-90m-tanks-from-scratch-in-2025/

Det er omtrent det antallet tanks som tapes i Ukraina i løpet av 2 uker. Restelagret av reparerbare tanks som kan bidra ellers er rimelig bunnskrapt nå, i følge en analyse fra et par uker tilbake. Tapene av tanks har sunket de siste månedene og det skyldes neppe at Ukrainerne har dårligere treffprosent eller måloppnåelse. Det skyldes nok at Russland har begrenset antall å sende av gårde hver uke.

[Simen1]

Demning brast i Tsjeljabinsk i Russland. Mon tro hvor pengene til vedlikehold tok veien?

Massivt koordinert sabotasjeangrep mot Frankrikes jernbanenett. 800 000 rammet. Mon tro hvem som står bak?

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

2h15m langt intervju. ChatGPT to the rescue for den som ikke har det. Jeg måtte bryte det opp i 6-7 deler for å kjøre det, og deretter kjøre det én gang til for å oppsummere oppsummeringene. Håper det er leselig og forståelig.

Intervjuet er forøvrig verdt å se i sin helhet.

Jeg er litt skeptisk til noe av det som presenteres mtp. det politiske, men det militærfaglige er svært interessant og noe vedkommende har mye erfaring i.

 

 

• Internal Investigation and Weapon Allocation:

  • U.S. investigation confirmed Azov is not neo-Nazi and eligible for weapons.
  • Awaiting delivery of approved weapons; National Guard has limited access to advanced Western equipment.

• Frontline Situation:

  • In the Serebriansk Forestry area of Luhansk, the brigade has superior capabilities due to effective planning.
  • Some brigades struggle with personnel management.

• Operational Challenges:

  • Forested terrain affects drone use and battlefield visibility.
  • Despite challenges, units adapt to maintain effective defense and operations.

• Enemy Tactics:

  • Russian army uses outdated tactics, relying on overwhelming numbers and artillery.
  • Russia's increased artillery use is ineffective compared to evolving Ukrainian tactics.

• Coordination and Leadership:

  • Effective leadership praised within the brigade for coordination and adapting to different units.
  • Importance of high morale and communication emphasized.

• Military Operations and Training:

  • Issues with training, such as improper identification of enemy positions.
  • Challenges in forested areas include signal blockage and limited visibility.

• Strategic and Tactical Issues:

  • Criticism of Ukrainian military's recognition and adaptation to mistakes.
  • Calls for better resource management, logistical disruption, and strategic flexibility.

• Command Structure Issues:

  • Problems with command unity and inadequate use of assigned units.
  • Need for clear roles, coordination, and preparation highlighted.

• Leadership and Experience:

  • Praises Azov brigade’s leadership for effectiveness.
  • Importance of combining ideological and practical combat training stressed.

• Trust and Accountability:

  • Frustration with military officials not fulfilling promises or managing duties effectively.
  • Calls for more direct involvement of combat commanders in decision-making.

• Misinformation and Reporting Issues:

  • Concerns about accuracy of frontline reports and potential misinformation.
  • Criticism of General Yuriy Sodol for misguided decisions causing high casualties.

• Legal Actions and Investigations:

  • Complaint filed demanding investigation into General Sodol’s actions.
  • Frustration with lack of legal action and delays in investigations.

• Coordination with Critics:

  • Other public figures criticize Sodol; emphasis on the need for justice and accountability.

• Call for Action:

  • Urges Ukrainian legal system to act decisively and hold responsible individuals accountable.

• Leadership and Coordination Challenges:

  • Difficulties in coordinating with military units and following orders.
  • Inadequate support and equipment causing operational difficulties.

• Critique of Military Leadership:

  • Criticism of ineffective leadership and strategic thinking.
  • Support for younger, innovative leaders who understand modern warfare.

• Propaganda and Public Perception:

  • Need for effective propaganda to explain reasons for fighting and counter Russian propaganda.
  • Criticism of current Ukrainian government’s communication efforts.

• Political and Military Ambitions:

  • Support for leaders like Denis Prokopenko for potential positive changes.

• Concerns About Peace Initiatives:

  • Skepticism about ending the war soon and past failures in diplomatic negotiations.

• Personal Commitment and Accountability:

  • Willingness to take responsibility and face consequences, emphasizing commitment to victory and addressing military issues.

Endret 26. juli 2024 av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/26/us/politics/austin-russia-ukraine-defense-plot.html

A Mysterious Plot Prompts a Rare Call From Russia to the Pentagon

 

Quote

 

Russia’s defense minister said he needed to talk to Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin about an alleged Ukrainian operation. What happened next remains murky.

Earlier this month, Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III received an unusual request from an unlikely caller: His Russian counterpart wanted to talk.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, Mr. Austin had spoken by phone with Russia’s defense minister only five other times, almost always at the Pentagon’s initiative and often in an effort to avoid miscalculations that could escalate the conflict.

In fact, Mr. Austin had reached out to Russia’s new defense minister, Andrei Belousov, just a couple of weeks earlier, on June 25, in an effort to keep the “lines of communication open,” the Pentagon said. It was the first phone call between the two men since Mr. Belousov, an economist, replaced Sergei K. Shoigu, Russia’s long-running defense minister, in a Kremlin shake-up in May.

Now on July 12, Mr. Belousov was calling to relay a warning, according to two U.S. officials and another official briefed on the call: The Russians had detected a Ukrainian covert operation in the works against Russia that they believed had the Americans’ blessing. Was the Pentagon aware of the plot, Mr. Belousov asked Mr. Austin, and its potential to ratchet up tensions between Moscow and Washington?

Pentagon officials were surprised by the allegation and unaware of any such plot, the two U.S. officials said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the confidential phone call. But whatever Mr. Belousov revealed, all three officials said, it was taken seriously enough that the Americans contacted the Ukrainians and said, essentially, if you’re thinking about doing something like this, don’t.

Despite Ukraine’s deep dependence on the United States for military, intelligence and diplomatic support, Ukrainian officials are not always transparent with their American counterparts about their military operations, especially those against Russian targets behind enemy lines. These operations have frustrated U.S. officials, who believe that they have not measurably improved Ukraine’s position on the battlefield but have risked alienating European allies and widening the war.

Over the past two years, the operations that have unnerved the United States included a strike on a Russian air base on the western coast of Crimea, a truck bombing that destroyed part of the Kerch Strait Bridge, which links Russia to Crimea, and drone strikes deep inside Russia.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia often refers to such strikes as “terrorist attacks,” and the Kremlin uses them as evidence to back up Mr. Putin’s spurious claim that his invasion of Ukraine is really a defensive war. Despite American denials, Russian officials insist publicly that such strikes could not happen without U.S. approval and support.

Whether the alleged Ukrainian plot this month was real and imminent is still unclear, as is what form it might have taken. Pentagon and White House officials say nothing has happened — yet. They have declined to describe the call in detail but stressed the need for dialogue among adversaries.

“During the call, the secretary emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication amid Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine,” Sabrina Singh, a Pentagon spokeswoman, told reporters hours after the conversation on July 12.

Pentagon officials declined to say if Mr. Austin brought up the matter in a phone call on Tuesday with his Ukrainian counterpart, Rustem Umerov.

A Russian Defense Ministry statement after the July 12 call confirmed that Mr. Belousov initiated it, adding that “the issue of preventing security threats and reducing the risk of possible escalation was discussed.” But the statement made no mention of a suspected Ukrainian covert mission.

Ukrainian officials declined to comment on the matter. The Kremlin also declined to comment for this article, and the Russian Defense Ministry did not respond to a request for comment.

The rare glimpse behind the scenes of a sensitive call between defense ministers illustrates how much more there often is to private conversations between American and Russian officials than what is revealed to the public. And how the United States and Russia try to manage escalation risks behind the scenes.

For instance, in the phone call last month between Mr. Austin and Mr. Belousov, Mr. Austin “emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication amid Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine,” said Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, the Pentagon press secretary.

Mr. Austin initiated that call and “believes that keeping lines of communication open are important,” General Ryder said.

Mr. Austin and Mr. Belousov “exchanged views on the situation around Ukraine,” the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement about the same call. It added that Mr. Belousov “pointed to the danger of further escalation of the situation in connection with the continued supply of American weapons to the Armed Forces of Ukraine.”

But two officials familiar with the call said Mr. Austin also warned his Russian counterpart not to threaten U.S. troops in Europe amid rising tensions in Ukraine.

About four days later, American defense officials raised the security alert level at military bases in Europe in response to vague threats from the Kremlin over Ukraine’s use of long-range weapons on Russian territory.

American officials said that no specific intelligence about possible Russian attacks on American bases had been collected. Any such attack by Russia, whether overt or covert, would be a significant escalation of its war in Ukraine.

Russia has stepped up acts of sabotage in Europe, hoping to disrupt the flow of matériel to Ukraine. So far, no American bases have been targeted in those attacks, but U.S. officials said raising the alert level would help ensure that service members were keeping watch.

Then there were the calls on Oct. 21 and Oct. 23, 2022, between Mr. Austin and Mr. Shoigu — the first requested by the Americans, the second by the Russians.

The Pentagon’s summary of the second call stated, “Secretary Austin rejected any pretext for Russian escalation and reaffirmed the value of continued communication amid Russia’s unlawful and unjustified war against Ukraine.”

A week later, The New York Times reported that senior Russian military leaders had recently discussed when and how Moscow might use a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine, according to multiple senior American officials.

The new intelligence surfaced when Moscow was promoting the baseless notion that Ukraine was planning to use a so-called dirty bomb — a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia was not a part of the conversations with his generals, which were held as Russia was intensifying nuclear rhetoric and suffering battlefield setbacks.

But the fact that senior Russian military leaders were even having the discussions alarmed the Biden administration because it showed how frustrated they were about their failures in Ukraine and suggested that Mr. Putin’s veiled threats to use nuclear weapons might not just be words.

While the risk of further escalation remained high, Biden administration officials and U.S. allies also said at the time that the phone calls between Western and Russian counterparts in late October helped ease some of the nuclear tensions.

“These calls are about avoiding worst-case outcomes in a relationship that could potentially go over the edge,” said Samuel Charap, a Russia analyst at the RAND Corporation.

 

 

 

Russland har altså en direktelinje inn i Pentagon som de bruker til å spre fryktpropaganda i Biden-regjeringen og for å få USA til å ringe Ukraina og be dem være mer tilbakeholdne.

Håpløst.

Forøvrig har også russerne en tendens til å projisere kraftig, som betyr at det er godt mulig at det er de som forbereder en radiologisk bombe og eventuelt et falsk-flagg. Russerne drepte hundrevis av egne borgere for å invandere Tsjetsjenia. De har ofret hundretusener av landsmenn for å ta kun deler av Ukraina. Ingen tvil om at de ville ofret hundrevis eller tusenvis for noe slikt.

Skulle Ukraina ønske å bygge radiologiske bomber eller atombomber er det også noe de har all rett til, da avtalene de har undertegnet har blitt brutt av de andre partene i disse avtalene.

Endret 26. juli 2024 av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/07/26/7467628/

Indian Prime Minister plans to visit Ukraine in August

 

Blir nok en sjarmoffensiv fra Zelenskyy. India har siden i hvert fall 2018 i likhet med Kina forsøkt å bevege seg nærmere Russland for å få bedre tilgang på særlig militære teknologier. Samtidig eksporterer India en del til Russland nå, inkludert militærstøvler og andre ting, og kjøper billig råolje. Så er spørsmålet om India er klare til å forlate Russlands sfære til gjengjeld for samarbeid med andre, f.eks Ukraina. Ukraina utvikler med vestlig hjelp nå antagelig bedre våpen enn Russland gjør.

[bojangles]

 

Ja hva skal en si til slike tapstall for russerne, dag etter dag, måned etter måned? Når blir tapet stort nok? Det fyker ut panser, artilleri, luftvern og kjøretøy m.m i et tempo vi ikke har sett før. Og sannelig sjekker også mengder av russere ut av frontkjempernes rekker. 

Er denne krigen egentlig russisk nedrustning i praksis? For vi nærmer oss jo det stadiet før eller senere. 

 

Endret 27. juli 2024 av bojangles

[bojangles]

 

[bojangles]

 

Så nå vet UA med sikkerhet hvor det russiske luftvernet er slik at i neste runde er det russisk luftvern som går opp i røyk. 

[bojangles]