Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

 

❤️

[Samms]

Just now, Brother Ursus said:

Sist jeg sjekket var det en krig på gang.

En utenomrettslig krig.

Heilt klart ein krig på gang. Og begge sider går på akkord med reglar for krigføring. Poenget er at det er vanskeleg å argumentere med å være "den gode" når begge parter er like gode, ok dårlege, litt etter kvar område det er snakk om.

[bojangles]

2 hours ago, Brother Ursus said:

Sist jeg sjekket var det en krig på gang.

En utenomrettslig krig.

Rart det der, enkelte glemmer helt at russiske soldater i Ukraina daglig begår krigsforbrytelser, terrorbombing av sivile, henrettelser av sivile, voldtekt av sivile og kidnapping av Ukrainaiske barn. At Ukraina må gjøre alt de kan for å forsvare sitt land, sitt folk og sin kultur blåser de glatt i. 

Endret 5. mai 2024 av bojangles

[torbjornen]

Brother Ursus skrev (5 timer siden):

https://www.afr.com/world/europe/russia-plotting-sabotage-across-europe-intelligence-agencies-warn-20240505-p5fp1k

Russia plotting sabotage across Europe, intelligence agencies warn

Berlin/London/Oslo | European intelligence agencies have warned their governments that Russia is plotting violent acts of sabotage across the continent as it commits to a course of permanent conflict with the West.

Russia has already begun to more actively prepare covert bombings, arson attacks and damage to infrastructure on European soil, directly and via proxies, with little apparent concern about causing civilian fatalities, intelligence officials believe

Although the Kremlin’s agents have a long history of such operations – and have launched attacks sporadically in Europe in recent years – evidence is mounting of a more aggressive and concerted effort, according to assessments from three different European countries shared with the Financial Times.

Intelligence officials are becoming increasingly vocal about the threat in an effort to promote vigilance.

“We assess the risk of state-controlled acts of sabotage to be significantly increased,” said Thomas Haldenwang, head of German domestic intelligence. Russia now seems comfortable carrying out operations on European soil “[with] a high potential for damage,” he told a security conference last month hosted by his agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution.

Mr Haldenwang spoke just days after two German-Russian nationals were arrested in Bayreuth, Bavaria, for allegedly plotting to attack military and logistics sites in Germany on behalf of Russia.

Two men were charged in the UK in late April with having started a fire at a warehouse containing aid shipments for Ukraine. English prosecutors accuse them of working for the Russian government.

In Sweden, security services are meanwhile investigating a series of recent railway derailments, which they suspect may be acts of state-backed sabotage.

Russia has attempted to destroy the signalling systems on Czech railways, the country’s transport minister told the FT last month.

In Estonia, an attack on the interior minister’s car in February and those of journalists were perpetrated by Russian intelligence operatives, the country’s Internal Security Service has said. France’s defence ministry also warned this year of possible sabotage attacks by Russia on military sites.

“The obvious conclusion is that there has been a real stepping up of Russian activity,” said Keir Giles, senior consulting fellow at Chatham House, the think tank.

“One cannot tell if that’s a reflection of the fact that the Russians are throwing more resources at it; whether they are being more sloppy and getting caught; or whether Western counter-intelligence has simply become better at detecting and stopping it,” he added.

“Whatever it is though – there is a lot going on.”

‘Clear and convincing Russian mischief’

One senior European government official said information was being shared through NATO security services of “clear and convincing Russian mischief”, which was co-ordinated and at scale.

The time had come to “raise awareness and focus” about the threat of Russian violence on European soil, he added.

NATO issued a statement on Thursday declaring its deep concern about growing “malign activities on allied territory” by Russia, citing what it said was an “intensifying campaign… across the Euro-Atlantic area”.

The growing fears over Russia’s appetite for physical damage against its adversaries follow a spate of accusations against Russia over disinformation and hacking campaigns. On Friday, Germany vowed consequences for Moscow – in a statement backed by the EU and NATO – over a 2023 hacking attack on the Social Democratic Party of Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

A scandal exposing Russian attempts to co-opt far right European politicians before the coming European elections is meanwhile still unfolding.

One intelligence official said Moscow’s sabotage efforts should not be seen as distinct from other operations, saying the intensifying activity reflected Russia’s aim to exert maximum pressure “across the piece”.

Vladimir Putin is currently feeling “emboldened” and will seek to push lines as hard as he can in Europe, on several fronts, he said, whether through disinformation, sabotage or hacking.

Increased aggression from Russian intelligence also reflects the desire for the country’s spymasters to reassert themselves after their most serious setback since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the weeks following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, more than 600 Russian intelligence officers operating in Europe with diplomatic cover were ejected, dealing serious damage to the Kremlin’s spy network across the continent.

In a recent report, analysts at the UK’s Royal United Services Institute highlighted the efforts to which Russia had gone to reconstitute its presence in Europe, often using proxies. Those include members of the Russian diaspora as well as organised crime groups with which the Kremlin has long-standing ties.

A key strategic shift has also occurred, with so-called “Committees of Special Influence” co-ordinating intelligence operations country-by-country for the Kremlin, drawing together what were previously piecemeal efforts by the country’s fractious security services and other Kremlin players.

High alert over threats

With Russia’s stepping up operations, security services have been on high alert over threats and are looking to identify targets they may have missed.

Questions have been raised, for instance, over a so-far unexplained explosion at a BAE Systems munitions factory in Wales that supplies shells used by Ukraine. In October 2014, a Czech arms depot where weapons for Kyiv were being stored was destroyed; Russian military intelligence agents were later revealed to have planted explosives at the site.

A huge fire broke out on Friday at a factory in Berlin owned by the arms company Diehl, which also supplies Ukraine. More than 160 specialist firefighters were called to tackle the blaze, with residents in a huge swath of the west of the capital told to keep windows closed due to possible toxic fumes.

“As ever with Russia, it’s wise not to look for a single explanation of why they are doing anything. There’s always a combination of things going on,” said Mr Giles.

“These pinprick attacks we’ve seen so far are of course to create disruption, but they can also be used for disinformation. And then there is what Russia learns from these attacks if they want to immobilise Europe for real  ... They’re practice runs.”

Russarane bør vere forsiktige, for dette vil på eitt eller anna tidspunkt kunne utløyse artikkel 5.

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[Samms]

10 minutes ago, Brother Ursus said:

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778

North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger

"It was bursting with the latest foreign technology. Most of the electronic parts had been manufactured in the US and Europe over the past few years. There was even a US computer chip made as recently as March 2023. This meant that North Korea had illicitly procured vital weapons components, snuck them into the country, assembled the missile, and shipped it to Russia in secret, where it had then been transported to the frontline and fired - all in a matter of months.

"This was the biggest surprise, that despite being under severe sanctions for almost two decades, North Korea is still managing to get its hands on all it needs to make its weapons, and with extraordinary speed," said Damien Spleeters, the deputy director at CAR."

 

Sanksjonane lekker som ein sil. Nord Korea har vært utsatt for sanksjoner i tiår og dei klarer å få importert dei nyaste delane frå "vesten", satt saman våpen med dei og eksportert våpna i løpet av månader. 

[Brother Ursus]

2 minutes ago, Samms said:

Heilt klart ein krig på gang. Og begge sider går på akkord med reglar for krigføring. Poenget er at det er vanskeleg å argumentere med å være "den gode" når begge parter er like gode, ok dårlege, litt etter kvar område det er snakk om.

Denne personen, enten han var torturist eller ei, var en russisk okkupant, og dermed et lovlig mål uansett.

Hadde Ukraina invandert og forsøkt å utslette Russland og brukt kjemiske våpen mot russerne, så kunne vi snakket om "like ille".

Men dette synes jeg var den svakeste falske ekvivalensen du har kommet med hittil.

[torbjornen]

Samms skrev (1 time siden):

Domminoteorien var vel brukt for å videreføre ein fransk krig. Krigen i Vietnam. USA fortsatte krigen i Vietnam, og av argumenta for å krige var dominoteorien. Om kommunistane tok makta i Vietnam så kom land etter land til å bli kommunistisk. Historia viser noko anna og i dag er vel også Vietnam eit "kapitalistisk" land...

Hitler tok land etter land til han vart stansa av den raude arme.

Er det nokon grunn til å tru at ikkje Putin vil prøve på det same dersom han ikkje blir stansa?

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[Samms]

1 minute ago, Brother Ursus said:

Denne personen, enten han var torturist eller ei, var en russisk okkupant, og dermed et lovlig mål uansett.

Hadde Ukraina invandert og forsøkt å utslette Russland og brukt kjemiske våpen mot russerne, så kunne vi snakket om "like ille".

Men dette synes jeg var den svakeste falske ekvivalensen du har kommet med hittil.

Lovleg mål for Ukrainske militære i Uniform. Ikkje for sivilister i det okkuperte området. Så ok om Ukraina brukte ein krysserrakett eller liknande, ikkje ok om ein agent i sivil brukte eksplosiver.

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

Dynamic Protection eller BRAT ser ut til å være navnet amerikanerne har gitt en lettere type ERA (explosive reactive armor).

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

Håper vi kan stole mer på Rheinmetall enn Scholz... og det tror jeg heldigvis vi kan.

[torbjornen]

MK3 skrev (26 minutter siden):

Russland planlegger sabotasje i europeiske land.

På tide å starte internering av russersympatisører i europa.

https://www.nettavisen.no/nyheter/slar-alarm-om-putins-planer-for-europa-vil-utfore-sabotasje/s/5-95-1801610

Nei. Men det er viktig at folk følgjer med og rapporterer dersom dei ser mistenkeleg aktivitet.

[torbjornen]

Samms skrev (16 minutter siden):

Heilt klart ein krig på gang. Og begge sider går på akkord med reglar for krigføring. Poenget er at det er vanskeleg å argumentere med å være "den gode" når begge parter er like gode, ok dårlege, litt etter kvar område det er snakk om.

Om du meiner at begge partar er like gode eller dårlege må du ha følgt svært dårleg med dei siste to åra. Når du skriv slikt avslører du kvar du sjølv står.

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[torbjornen]

Samms skrev (10 minutter siden):

Lovleg mål for Ukrainske militære i Uniform. Ikkje for sivilister i det okkuperte området. Så ok om Ukraina brukte ein krysserrakett eller liknande, ikkje ok om ein agent i sivil brukte eksplosiver.

Så då meiner du vel også at motstansfolka i englandsfarten og dei som hjelpte dei langs norskekysten og sette sine eigne liv i fare dreiv ulovleg krig? Eller?

[Dragavon]

Samms holder sin vanlige standard......

[torbjornen]

Han har nokre poeng, men ein del av det han kjem med heng ikkje på greip.

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[JK22]

Det kommer til å bli interessant å se hva en Rapier vil gjøre med dette. Disse blyatmobile stridsvogner er immun mot FPV med RPG-stridshoder, men trenger beskyttelse mot ukrainske stridsvogner (hvilken er hvorfor blyatmobile ofte har ordinære stridsvogner i følge eller egne rygg) - og har NULL beskyttelse mot presisartilleri, spesielt flatbaneskyts. Disse 100mm Rapier antitanksskytsene er svært effektiv i disses rolle. Man kanskje kan også bruke FPV med ildpåsettelsesvåpen som termitt bare for å se om det vil virke. Men det er ikke billig, motorene slites ut raskere, man må hente ekstrapanseret fra annetsteds og russerne vet altfor godt at artillerister vil frydes over et slikt velkomne mål.

Dette kan bli løsningen på pilotproblemet, for hvis det simpelt ikke er mulig å ha en pilot ferdigtrent og klargjort for strid i løpet av en ettårsperiode, burde man ta i bruk AI for fremtidens jagerbombefly. Nå er det slikt at det typiske kampflyet som deles inn i de strategiske og taktiske flytyper, først og fremst fungerer som en stand-off våpenplattform som kan få meget omfattende bakkeassistanse. USA vil ha 1,000 AI-styrte kampfly i 2028. Mye tyder på at det vil bli den australsk-amerikanske Boeing MQ-28 "Ghost Bat" som kan komme i serieproduksjon mens Kratos MQ-58 "Valkyrie" vil bli et rent angrepsfly for SEAD/DEAD oppdrag. Det amerikanske flyvåpenet mente at de må ha billigere og mindre ubemannede fly pga. anskaffelseskostnader og deretter de nevnte problemer med pilottilgjengelighet. Tyrkia har allerede et prosjekt på gang, Bayraktar Kızılelma, som vil ha ukrainske jetmotorteknologi. 

Endret 5. mai 2024 av JK22

[torbjornen]

Sitat

Orban-utfordrer samlet tusenvis av demonstranter

PUBLISERT KLOKKEN21:43 IUNGARN

Rundt 10.000 personer samlet seg søndag i Ungarns nest største by, Debrecen, for å høre 43 år gamle Peter Magyar snakke.

43-åringen har vært knallhard i sin kritikk av statsminister Viktor Orban, som han har anklaget for populisme og korrupsjon. Budskapet går rett hjem hos mange ungarere som er misfornøyde og ønsker endring etter 14 år med Orban ved makten.

– Forandring kan bli stanset i noen få dager eller uker, men ingen har noensinne gjennom historien greid å stoppe det – og det kan heller ikke de gjøre, sa Magyar til folkemassene.

Magyar er forresten også namnet på språket eller folkegruppa ungararar

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[torbjornen]

https://www.nrk.no/norge/barth-eide-_lurt_-med-pa-anti-israel-bilde-pa-1.-mai-1.16871433

Slik kan ein gå fram for å sverte ein utanriksminister.

Endret 5. mai 2024 av torbjornen

[skaftetryne32]

Samms skrev (1 time siden):

Lovleg mål for Ukrainske militære i Uniform. Ikkje for sivilister i det okkuperte området.

Okkupanter er ikke sivile, det er ulovlig det de gjør. 

[JK22]

The Russian Army may have defeated Ukraine — if it had followed its own manual (msn.com)

The Russian Army may have defeated Ukraine — if it had followed its own manual

The US Army's new manual on Russian tactics is an impressive-looking document. It's 280 pages packed with details and diagrams of how Russian soldiers are supposed to fight.

It is also evidence of a major reason why Russian troops have often fought poorly in the Ukraine war: they are not following their own playbook.

"A lot of the basic elements of that doctrine are sound enough that they could form a basis for successful operations," Scott Boston, a Russia military expert for the RAND Corp. think tank, told Business Insider. "But you do have to follow them."

To be clear, the US Army's manual — ATP7-100.1, "Russian Tactics" — specifies that it "is not meant to represent how the Russians are currently fighting in Ukraine." Nonetheless, armies try to fight according to their doctrine, or the fundamental principles that are intended to guide military operations.

For example, when a Russian division or brigade conducts an assault, units are supposed to advance in multiple echelons — or waves — of troops and tanks, tightly synchronized with reconnaissance, flank protection, engineering, artillery and air defense elements. The goal is to hit hard, move fast, breach the defenses and advance deep into the enemy rear. To minimize the resistance they face, assault troops should concentrate into multiple columns to "spread the attacking units in both width and depth to disperse and reduce the effects of nuclear or precision fires," according to the ATP7-100.1 manual.

But when Russia tried to seize Kyiv with a lightning advance in the opening days of the war, armored columns were sent down narrow, congested roads. Bottled up by roadblocks and ambushes, they were decimated by Ukrainian artillery, drones and anti-tank missiles. Nor does the manual describe how the Russian Army is fighting today. Instead of rapid and well-coordinated maneuver with its once-vaunted Aerospace Forces, attacks rely on obliterating Ukrainian defenses with artillery or glide bombs, or swamping them with large numbers of freed convicts and other "disposable infantry."

The cost has been enormous: an estimated 450,000 Russian casualties and 3,000 tanks destroyed. Moscow's best pre-war units have been decimated, and its best tanks and other equipment wrecked.

"Doctrinally sound attacks can still fail," Boston pointed out. "But a lot of their mistakes were failures to follow doctrinal guidance that is there for good reason. Like, have a guard force out in front so your main body doesn't blunder into combat and become decisively engaged. Don't try to send your entire force down too few roads. Don't leave your support troops unprotected. These were pretty basic things."

Assessing current Russian doctrine is difficult. Much of it is derived from the Soviet era of rigidly controlled mass armies. "The commander directs the fight, is responsible for the main elements of the plan, and generally does not expect initiative or flexibility to nearly the same degree from his subordinates, compared with a good US commander," Boston explained.

Yet military reforms enacted after 2008 were supposed to create smaller and more agile Western-style forces. "When that system failed for them in the initial months after February 2022, they reverted to older, more traditional approaches that eventually included much more emphasis on mass," said Boston, a former US Army artillery officer.

However, the problem may not have been Russian doctrine as much as the overall strategy of the Ukraine war. Soviet plans to invade Western Europe were based on fielding millions of Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops supported by huge stockpiles of weapons and supplies. With an initial assault force of just 180,000 soldiers attacking across a 600-mile-wide front against a smaller but still substantial Ukrainian army, Russia couldn't generate the overwhelming mass that its doctrine counted on. Russian leaders also expected — as did many Western experts — that Ukrainian resistance would collapse and the country would be swiftly occupied. Assault units weren't even briefed about the attack until just before the war began.

"It's not impossible to win battles with an inflexible army, but in order to have a reasonable chance of doing so it helps a lot to have a good plan," Boston said. He pointed to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003: commanders hoped that Iraqi forces wouldn't offer strong resistance, but the invasion plan assumed they might. "It would have been irresponsible for the US military to do otherwise. But Russia's plan was that level of irresponsible. Units were directed to move into Ukraine and seize key locations on aggressive timetables and without meaningful warning or time to plan for things to go wrong. Doctrine and training can only do so much when you're sent to do the wrong thing with the wrong tools for the job."

To be fair, some areas of Russian doctrine have proven quite sound, especially on the defense, where Russia stopped Ukraine's counteroffensive last summer. "There are plenty of aspects to their defense that are entirely consistent with their historical practice and doctrine," Boston said. "And in some cases, they've improved on their doctrine such as by increasing the depth and density of minefields."

One question will tantalize historians for years to come: could Russia have seized Kyiv — and probably won the war — in the first days of the invasion? "This is a tricky counterfactual," said Boston. "If Russia had made more adequate preparations, Ukraine could have noticed and reacted differently. But Russia had some substantial advantages that they squandered with the initial plan and with their slow adaptation over time. If Russia had tried a better plan, things would have gone much worse for Ukraine much more quickly."

Ironically, Boston feels maligning Russian military prowess does a disservice to Ukrainian skill. If the Russian military was that bad, then maybe the Ukrainian military wasn't that good? "We underrate how much damage the Ukrainians did against real Russian military capability if we think that that the Russians were all just terrible," Boston said. "I don't think they were terrible. I think they were terribly wrong-footed by their leadership."

Det som Boston påpekt er helt korrekt hva som gikk galt; og som eksperter har pekt ut i nærmest to år; Den russiske invasjonen endt i en militær katastrofe pga. en virkelighetsfjern sivilledelse som ikke skjønte noe som helst om et brødrefolk i et naboland, og en militærledelse med middelmådige og uansvarlige offiserer med dårlige meritter innenfor ledelses- og stridssegenskaper. Men vi hadde sett i februar-mars at mens invasjonen fra nord var en ekstrem pinlig fadese uten sidestykke i Russlands historie, var den fra sør suverent langt mer suksessfullt fordi den russiske doktrinen var korrekt fulgt sammen med en betydelig satsing av russiske etterretningsorganer som klarte å kompromittere den sivilmilitære ledelsen (som fulgt til arrestasjon og fengsel da dødsstraff vil være foretrukket). 

Det er dessuten et historisk fenomen fra gammelt av om at russerne ikke følge deres manualene om hvordan å føre krig tross betydelig teoretisk innsats og omfattende ressursforbruk, da dette var sett mange ganger siden slutten på 1800-tallet, da Suvorovs taktiske lære basert på bajonettangrepet gjennom manøvrering, konsentrering og sluttet fremstøt måtte erstattes av nye doktriner i møte med den defensive ildkraften.

Da russerne gikk i krig mot tyskerne i 1914 hadde de nylige krigserfaring og dermed utarbeidet en rekke manualer for infanteri, kavaleri og artilleri som hvert for seg var svært avansert og på mange måter langt forut tyskernes egne, men sviktet på to punkter: taktisk initiativ kalt Auftragstaktik med henblikk på størst mulig selvstendighet for mindre feltenheter og strategisk samordning mellom våpengrenene. Det vist seg straks under de innledende stridighetene at selv om russerne var først overlegent, kunne de ikke opprettholde kvaliteten fordi offiserskvaliteten var simpelt for dårlig. Som å gi manualer om hvordan å bygge et skip til amatørbåtbyggere. Dette gjentok seg i 1941; den tyske blitzkrieg aktuelt var forstått av de sovjetiske offiserer helt siden 1920, men Stalin hadde ødelagt offiserskorpset og gitt kommissærene for mye makt. Dette gjentok seg i Afghanistan da man på forveien var innforstått med geriljakrigsdoktrinen, og i Tsjetsjenia da man bare sendt panserkolonner inn i Groznyj. 

Bruk av masse, enkelte taktikk og primitive konsepter der man satser på blod og jern i uhyrlige mengder, var dermed ofte det eneste russerne kunne faller på, og det er bare med det russiske folkets kultur som dyrker fatalismen og militarisert imperialisme med fravær på folkesolidaritet, dette var mulig ved å ha det rette soldatmaterialet. Allerede i 1500-tallet var det sett at de russiske hærførere ofte satset på masse under feltslag selv i møte med underlegne fiendehær, ofte fordi de ikke hadde mye kavaleri og hadde store vansker med å koordinere enhetene. Ennå vet man at det var mange intellektuelle militære med oppfinnsomhet og analytiske evner gjennom århundrene, som gang på gang hadde kunne komme med ubehagelige overraskelser som bevitnet under krigen i dag. De bare har ikke effektiv gjennomslag i et folk med kollektive fatalistiske holdninger ("som skjebnen vil"), ekstrem individualisme og fravær på solidaritetstradisjon på verken religiøse, etniske, språklige eller sosiale kriterier.

Så det som hendt i februar 2022 glir rett inn i den russiske tradisjonen. 

Endret 5. mai 2024 av JK22