Gå til innhold

Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]


Gjest Slettet-404071
Melding lagt til av Runar,

Det er sterkt ønskelig å legge ved kilder til nyhetsartikler, innlegg, bilder og lignende man poster, gjerne i form av en lenke direkte til der informasjonen stammer fra. Innlegg med spesielle påstander uten kilde kan bli slettet uten forvarsel.

Anbefalte innlegg

Videoannonse
Annonse
Skrevet

Er dette noe som ligner på en innrømmelse?

Sitat

Putin la også til:

– Vi ser alle sammen det som foregår i Ukraina. Men hvordan begynte det? Med Ukrainas forsøk på å bli med i EU.

https://www.tv2.no/nyheter/putin-ut-mot-nytt-land-de-har-ikke-mye-a-stille-opp-med/18828800/

 

En slags innrømmelse av at det handlet om frykt for tap av innflytelse i naboland og det han har oppfattet som "russisk sfære", og slett ikke alle de forskjellige, og ofte motstridende, årsakene som har vært listet i årevis.
Litt sånn... naboen søkte grønnere gress hos andre, da blirre krig, se.

  • Liker 1
  • Innsiktsfullt 5
Skrevet

Jeg ville ikke latt Putin styre den prosessen og bruke sine samarbeidspartnere Kina, Tyrkia og Trump til å trekke en linje mellom Ukrainas og Russlands interesser. Det betyr bare at landgrab lønner seg og at Russland får belønning for krigen. Den eneste løsningen er å gi han og apparatet rundt han en rettferdig rettsak i Haag, dømme Russland til erstatninger og et oppgjør med imperialismen. Og selvsagt levere tilbake alt stjålet: land, korn, mineraler, folk etc.

  • Liker 6
  • Innsiktsfullt 3
Skrevet

image.png.f42c03d8ba010a1b0449ff2e0ff83161.png

READ 💬: In the ongoing naval chess match between Moscow and Kyiv, the first week of May 2026 has proven to be one of the most volatile periods of the war. In a span of just forty-eight hours, the Russian Navy celebrated the commissioning of a new high-tech missile ship in the Baltic Sea, only to be met with news that its long-range reach had been challenged in two of the most unexpected locations: the landlocked Caspian Sea and the heavily guarded northern coast of the Baltic. This rapid exchange highlights a new reality where Russia is struggling to expand its fleet while Ukraine successfully strikes targets thousands of kilometers from the front line.
A New Storm in the Baltic 🔻
The Russian Navy’s week began with a display of pageantry. On May 8, 2026, the Baltic Fleet officially welcomed its newest member, the Project 22800 Karakurt-class corvette named Burya (meaning Storm). During a ceremony in the naval base of Baltiysk, the Russian flag was raised over the ship, marking the eighth vessel of its kind to enter service.
The Burya is a compact but lethal platform. Despite its small size, roughly the length of six school buses, it is built specifically to carry the Kalibr cruise missile. These missiles are the backbone of Russia’s long-range strike capability, able to hit targets deep inside Ukraine from hundreds of miles away. By adding the Burya to its Baltic Fleet, Russia is attempting to maintain a persistent missile threat in Northern Europe, even as it faces industrial bottlenecks that have delayed other ships in the same class.
The Long-Range Reach of the FP-1 🔻
However, the celebration in Baltiysk was overshadowed by events that took place just twenty-four hours earlier. On May 7, Ukrainian military officials confirmed that they had successfully struck a sister ship of the Burya located at the Kaspiysk naval base in the Republic of Dagestan.
What makes this strike historic is the location. Kaspiysk sits on the western shore of the Caspian Sea, more than 1,500 kilometers away from Ukrainian-held territory. The strike was reportedly carried out using new FP-1 long-range drones, which are designed to fly low and slow to avoid radar. For the first time in the war, Ukraine demonstrated that the Russian "Caspian Flotilla," a force that has frequently launched Kalibr missiles at Ukrainian cities, is no longer safe in its home port. By damaging a Karakurt-class corvette deep inside Russian territory, Ukraine has forced naval planners to rethink how they protect their most valuable missile carriers.
Double Blow: From the Caspian to the Baltic 🔻
The pressure on the Russian Navy did not stop in the south. Just days before the Burya was commissioned, another Karakurt-class corvette was reportedly targeted in the Baltic Sea. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy confirmed a successful drone attack on a missile ship docked at the port of Primorsk, near Saint Petersburg.
This second strike in the north creates a "pincer" effect on Russian naval logistics. While Russia is working hard to produce new ships like the Burya to fill its ranks, Ukraine is successfully damaging existing hulls in the very shipyards and bases where they are built and maintained. The strike in Primorsk, combined with the attack in the Caspian, shows that Ukraine has developed a truly global reach, capable of threatening Russian naval assets regardless of which sea they call home.
The Industrial Bottleneck 🔻
While Russia celebrated the delivery of the Burya, the program itself is facing significant hurdles. Most of the Karakurt-class ships have been delayed for years due to problems with their high-speed diesel engines. Because of international sanctions, Russia has struggled to produce enough propulsion systems to keep up with its shipbuilding schedule.
This means that every ship Ukraine damages becomes a major problem for Moscow. Repairing a missile corvette in 2026 is a slow and difficult process, and with new hulls sitting at the docks waiting for engines, the Russian Navy cannot easily replace its losses. For every "Storm" that Russia adds to its fleet, it seems that Ukraine is finding a way to create a lightning strike that keeps the balance of power in flux.
Russia’s commissioning of the new Kalibr-capable corvette Burya in the Baltic was immediately countered by Ukrainian long-range drone strikes that successfully targeted sister ships in both the Caspian and Baltic Seas, signaling a new era of vulnerability for the Russian Navy's most important missile platforms.

  • Liker 3
  • Hjerte 3
Skrevet

Bare et kjapt spørsmål: Hvis Ukraina klarer å smugle inn f.eks droner over grensa til Russland. Er det da fritt frem for å frakte de rundt i landet eller er det massevis av kontrollposter med gjennomgang av bagasje og gods? Hvis det er fritt frem så burde jo det være en enklere vei til den røde plass enn via lufta, og forsåvidt også til viktige mål nærmere Stillehavskysten.

  • Innsiktsfullt 1
Skrevet
Simen1 skrev (1 minutt siden):

Bare et kjapt spørsmål: Hvis Ukraina klarer å smugle inn f.eks droner over grensa til Russland. Er det da fritt frem for å frakte de rundt i landet eller er det massevis av kontrollposter med gjennomgang av bagasje og gods? Hvis det er fritt frem så burde jo det være en enklere vei til den røde plass enn via lufta, og forsåvidt også til viktige mål nærmere Stillehavskysten.

Jeg gjetter på at det forrige angrepet der de sendte av gårde droner fra kontainere og lastebiler var et slikt angrep, og at det ble gjort mulig ved å utnytte den gjennomgående korrupsjonen som finnes i Russland. Altså at man kjøpte seg fritt leide gjennom de kontrollpostene man eventuelt møtte på veien.
Og om jeg har rett så viser det at Russland på ingen måte er trygt noe sted. Ukraina kan kjøpe seg vei gjennom Russland med dronelaster og annet og på den måten slå til der de selv ønsker.

  • Liker 5
Skrevet

image.png.7bdcb30aced0f9d2e9ba599c23aadf4d.png

Putin is losing his war... which is why he is so dangerous.
As I shared yesterday, more than 30,000 Russian soldiers are being killed in Ukraine every month. According to the Institute for the Study of War, this has resulted in a stunning net loss for Russian forces of 116 square kilometers over the past month.
Last month I shared a video in which I explained the primary cause of this change in fortune for Ukraine, that being the strategic investment from European manufacturers in existing Ukrainian drone developers. As I suggested in that video, this has the potential to make Europe, in cooperation with Ukraine, a genuine military superpower.
Meanwhile, within Russia, Putin has effectively blocked access to the internet for most Russians, beyond a short list of government approved websites; a clear indication that the Kremlin is looking to make it more difficult for the collective grievances of the Russian people to coagulate into a political movement
Yet, despite this overwhelming evidence of weakness, almost every day I read reports from European intelligence agencies warning that a Russian attack on NATO in imminent. To many people, these two notions are inconsistent. If Russia is too weak to defeat Ukraine, then why would it open a new front against all of NATO?
What this question fails to consider is what Putin would be attempting to achieve by attacking NATO now. The fear isn't that Putin will attack Europe because he thinks Russia is strong enough to take on NATO, it's that he will attack Europe because he realises that he cannot defeat Ukraine while Europe is helping them.
Not unlike his orange proxy, Putin has cornered himself. His entire mythology is centred on the illusion of masterful control and strategic brilliance that he propagates to the world. A retreat could genuinely be fatal for him, both politically and literally. Yet, despite condemning almost half a million of his subjects to die in his place, it is becoming more and more obvious that throwing more and more expendable patriots at the Ukrainian lines isn't going to break them.
So, he has two options to break the stalemate; agree to ceasefire terms with an increasingly confident Ukraine, or escalate.
Last month, the Russian Ministry of Defence published the addresses of companies and facilities across Europe allegedly involved in drone production for Ukraine. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev then declared that the information "should be perceived as a list of potential targets for the Russian Armed Forces."
To be clear, it's not the first time Russia, and Medvedev in particular, have made threats like this. But if Putin wanted to change the course of this war, conducting a strike against one of the 11 facilities named across the UK, Germany, Poland, Italy, and Spain, would be a gamble that might just pay off.
The urgency is fueled by a reality that Putin might feel that he has a small window of opportunity to work with. Trump is making fairly clear signals that he will not intervene to defend European countries if Russia attacks, but his power to make that call won't last forever (at least it shouldn't). Meanwhile, ukraines new found drone superiority could soon become unassailable.
Putin may feel that launching attacks against European facilities or infrastructure that directly support the Ukrainian war effort will do two things.
Firstly, it will bring the war to the European people and hopefully cause public fear of escalation that would likely result in domestic political pressure to step back and leave Ukraine to its fate. A sentiment its information warfare machine will no doubt help along.
But perhaps most importantly, strikes of this nature could carry sufficient plausible justification to allow Trump to adopt the Kremlin narrative. It is entirely conceivable that instead of responding to a clear Article 5 trigger under the NATO Treaty, Trump could take Russia's side and present himself as a peace maker.
The gamble relies on the idea that Europe will lack the unity, coordination, and collective will, to respond militarily to Russian airstrikes without US support. 
How likely will British Citizens be too support war with Russia because they blew up a factory in Poland?
Will French Citizens support a military campaign that would see Russian iCBM's falling on Paris, just because a warehouse got blown up in Spain?
These are the questions that Putin feels confident he knows the answer to. He believes he can shatter the myth of NATO collective security and send a signal to every European nation on its border that they are on their own.
If that happens, he won't just be able to isolate Ukraine and cut off their lifeline to Europe, but he can isolate the Baltic States, Moldova, maybe even Romania.
In its simplest form, it would be a move intended to force Europe to abandon Ukraine and reveal what he believes to be a soft underbelly of Western character that will avoid confrontation at all costs.
For Europe, the reasonable fear of escalation must serve to recognise the effectiveness of the current course. If they maintain a strong defensive posture and have consensus on a unified, proportional, and immediate response to any Russian attack then Putin's gambit will fail.
But that is a hugely consequential "if". Se mindre

  • Innsiktsfullt 4

Opprett en konto eller logg inn for å kommentere

Du må være et medlem for å kunne skrive en kommentar

Opprett konto

Det er enkelt å melde seg inn for å starte en ny konto!

Start en konto

Logg inn

Har du allerede en konto? Logg inn her.

Logg inn nå
  • Hvem er aktive   1 medlem

×
×
  • Opprett ny...